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ABSTRACT. 
Combating terrorism in Africa seems to be a mission impossible despite numerous anti-
terrorism Laws in existence. Africa has a union, known as African Union (AU), 
comprising of all independent States in Africa, except Morocco. This AU has a well 
known anti-terrorism Law known as 'OAU Convention on Preventing and Combating 
Terrorism, 1999 and other national anti-terrorism laws in existence in its Member States 
nations. 
Despite all these anti-terrorism laws, including Plan of Actions for the Prevention and 
Combating of Terrorism, Protocol to the OAU Convention on the Prevention and 
Combating of Terrorism in existence, terrorist acts are on the increase daily in the 
continent. 
This dissertation reviews the said OAU (AU) Conventions on Preventing and Combating 
Terrorism, identifies its deficiencies and analyses its inefficacies in preventing and 
combating terrorism in Africa. It also discusses the Member States' response to the 
Convention. 
The dissertation, therefore, argues that terrorism will be better combated on regional level 
than leaving it on the hands of individual Member States; and recommends that AU 
should establish a regional court vested with the jurisdiction of terrorism, for an effective 




Terrorism is the world's greatest 'nightmare', yet, effectiveness of combating it is 
still unattained. Generally, nearly all nations are, or have been affected by terrorism 
in one way or another. 
Combating terrorism has become a critical issue of major concern to both 
international and domestic laws. Much has been said and scholarly written about 
legal provisions on terrorism, such as, treaties, conventions, protocols and 
resolutions, but less discourse on the effectiveness of those legal provisions in 
combating terrorism. 
There are many legal status of universal International instruments relating to the 
combating and suppression of terrorism such as, the 1996 Convention on Offences 
and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft (Aircraft Convention), 1970 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (Unlawful Seizure 
Convention), 1971 Civil aviation Convention, 1973 Diplomatic agents Convention, 
1980 Nuclear Materials Convention, 1988 Airport Protocol, 1997 Terrorist 
Bombing Convention, 1999 Terrorist Financing Convention, 2005 Nuclear 
terrorism Convention, etcetera. 
1 
No doubt, there are also several regional and sub regional legislations on terrorism, 
such as, OAS Convention to Prevent and Punish acts of Terrorism Taking the form 
of Crimes against Persons and Related Extortion, that are of International 
Significance, 1971, European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, 1977, 
SAARC regional Convention on Suppression ofT errorism, 1987, Arab Convention 
on the Suppression of Terrorism, 1998, Convention on the Islamic Conference on 
Combating International terrorism, 1999, Organization of African Unity(OAU) 
Convention on the prevention and Combating terrorism, 1999 and so on. 
The issue is, are the Member States to these legal provisions in compliance with the 
requirements of international law (United Nations) in combating and preventing 
terrorism? 
The United Nation's (UN) 1 Charter, which is at the top of the hierarchy of 
international law; enshrined m Art.l03 2, obligations, rights and duties of all 
members of the United Nations. 
Chapter I, Art.2 (2) of the Charter provides thus; 
"All members, in order to ensure to all of them the 
rights and benefits resulting from membership, 
shallfuljill in goodfaith the obligations assumed 
by them in accordance with the present Charter "3 
1 The UN is an international organization which came into being with the entry into force of the UN 
Charter, a multilateral treaty, which forms a kind of constitution for the union, on October 24, 1946. The 
UN currently has 193 Member States 
2 Charter of the UN 
3 !d. at Art.2(2) 
2 
Also, Art. 2 (4) ofthe same Charter, provides that; 
"All members shall refrain in their international 
relations from the threat or use of force against 
territorial integrity or political independence of 
any state, or in any other manner inconsistent 
with the purpose of the United Nations "4 
The same charter also provides for obedience and compliance to decisions of the 
Security Council by its members: 
"The members of the United Nations agree to accept 
and carry out the decisions of the Security 
Council in accordance with the present Charter. "5 
Further, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)6 had made many resolutions 
in combating of terrorism which must be complied with by all lJN Member States. 
For instance, Security Council resolution, 13 73 (200 1 ), which was adopted in 
response to the 9/11, 2001 terrorist attack, requires all United Nations Member 
States, to take necessary steps to prevent the commission of terrorist acts, to 
criminalize assistance to terrorist activities, deny financial support and safe haven to 
terrorists, and to afford one another the greatest measure of assistance in connection 
with criminal investigation and criminal proceedings. 7 
Also, Security Council Resolution 1456, 2003 provides: 
"States must ensure that any measure taken to combat 
4 Jd. at Art.2(4) 
5 ld. at Chap. V, Art.25. 
6 The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is one of the major organs of the UN, set up by the UN in 
its Charter. It consists of 15 members, five permanent members and ten non pem1anent members, which 
are to be elected for two years term. Its' functions and powers are enshrined in Chapter V of the Charter 
of UN. The permanent members are republic of China, France, Russia federation, United Kingdom and 
United States of America. 
7 See Security Council Resolution 1373, 2001. 
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terrorism comply with all the obligations under 
International law, and should adopt such measures in 
accordance with international law, in particular 
international human rights, refugee and humanitarian law. " 
Are these legal provisions theoretically applicable? If so, to what extent are the 
Member States to the legal provisions complying with provisions enshrined therein? 
How have these legal provisions helped to combat terrorism in this present time? Or 
are there loopholes in these legal documents that urgently need to be amended for 
more effective results in combating terrorism? These are some of the questions this 
dissertation sets forth to unfold. 
Such resolutions, though, maybe difficult to comply with in combating terrorism, 
nevertheless, are expected to be complied with by Member States. More often than 
none, especially in the recent time, global issue of concern is on terrorism and 
continual havoc being committed by terrorists. Terrorist activities are on the 
increase day by day, and it is becoming obvious that how to fight it is not yet 
legally effective, hence the increase in their incessant activities, daily. 
There are certain possibilities that could be militating against effectiveness of 
combating terrorism. It may be as a result of ineffectiveness of applicable laws or 
that the procedure enshrined in the legal document for combating terrorism cannot 
be achieved because of certain circumstances beyond the control of the state or 
states, such as poverty, security laxity, corruption, to mention but a few. 
4 
The Charter of the United Nations and Resolutions of the General Assembly urges 
Member States to make National Laws to combat and suppress terrorism. How 
possible will this be, especially with the low economic level of some African 
countries and other third world countries that are still developing? Lack of modem 
technology and facilities are in those countries. More so, International Law requires 
a State to carry out its international obligation but neither prescribes nor concerned 
about how the state will do that. 
Another factor that affects the effectiveness of combating terrorism is culture 
diversity and religious differences, especially in the same country. Some people try 
to justify terrorist acts by claiming that it is their right to religion, (which is one of 
the fundamental human rights) that they are asserting. In other words, what may be 
regarded as terrorism in one country or part of a country may actually be normal 
and legal in another. As rightly put by D' Amato 'one man's terrorist is another 
man's freedom fighter.' 
But basic questions are: Is terrorism actually justifiable? If no, how can social 
stability be achieved in a diverse culture and religion? Does attainment of such 
social stability require certain universal legal provision to achieve it? 
On these hypothetical questions will this dissertation anchor its central thesis, which 
is: 'a case for removal of combating terrorism from national level to regional level 
for effectiveness of combating terrorism'. 
5 
As mentioned before, some of the reasons behind the central thesis are level of 
corruption, poverty, lack of resources especially in developing states and more so 
for avoidance of conflict between combating terrorism and Humanitarian and 
Human Rights law. Unfortunately, those developing States happen to be the ones 
that are greatly affected by terrorist acts. 
It is paramount therefore, that the concept of terrorism should be understood 
because one of the major reasons affecting inefficiency in combating terrorism is 
lack of universal acceptable definition of the term 'terrorism'. At the International 
level, attempts to define terrorism have fallen short of its purpose. Either that some 
crucial elements are lacking in the definition or that the scope of the definition is 
not comprehensive enough to cover all areas of terrorist acts. 
Terrorism should also be differentiated from insurgency, despite the fact that at 
times the two concepts are at play at the same time. In combating, under 
insurgency, regards to human rights and humanitarian law are so essential and 
should not be infringed upon, unlike in combating terrorism. 
Further, human rights and humanitarian law can also be better adhered to, if the 
case advocating in this dissertation will be followed effectively. Perpetrators of the 
act will be captured and tried accordingly by the universal law, in a universal court, 
acceptable by its Member States. 
6 
"Universal Court" means, in the context of this dissertation, "Regional Court or 
International Court for all or some Member States of a particular Region or Union". 
Limitation to the definition of universal court is due to the fact that discourse on the 
effectiveness of combating terrorism all over the world will be beyond the scope of 
this paper, so also will discussing each of the Conventions and Protocols 
enumerated above. Therefore this dissertation is limited to some parts of Africa. 
There are much terrorist acts going on in Africa, such as different Islamic extremist 
radical groups and some countries are known or rather accused of harbouring 
terrorists. 
Although there are Conventions on combating of terrorism that are of African 
Origins; how effective are these conventions in combating terrorism? Or are they 
just enacted for compliance with the United Nations requirements? What is the 
originality of these conventions and how have they helped to advance mechanisms 
of combating terrorism in Africa? Hence, the reason for the topic of this 
dissertation: A Re-Assessment of the Effectiveness of the OAU (AU) Conventions 
on Preventing and Combating Terrorism. 
Africa is the second largest continent in the world and also the second continent 
with highest population after Asia. It contains fifty four countries and Western 
Sahara. It also contains the world's longest Nile River system and the world's 
7 
largest massive Sahara Desert. Africa is bounded by the Mediterranean sea· to the 
North, both the Suez Canal and the red Sea along the Sinai peninsula to the 
Northeast, the Indian Ocean to the south east and the Atlantic Ocean to the west.8 
As mentioned in the beginning, combating terrorism in Africa had never been a 
much debated topic, maybe, because of the developing nature of the countries in 
Africa. In this dissertation, focus shall be made on comparing and analyzing the 
Organization of African Unity (OAU) Convention on Preventing and Combating 
Terrorism, 1999 (known as OAU Algiers Convention, 1999), with Arab 
Convention for Suppressing Terrorism, 1998 and Convention of the Organization of 
Islamic Conference (OIC) on Combating of Terrorism, 1999 because of their 
African Origins. 
Further, researching on the whole of African countries will be too enormous for this 
dissertation, thus the discourse shall be limited to Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan 
and Nigeria; some of the African countries (in my opinion), that has been focused 
as African countries with high rate of terrorist activities, especially Islamic 
extremists terrorist activities. 
African States have a Union known as African Union (formerly known as OAU) 
that unites all Africans. One of their major objectives among others is to "achieve 
greater Unity and Solidarity for African countries and the peoples."9 The Union is 
8 See Map of Africa; at http/www.worldatlas.com/webimage/countrys/af.htm. 
9 Art.3 (a) of the African Union Constitutive Act, 2000. 
8 
also a member of the United Nations. They have many Conventions, Protocols and 
Treaties in force, but the one under review in this dissertation is the OAU Algiers 
Convention, 1999. 
1.1. A BRIEF HISTORY OF ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY 
(OAU), NOW AFRICAN UNION (AU). 
The origin of OAU, can be traced back to late 19th century during the colonization 
of African continent. The self-centeredness of the colonial masters in the 19th 
century before the end of second world war, which is called 'the scramble of 
Africa', and the imposition of their own systems of law on African societies, which 
were brutal and denial of African's basic human rights was what led to the demands 
for independence and "uhuru" or freedom from colonial masters at the end of 
second world war. 10 In addition, the influence of the spread of socialism and the 
cold war rivalry led to the rapid political de-colonization of Africa. 11 
Based on the grounds supra and fight against apartheid, the leaders of the then 
independent African Countries established the OAU. OAU came into existence on 
May 25, 1963 in Addis Ababa by the signing of the OAU Charter by 32 
governments' representatives. Another 21 States have joined gradually with South 




Africa being the 53rd member on May 1994. 12 Morocco remains the only African 
Country that is not a member of the OAU. 
Article I of the OAU Charter states thus, 
"The High Contracting Parties do by the present 
Charter establish an Organization to be 
known as the ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY" 
The first premier president of the Union is Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, the then president 
of Ghana. This is why May, 25 is celebrated as African Unity day. 
1.1.1. STATED OBJECTIVES AND UNDERLYING PURPOSE OF THE 
OAU CONVENTION ON PREVENTING AND COMBATING 
TERRORISM: 
The OAU'S Charter objectives are to promote the unity and solidarity of African 
States, co-ordinate and intensify their co-operation and efforts to achieve a better 
life for the people of Africa, defend their sovereignty, territorial integrity and 
independence, eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa, promote international 
co-operation, giving due regard to the Charter of United Nations and the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights; and co-ordinate and harmonize members' political, 
diplomatic, economic, educational, cultural, health, welfare, scientific, technical and 
defence policies. 13 
12 Organization of African Unity (OAU) /African Union (AU) 
http/www .dfa.gov .zalforeign/Multilateral/ A frica!oau. htm. 
13 Art.ii of the Charter of Organization of Africa 
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The principles of the Charter are the sovereign of equality of all Member States, 
non-interference in the internal affairs of States, respect for the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of each State and for its inalienable right to independent 
existence, peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation or 
arbitration, unreserved condemnation, in all its forms, of political assassination as 
well as of subversive activities on the part of neighbouring States or any other 
States, absolute dedication to the total emancipation of the African territories which 
are still dependent, and affirmation of a policy of non-alignment with regards to all 
blocs. 14 
The Charter also provides among others in its Articles, Membership, Rights and 
duties of Member States, Institutions, the Assembly of heads of State and 
Government, the Council of Ministers, General Secretariat and so on. 
There is also the Abuja treaty establishing the African Economic Community 
(AEC) in May, 1994, which made OAU to operate under the basis of two legal 
instruments. For this reason the OAU was officially referred to as OAU/ AEC. 15 
The need for the amendment of the OAU Charter to meet the challenges of the 
twenty first century gave birth to African Union (AU). AU was established in an 
Extraordinary Summit of the OAU held in Sirte, Libya on September 9, 1999, with 
the ultimate objectives of the OAU Charter and the provisions of the Treaty 
14 Art. iii of the Charter of Organization of Africa. 
15 Supra note 3. 
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establishing the African Economic Community. The Constitutive Act of the African 
Union was adopted on July, 111h, 2000 during the Lome Summit. 16AU merged 
OAU and AEC into one unified institution. 
The AU was created to take up the multifaceted challenges confronting the African 
continent and peoples "in the light of social, economic and political changes taking 
place in the world. 17 The AU objectives are somehow different and more 
comprehensive than the one contained in OAU. They are as follows: 
16 !d. 
"(a) achieve greater unity and solidarity between 
the African Countries and the peoples of Africa; 
(b) defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and 
independence of its Member States; 
(c) accelerate the political and socio-economic 
integration of the continent; 
(d) promote and defend African common positions on 
issues of interest to the continent and its peoples; 
(e) encourage international cooperation, taking due 
account of the Charter of the United Nations and the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights; 
(f) promote peace, security, and stability on the 
continent; 
(g) promote democratic principles and institutions, 
popular participation and good governance; 
(h) promote and protect human and peoples' rights in 
accordance with the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples' Rights and other relevant human rights 
instruments; 
(i) establish the necessary conditions which enable the 
continent to play its rightful role in the global economy 
and in international negotiations; 
(j) promote sustainable development at the economic, 
social and cultural levels as well as the integration of 
African economies; 
(j) promote co-operation in all fields of human activity 
to raise the living standards of African peoples 
17 Nsongurua J. Udombana., The institutional structure of the Africa Union: A Legal Analysis. 33 
CA WILJ 69 at 2. 
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(k) coordinate and harmonize the policies between the 
existing and future Regional Economic Communities 
for the gradual attainment of the objectives of the Union 
(l) advance the development of the continent by promoting 
research in all fields, in particular in science and 
technology; 
(m) work with relevant international partners in the 
eradication of preventable diseases and the promotion 
of good health on the continent. "18 
The AU provided for a smooth transitional period from OAU/AEC by the Act 
entering into force thirty days after two-third of the fifty three Member States have 
ratified it. Also the OAU charter shall remain operative for a transitional period of 
one year or such further period as may be determined by the Assembly, for the 
purpose of enabling the OAU/ AEC undertake the necessary measures regarding the 
devolution of its assets and liabilities to the African Union and all matters relating 
thereto. 19 
The African Union built on the successes of the OAU, which, since its inception, 
has developed into political and economic fulcrum of Africa. 20 The AU entered into 
force on May 26, 2001, less than one year after its adoption. The OAU was 
formerly dissolved on July 9, 2002, during the last session of the OAU Assembly in 
Durban, South Africa.21 The AU was also launched the same period at the same 
session. With the launching of the AU, the OAU ceased to be an umbrella 
international organization for collective Africa. 22 
18 The Constitutive Act of African Union, 2000, supra note 9. 
19 Supra note 3. 
20 ld. 
21 Nsongurua J. Udombana., supra note 17. 
221d. 
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The present leaders are dedicated to the principles ofthe OAU and "to the ideals of 
freedom, unity and development which the founding leaders sought to achieve in 
establishing the organization".23 Therefore, the AU takes over the rights, powers 
and obligations of the OAU as its successor. 
The AU Constitutive Act has thirty three (33) articles, besides its preamble. Article 
2 establishes the Union, while Articles 27 and 28 provides for signature, 
ratification, accession and entry into force?4 
1.1.2. MEMBERS OF OAU (Now AU). 
By Article IV of the OAU Charter, 1963, each independent sovereign African State 
shall be entitled to become a member of the organization. The members of AU, 
therefore, include all African independent Countries except Morocco. There are 
actually fifty four(54) countries that are members, namely: Algeria, Angola, Benin, 
Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central Africa republic, Cape Verde, 
Chad, Cote d' }voire, Comoros, Congo, Djibouti, Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-
Bissau, Guinea, Kenya, Libya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Mali, Malawi, 
Mozambique, Mauritania, Mauritius, Namibia, Nigeria, Niger, Rwanda, South 
Africa, Sahrawi Arab Democratic republic, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, 
Somalia, Sao Tome & Principe, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, 
23 Id. 
24 Supra note 18. 
14 
I 
Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe and South Sudan recently joined in July, 2011, three 
weeks after it attained its independence. Morocco resigned from OAU membership 
because the Union recognizes the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, which is a 
portion of Western Sahara.25 
The headquarters of AU is in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The Union's official 
languages are English, French, Arabic and Portuguese; nevertheless, many 
documents are printed in Swahili and other local languages. 
The OAU in 1999 adopted the Convention on the Prevention and Combating of 
Terrorism, known as the Algiers Convention, which entered into force on 6 
December, 2002. As of today, 49 states out of 54 Member States had signed it, 
while 40 had ratified it. Cape Verde, Malawi, Mauritius and Zimbabwe are the 
countries that are yet to sign it, while Botswana, Cameroon, Central Africa Rep., 
Cote d' Ivore, Democratic Rep. of Congo, Liberia, Namibia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, 
Sao Tome & Principe, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe had not ratified it. 
1.1.3. CHARTER OF OAU PRINCIPLES AND PURPOSES, 1963. 
The Algiers Convention stemmed from the purposes and principles enshrined in the 
Charter of the Organization of African Unity, particularly, its clauses relating to 
security, stability, development of friendly relations and cooperation among its 
25 Katherin Schulz Richard, Africa Union: organization of 54 African Countries forms African Union. 
http://georgraphy.about.com/od/africamaps/a!african-union.htm 
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Member States and the provisions of the declaration on the Code of Conduct for 
Inter-African Relations. It refers to the need to promote human values based on 
tolerance and rejects all forms of terrorism irrespective of their motivations.26 
The AU Constitutive Act, which succeeded OAU Charter as discussed supra, also 
enshrined in its Art. 4, among its other principles, "respect for the sanctity of life, 
condemnation and rejection of impunity and political assassination, acts of 
terrorism and subversive activities"?7 
The AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) is mandated to request all Member 
States to report annually on the steps they had taken to prevent and combat 
terrorism, and specifically to implement the Algiers Convention. Additionally, the 
solemn Declaration on the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Co-
operation in Africa (CSSDCAl8 adopted by the Lome Summit in July 2000, refers 
to terrorism under the principle of stability and declared "terrorism, in all its 
manifestations, is inimical to stability"29 
In the Plan of action, meant to translate into concrete actions for the principles 
governing the CSSDCA process, the Member States agreed, on the necessity to 
"exchange information and co-operation, at the 
sub-regional level, on security matters, especially 
on issues relating to terrorism "30 
26 See the preamble ofthe OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating ofTerrorism, 1999. 
27 Art. 3 (a) of the African Union Constitutive Act, 2000, supra note 9. 
28 AHG/Decl.4 (XXXVI). CSSDCA Solemn Declaration. 
29 ld., at par.ll (e). 
30 ld.,atpar.14(d)) 
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Pursuant to the decision adopted by the 72nd Ordinary Session of the Council of 
Ministers, held in July 2000, in Lome, Togo,31 the OAU convened an experts 
Meeting to consider a Draft Convention on Mutual Legal Assistance in criminal 
matters, in Addis Ababa, from April 2 to 5, 2001.32 
AU has also established an African Centre for Study and Research on Terrorism 
(ACSRT) in Algiers, Algeria, as an institution of the AU Commission. It was 
established as enshrined in Section H, Par.19-21 of the Plan of Action of African 
Union High-Level Inter-Governmental Meeting on the Prevention and Combating 
of Terrorism in Africa, on September 11 to14, 2002. Its' functions are set out in 
Section F, Par. 16(a-d) of the same Plan of Action. Some of the functions includes, 
evaluating terrorist threat in Africa, promoting Intra-African co-operation against 
terrorism, training measures for combating terrorism, conducting studies, setting up 
data basis for gathering and exchanging information, monitoring and analyzing 
information relating to terrorism and assisting in implementation of International 
Conventions relating to terrorism. 
1.2. DECLARATION OF THE CODE OF CONDUCT FOR INTER-
AFRICAN RELATIONS PROVISION, 1994. 
Africa's commitment in combating terrorism can be traced back as far as July 1992, 
when the OAU, during its 28th Ordinary Session, held in Dakar, Senegal, adopted 
31 CM/Dec.540(LXXII) Rev.l 
32 African commitments to combating organized crime and terrorism., at 59. 
www.iss.co.za/pub/other/ahsi/Goredema-Botha1pt2chap7.pdf 
17 
resolution AHG/Res.213 (XXVIII), aimed at enhancing cooperation and 
coordination of efforts among Member States with the zeal to fight extremism.33 
In June, 1994, at is 30th ordinary Session, held in Tunis, Tunisia, the OAU Summit 
adopted declaration AHG/Dec1.2 (XXX) on the code of conduct for Inter-African 
Relations, which categorically rejected fanaticism and extremism or the use of 
religion to commit acts of violence, including tenorist acts. Nevertheless, the code 
of conduct recognises that the freedom of religious belief and its peaceful 
expression are a fundamental right of all human beings as enshrined in the 
Universal Declaration of Human rights and also recognises the threats posed by 
movements based on religious, political and tribal extremism?4 They want Africa to 
be a source of peace, open to dialogue, co-operation and exchange with the rest of 
the world, and committed to the search for common responses to future 
challenges.35 
1.3. PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ON TERRORISM: 
MEASURES TO ELIMINATE INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM. 
Despite the fact that there is no universal acceptable of definition of tenorism in 
international level, however, United Nations adopted what can best be described as 
'sectorial approach' and held several general meetings on eliminating international 
33 Preventing and Combating Terrorism; March 14,2012. http://www.peaceau.org/en/pages/dsd-counter-
terrorism 
34 See preamble of Declaration of a Code of Conduct for Inter-African relations, Assembly of Heads of 
State and Government, Thirtieth Ordinary Session, Tunis, Tunisia, 13-15 June 1994. 
Js Id. 
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tenorism; such as Resolution 49/60 of the General Assembly, 1994, Resolution 
51/210 ofthe General Assembly, 1996 and Resolution 52/164. 
Resolution 49/60: The 84th Preliminary meeting of the UN's General Assembly, 
held on 9th December, 1994, known as 'Resolution 49/60', recalled its resolutions of 
45/51 of 1991 and 48/411 of 1993, of depth consideration of question on measures 
to eliminate international tenorism. The assembly was convinced that the adoption 
of the declaration on measures to eliminate tenorism should contribute immensely 
to combating international tenorism.36 They, therefore, approved the Resolution 
49/60, Declarations on measures to Eliminate International Tenorism, as guided by 
the purpose and principles of the UN' s Charter. In its annex, it affirms its resolution 
to eliminate international tenorism and other related offences. 37 The Resolution 
further stipulates that all States must take appropriate measures in accordance with 
the relevant provisions of international law and international standards of human 
rights to ensure the apprehension and prosecution or extradition of perpetrators of 
tenorist acts in accordance with the relevant provisions of their nationallaw.38 
Resolution 51/210: Further, the UN in its 88th plenary meeting on 171h December, 
1996, known as Resolution 511210, which is a supplement to Resolution 49/60, 
recalls the said Resolution 49/60 and states that they are disturbed by the 
persistence of tenorist acts?9 At the meeting, the General Assembly, also recalls 
36 See United Nation's A/RES/49/60. Measures to eliminate international terrorism 
37 !d. at its annex. 
38 Supra note 34 at par.5(a-f). 
39 See A/Res/51/21 0. Measures to eliminate international terrorism, 1996. 
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that in the 84th plenary meeting, that States were encouraged to review urgently the 
scope of existing international legal provisions on the prevention, repression and 
elimination of terrorism in all its forms. 40 
The General Assembly categorically condemns all acts, methods and practices of 
terrorism as criminal and unjustifiable, wherever and by whomever committed.41 
They also encouraged States to exchange verified information on facts related to 
terrorism.42 States were urged to become parties to Conventions on terrorism and 
other related offences if they have not done so and also re-emphasis on the need for 
States to enact appropriate domestic legislation necessary to implement the 
provisions of those Conventions and protocols, to ensure that the jurisdiction of 
their courts enables them to bring to trial the perpetrators of terrorist acts and to 
provide support and assistance to other governments for those purpose. 43 
But, the perturbing question remains; how will this common goal of eliminating 
international terrorism be achieved in different States with different national laws 
and legislations, without infringing on principles of international human rights? 
Can terrorism be justifiable? How can one actually claim that terrorist act is part of 
the person's religion? Is this a sort of fanatic blasphemy (although it sounds 
philosophical), or are they actually the reality of such religion? In discussing these 
40 !d. 
41 Id at I of part I. 
42 I d. at 4 of part I. 
43 I d. at 6 of part I. 
20 
questions, some terrorist incidents that had taken place in some parts of African 
States under review, shall be considered in Chapter two of this dissertation. 
It is becoming more glaring, from the above discussions, that most of these national 
legislations (discussed supra) are in conflict with the UN requirements for 
combating terrorism. How then, is the best way to counter terrorism without 
infringing on human rights in Africa? 
Chapter two of this dissertation, centres on the scope of terrorism, its' effects to the 
stability, economic and security of the States. To be able to properly introduce the 
concept of terrorism, the chapter starts by differentiating between Terrorism, 
Insurgency and Armed conflict. Then proceed to evaluate justifications some 
people claim for being terrorists and actually deduce if there is any reasonability in 
such assertions (though, already mentioned briefly in this present chapter) and the 
motives or objectives behind the activities ofthe terrorists. 
Further, the same chapter two evaluates terrorism and violation of human rights, for 
the purpose of finding the balance between terrorism and human rights. This 
discourse is approached from two different perspectives; firstly, from the terrorist 
angle; whether the person's act is actually right? If the person has a right to claim 
justification under human rights law violation, bearing in mind the equitable maxim 
of 'whoever that comes into equity must come with clean hands', on the other side, 
from the legal point of view on the side of the terrorist combatants and the legal 
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provisiOns on terrorism. The outcome of the evaluation determines if the legal 
provisions are in conflict with human rights and humanitarian law? Do they have to 
prioritize Human Rights law over combating terrorism effectively? 
This leads to the next stage of discussion, though under the same chapter, the 
impact of war on terror on African States. How terrorism has affected the security, 
economic status of African States, and even their international relations with other 
countries. That is, an analysis on the scope of terrorism in African States. 
Chapter three is on a legal analysis on the existing OAU Convention on Preventing 
and Combating of Terrorism, 1999 (Algiers Convention), which seems to be the 
main convention for AU in combating terrorism. Firstly, critical analyses of 
definition of terrorism under the Convention are discussed, to determine its scope of 
coverage. Its sectional analyzes, such as the roles and jurisdiction of Member States 
on terrorist Acts, extradition of terrorists, extra-territorial investigations 
(Commission Regoire) and mutual assistance and the reservation provision is made. 
Also discussion on the Convention is made in order to actually ascertain if the 
convention is in compliance with the UN requirement for combating terrorism. 
Further, under the same chapter, the enforcement of the Convention and the 
Member States ratification of the Conventions; and then, the effects of the existing 
convention on the Member States, are also evaluated in order to ascertain if they 
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(Member States) had complied or are yet to comply with the requirements of the 
OAU Convention. 
Chapter four focuses on a comparative analysis of the OAU Algiers Convention, 
1999 with two other Conventions that have some African origin: Arab Convention 
for the Suppression of Terrorism, 1998 and Convention of the Organization of 
Islamic Conference (OIC) on Combating International Terrorism, 1999. Most 
Members States to the two Conventions are Africans. From the comparative 
analysis, the originality of the OAU Algiers Convention, 1999 is extracted and re-
assessed. Then, it becomes clearer, if it is a duplicate of another Convention or if it 
is in the actual sense 'original'. 
Finally under this same chapter four, detailed responses to the convention by some 
African Member States (Ethiopia, Somali, Kenya, Sudan and Nigeria) is assessed; 
to determine if they have already complied with their obligations under those 
Conventions and other International Conventions that they are Member States. If 
they have not, then what are they doing and what approaches do they use for 
combating terrorism in their respective national states. How effective are these 
approaches, if any, and how has it helped to curb terrorist acts in their national 
countries. 
Chapter five is the conclusion and recommendation. As stated before, this 
dissertation asserts that terrorism should be better fought or combated as one, in 
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International or Regional (because AU is region) Level than on a national level in 
Africa, mainly, due to its' economic undeveloped power, corruption, partiality, lack 
of resources and most especially for avoidance of conflict with humanitarian and 
human rights law. 
Under the same chapter five, recommendations on how practicable and effective the 
thesis of criminalizing and penalizing terrorism or combating terrorism jointly on 
regional level, instead of on national level is made. Also, it is important to note that, 
it can be practicably achieved so far in African Union, since the OAU Algiers 
Convention 1999, has a provision for amendment and agreements in the 
Convention.44 More so , there is a universal acceptable definition of terrorism in 
the Convention by the Member States, and the fact that, terrorist act as defined in 
Art.l (3) of the OAU Algiers Convention, 1999, is the violation of the criminal laws 
of a state party, which is committed in any other person's state. AU already has a 
multilateral agreement for extradition and extra territorial investigations and mutual 
assistance,45 which can be conveniently handled by a centralized judicial body for 
the Union. 
44 OAU Algiers Convention., Supra note 26 at Art.21. 
45 ld., at Art.7, Parts IV and V. 
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1.4. CONCLUSION. 
This dissertation is unique in so many ways from that of previous scholars because 
as stated before, most scholars had not suggested that combating terrorism in Africa 
should be effectively done in regional level as opposed to the current national level. 
Also, recommendations and practical procedures through which to achieve this 
thesis are the author's sole initiatives. None of the previous published studies had 
examined the possibility of approaching combating terrorism at a regional level in 
Africa as a union, instead of the national level, as mentioned supra, by amending 
the OAU Algiers Convention to include a central court, vested with jurisdiction on 
combating terrorism. Solidarity as enshrined in the AU Constitutive Act should be 
maximized to the fullest for better result, not just for effectiveness of combating 
terrorism, but, also for other issues that needs urgent attention in AU. 
To re-emphasis agam, m order to avoid conflicts and find the proper balance 
between counter-terrorism and Human Rights law in Africa, there should be a 
Universal Court vested with terrorist jurisdiction. 
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CHAPTER TWO. 
SCOPE OF TERRORISM AND ITS DANGER TO THE STABILITY 
OF STATES. 
2.0. INTRODUCTION. 
Before 9/1 1, terrorism was not considered a significant threat to the security of 
Africa, despite the US embassy bombings at Kenya and Tanzania. African 
Countries' were not considered as a safe haven for terrorist activities, although it 
was seen as a potential breeding ground for terrorism. 46 
The modem terrorism differs from that in the 1960's. It poses great danger to the 
world as a result of different religious affiliations mixed with political ideology and 
geo-political goals. 
The ongm of the word 'terror' (terrere ), which means 'frighten' was first 
introduced by French in the fourteenth (14th) century and was used by the English in 
1928.47 The French Legislature led by Maximilien Robesspierre, concerned about 
the aristocratic threat to the revolutionary government, ordered the public execution 
46 Ted Dagna. Africa and the war on terrorism. 2002, CRS Report for Congress. Congressional Re~earch 
Service. 
47 Reuven Young. Defining Terrorism: The evolution of terrorism as a legal concept in international law 
and its influence on definitions in domestic legislation. 29 BCICLR 23 at 3. 
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of seventeen thousand ( 17 ,000) people, ("regime de !a terreur ") to educate the 
citizenry of the necessity of virtue. 48 
After World War II, terrorism developed a new methodology. Terrorist hijackings 
of civil aviation aircraft became common. The international community responded 
with series of treaties.49 The UN also responded with the same enactment of 
treaties, such as International Convention Against taking of Hostages, 1979 and so 
on. 
Certainly, there are many treaties, conventions and laws both internationally and 
nationally on prevention of terrorism, but the static point is that, enacting those 
treaties, conventions and laws alone are insufficient; the effectiveness of enforcing 
same to prevent terrorist occurrences is the trivial point. 
For better understanding of the term 'terrorism', the author shall attempt to 
distinguish it between insurgency and armed conflict, to clear the ambiguity 
between the terms in this chapter, especially, for the fact that some scholars are 
using the terms interchangeably as if they are one and the same terminology. 
Further, the perturbing question as regards the possibility of justification of 
terrorism will be discussed in this chapter, so also the conflict between combating 




The effects of these terrorist acts m the security, economic stability and 
international relations of States cannot be over-looked. 
2.1. DIFFERENCE BETWEEN TERRORISM, INSURGENCY AND 
ARMED-CONFLICT. 
"The search for a legal definition of terrorism in 
some ways resembles the quest for Holy Grail: 
periodically, eager souls set out, full of purpose, 
energy and self confidence, to succeed where so 
many others before have tried andfailed"50. 
Till date there is still lacuna in international law because of the absence of universal 
acceptable definition of the word 'Terrorism'. Trudy Govier comments that "the 
United Nations has been trying to define terrorism for some thirty years, and has 
given up in its quest for a definition that everybody can agree upon. A major 
problem is that Western governments wanted to make sure that state agents could 
never be considered terrorist, while Islamic countries wanted to make sure that 
national liberation movements in the Middle East and Kashmir could never be 
considered terrorist. 51 
Further, the human rights voices said that the reason for UN's inability to have a 
definite definition of the term is due to the standoff with the Organization of the 
Islamic Conference (OIC). 
"The Arab Terrorism Convention and the Terrorism 
50 Geoffrey Levitt. Is 'Terrorism' worth defining?; 13 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 97, 1986. 
51 Trudy Govier. A Delicate Balance: What philosophy can tell us about. 
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Convention of the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference (OIC) defined terrorism to exclude 
armed struggle for liberation and self-determination. 
This claim purports to exclude blowing up certain 
civilians from the reach of international law and 
organizations. It is central to interpreting every 
proclamation by states which have ratified these 
conventions in any forum purporting to combat 
terrorism". 52 
Therefore, internationally, terrorism may be difficult to define because it has so 
many emotions attached to it. The absence of the universal definition of terrorism 
has made possible none existence of terrorism in international level. It would 
simply be a 
"phenomenon which is denounced as shameful and 
reprehensive by all but understood by none. Its legal 
value will be instrumental and incantatory, yet 
. ·fji . ,53 zne11 ZClent. 
"It would merely be a word of art meant to 
brand one's enemies, a label used loosely, 
selectively and invariably pejoratively 
.... where the defining elements of terrorism are 
often confused with value judgements about those 
accused of it ". 54 
The absence of its definition in international level has also led to the unceasingly 
international acts of terrorism, especially on the ground that some States harbour 
terrorists. Investigation and prosecution on the basis of a crime of terrorism alone 
would likely violate the precepts of certainty and legality if it were to be concluded 
52 See the Human Rights Voices; There is No UN definition of terrorism. 
www .bumanrightsvoices.org/E Y EontheUN/un-1 0 l /factd/?p=6l 
'
3 Jean Marc Sorel. Some questions about the definition of terrorism and fight against its financing; 14(2) 
Eur.J.INT'l L. 365, 2003 at 370. 
54 Robert P. Bamidge, Jr. Non-State Actors and Terrorism. Applying the law of State Responsibility and 
the Due Diligence principle. T.M.C.Asser Press. 2008 at 15. 
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that customary international law has not yet sufficiently defined the term 
'terrorism' .55 
States define terrorism to mean what they think is the best definition for it within 
their territory. That is to say, what may constitute a terrorist act in one country may 
not be so in another country. How it is perceived depends on who the terrorist is, 
where the terrorist act is committed and who is at the receiving end. Some terrorize 
their states in the name of freedom fighters. It is not a question of unwillingness by 
a majority of nations to define terrorism, but rather a question of the obstacles to 
reaching agreement as well as scepticism about using any universal definition for 
narrow purposes. 56 Professor Bruce Ackerman stated that: 
"terrorism is a 'product (~f the free market in the 
world of high technology' and even with peace 
and democracy around the world, fringe groups 
would still have the capability to undertake 
acts of terrorism. "57 
Although, there were some early proposed definitions of terrorism at international 
law, but none has been accepted as the universal definition of the term under the 
international law. It therefore, remains a nebulous concept for the international legal 
system. 
Terrorism was first used as a legal term in 1931 at the third conference for 
unification of penal law of Brussels; they tried to define an act ofterrorism as: 
55 \d. at 16. 
56 Upendra D. Acharya. War on terror or Terror war: The problem in defining terrorism. 2009. 37 
DENJILP 653 at 12. 
57 Bruce Ackerman. Before the Next Attack. 2006 at 14. 
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"The intentional use of means capable of producing 
a common danger that represents an act of terrorism 
on the part of anyone making use of crimes against 
life, liberty or physical integrity of persons or directed 
against private or state property with the purpose 
. l 'd ,58 ... socza z eas .... 
Later the sixth conference of Copenghen m 1935 adopted a text that defined 
terrorism in its Article I as: 
"International acts directed against life, physical 
integrity, health or freedom of a head of state, as 
well as crown princes, members of government, 
people enjoying diplomatic immunity, and members 
of the constitutional, a legislative or judicial 
bodies[if a perpetrator creates] a common danger, 
or a state of terror that might insight a change or raise 
an obstacle to the functioning of public bodies or a 
disturbance to international relations. "59 
Following the assassination of King Alexander I of Yugoslavia and the French 
Foreign Minister in 1934, France proposed an "International measures" to be 
taken.60 
In the 1937 Terrorism Convention, acts of terrorism were defined as: 
"Criminal acts directed against a state and 
intended or calculated to create a state of terror 
in the mind of particular persons, a group of 
persons or the general public". 61 
58 M.K. Nawaz & Gurdip Signh, Legal Control oflnternational Terrorism, 17 Indian J. Int'L, 66, 1977, 
59 Reuven Young. Supra note 47 at 7. 
6o Id. 
6
; Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, 1937, League of Nations Doc. 
C546M.383, 1937. 
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The UN General Assembly always adopt resolutions condemning acts of terrorism 
but never reached a consensus on what 'acts' constitutes terrorism. A universally 
accepted definition is paramount for the unification of combating terrorism. Before, 
9/11, the General Assembly in 1995, defined terrorism as: 
"Criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a 
state of terror in the general public, a group of 
persons or particular persons for political purposes 
are in any circumstance unjustifiable, whatever the 
considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, 
racial, ethnic, religious or any other nature that may be 
invoked to justifY them. "62 
In Security Council Resolution, 1566 (2004), adopted by the Security Council at the 
5053rd session , the UN while condemning the act of terrorism, still did not define 
the term 'terrorism', they only condemned acts of terrorism; 
"Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the 
United Nations, 
1. Condemns in the strongest terms all acts of terrorism 
irrespective of their motivation, whenever and by 
whomsoever committed, as one of the most serious treats to 
d . ,63 peace an secunty; ... 
It seems that general/universal definition of terrorism will limit some powerful 
countries' unilateral power to handle terrorist acts the way they deem fit. Overuse 
has made terrorism a 'politicized and emotive' term.64 But the universal acceptable 
definition remains the solid foundation in combating terrorism. 
62 See the General Assembly Resolution 49/60 of 1995. 
63 See 1 of Security Council Resolution 1566 (2004 ). 
64 Nathan A. Canestaro. Small Wars and The Law: Options for prosecuting the insurgents in Iraq. 43 
CLMJTL 73 
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Ben Saul in his article, 'the Challenge of defining Terrorism', Chapter 7, confirms 
that, an ultimate successful definition of terrorism will have to reconcile political 
with international law.65 To both academics and lawyers alike, a consistent 
definition of terrorism has remained 'increasingly elusive' and unsuccessful efforts 
to draft one have consumed much ink. 66 The definition will also enhance 
intelligence sharing and international co-operation. 67 
Interestingly, although there is no universal definition in international level, some 
regions, such as the ones under review in this dissertation (OAU, OIC & The Arab 
Conventions), succeeded in having a universal definition of terrorism in its' 
different Conventions. 
OAU defined Terrorist 'acts' in its Article 1 (3) of OAU Convention on The 
Prevention And Combating of Terrorism, 1999 as: 
"(a): any act which is a violation of criminal laws 
of a State Party and which may endanger the life, 
physical integrity orfreedom of. or cause serious 
injury or death to, any number or group of 
persons or causes or may cause damage to public 
or private property, natural resources, 
environmental or cultural heritage and is 
calculated or intended to: 
(i): intimidate, put fear, force, coerce or 
induce any government, body, institution, 
the general public or any segment thereof, 
to do or abstain from doing any act, or 
to adopt or abandon a particular standpoint, or 
to act according to certain principles; or 
(ii): Disrupt any public service, the delivery 
65 Ben Saul. Defining terrorism-How far Have We come? 17 Sept. 2012. www.isn.ethz.ch 
66 Nathan A. Canestaro. Supra note 64 at 30. 
67 Reuven Young. Supra note 47 at 5. 
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of any essential service to the public or 
create a public emergency; or 
(iii): create general insurrection in a State. 
(b): any promotion, sponsoring, contribution to, 
command, aid, incitement, encouragement, 
attempt, threat, conspiracy, organizing, or procurement 
of any person, with the intent to commit any act 
referred to in paragraph (a)(i) to (iii)". 68 
The Organisation of Islamic Conference Convention On Combating International 
Terrorism, 1999, defined Terrorism and terrorist crimes respectively in its Articles 
1(2), (3) as follows: 
" 2. ''Terrorism" means any act of violence or threat 
thereof notwithstanding its motives or 
intentions perpetrated to carry out an individual or 
collective criminal plan with the aim of 
terrorizing people or threatening to harm 
them or imperilling their lives, honour, 
freedoms, security or rights or exposing 
the environment or any facility or public or 
private property to harzards or occupying 
or seizing them, or endangering a national 
resource, or international facilities, or 
threatening the stability, territorial integrity, 
political unity or soverignity of independent States. 
3 "Terrosist Crime" means any crime executed, started 
or participated in to realize a terrorist objectives 
in any of the Contracting States or against 
its nationals, assests or interests or foreign 
facilities and nationals residing in its 
. . h bl b . l "69 terntory pums a e y zts aw. 
Also, the Arab Convention for The Suppression of Terrorism, 1998, defined 
terrorism and terrorist offence in its Article 1(2) & (3) accordingly as follows: 
"2. Terrorism 
68 See Article 1 of the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism; supra note 26. 
69 See Article 1(2) & (3) ofThe Organization of the Islamic Conference on Combating International 
Terrorism, which is an Annex to Resolution No: 59/26p of the organization. 
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Any act or threat of violence, whatever its motives 
or purposes, that occurs in the advancement 
of an individual or collective criminal agenda 
and seeking to sow panic among people, causing 
fear by harming them, placing their lives, liberty 
or security in danger, or seeking to cause damage 
to the environment or to public or private 
installations or property or to occupying or 
seizing them, or seeking to jeorpardize a 
national resources. 
3. Terrorist offence 
Any offence or attempted offence committed 
in furtherance of a terrorist objective in 
any of the contracting States, or against their 
nationals, property or interests, that is punishable 
by their domestic law. The offences stipulated 
in the following conventions have not been 
ratified by Contracting States or where offences 
have been excluded by their legislation, shall 
also be regarded as terrorist offences: 
(a) The Tokyo Convention on offences and 
Certain Other Acts Committed on Board 
Aircraft, of 14 September 1963; 
(b) The Hague Convention for the Suppression 
of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, of 16 December 
1970; 
(c) The Montreal Convention for the Suppression 
of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil 
Aviation, of 23 September 1971, and the protocol 
thereto of 10 May 1984; 
(d) The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment 
of Crimes against Internationally Protected 
Persons, including DiplomaticAgents, of 
14 December 1973; 
(e) The International Convention against the 
Taking of Hostages, of 17 December 1979; 
(f) The provisions of the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea of 1982, relating to piracy on the high 
seas. 70 
70 See Article I (2) & (3) of The Arab Convention For The Suppression of Terrorism, 1998. 
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Despite the existence of the definition of terrorism in the above mentioned national 
Conventions, the staring question still remains, how effective are the application of 
these laws to combating terrorism in those nations? 
At certain situations, the two concepts, 'insurgency' and 'terrorism', are in play at 
the same time. Some terrorists hide under the cloak of insurgency to terrorize a 
state. Such acts are usually in violation of criminal laws of that state; concurring 
with President of the United States of America, Barack Obama who labelled 
terrorism "a human-caused disaster". 71 In such a situation, insurgents are not 
exempted from their terrorist acts; immunity under insurgency cannot veil them for 
their terrorist actions. An example of such situation can be attributed to Al-Shabaab 
group in the East Africa that is linked to the notorious Al-Qaeda, Islamic extremist 
group, which continues to wage war against the government of Somalia in the name 
of insurgency. 
Also, the fact that National Liberation Movements have complicated the legal 
regulation of internal conflict, terrorism has become entangled with the right to self 
determination as per international law. 72 Some nations have anchored on the 
provisions of the United Nations Charter on inherent right to self determination73 to 
free themselves from being labelled as terrorists. 
71 Yonah Alexander and Micheal S. Swetnam. Al-Qa'ida ten years after 9/ll and beyond. 2012, Potomac 
Institute Press at xiv. at 17. 
72Nathan A. Canestaro. Supra note 64. 
73 See Article 1 of United Nations Charter, supra note 2. 
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Insurgency (sometimes called 'guerrilla warfare') can be viewed as a revolution, 
usually legitimate, which involves physical violence as war, but specifically for 
political and military gains rather than for private benefits.74 In other words, 
insurgency is strictly for political reasons, advancement into government or to 
overthrow the government, unlike terrorism that is for selfish reasons. The principle 
is always to prevent the government forces from employing its full might in the 
contest. 75 
Insurgency has also been defined as; 
"a protracted struggle conducted methodically, 
step by step, in order to attain specific 
intermediate objectives leading finally to 
h h ,.( h · • d n76 t e overt row OJ t e ex1stzng or er 
Terrorists are seen as unrepresentative and abnormal outliners in society while 
msurgency 1s the manifestation of deeper, widespread issues in society.77 
Insurgency is usually a small war used as an auxiliary form of fighting, especially 
behind enemy lines. 78 The tactics employed by the insurgents can be best described 
as 'hit and run'. 
741d. 
"Insurgency is a struggle between a non-ruling 
group and ruling authorities in which the 
non-ruling group consciously uses political 
resources .... And violence to destroy, reformulate, 
or sustain the basis of legitimacy of one or more 
.-r 1. . ,79 aspects OJ po 1t1cs. 
7
' Ariel Merari. Terrorism as a strategy of insurgency. Terrorism and political violence, Vol.5, No. 4 
(Winter 1993), pp.213-215. 
76 Ganesh Sitaraman. Counterinsurgency, the war on terror, and the laws of war. 95 V ALR 1745 at 21. 
"7 ' ld. at 24. 
78 Ariel Merari. Supra note 75. 
79Nathan A. Canestaro. Supra note 64. 
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Although both insurgents and terrorists neither wears uniform nor carry arms 
openly and induces fear and violence; but terrorism is different in the sense that its 
use of force is directed at non combatants. 80 The major difference between 
insurgency and terrorism is that the former tries to establish physical control for a 
territory unlike the later. 81 Insurgency is confined within the national boundary and 
it is directed against one's own government. On the other hand, terrorism can cross 
over the national boundary and it may be directed against one's own or other 
countries. Insurgents advocate ideologies, pay individuals to conduct operations, 
employ violence and intimidation, and exploit local grievances such as communal 
or sectarian conflicts. 82 
The weapons usually used by terrorists are most sophisticated than that of the 
insurgents that use infantry-type light weapons but sometimes artillery pieces as 
well.83 The insurgents main targets are the political opponents, military and police, 
while the terrorists' targets both political opponents and the public at large. 84 
The major purpose of terrorist acts is to obtain publicity, by attacking targets that 
represents what they oppose and they feel mission accomplished when the public 
and government reacts to their attacks. They (terrorists) do not usually challenge the 
government forces openly, rather, they aim at changing the perception as to the 
effectiveness or legitimacy of the government itself. Terrorism is seen as either a 
80 ld. 
81 Ariel Merari; Supra note 75 at I 0. 
82 Ganesh Sitaraman. Supra note 76. 
83 Ariel Merari. Supra note 75 at II. 
84 Id. 
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law enforcement or military problem, rooting out a few bad apples, while 
insurgency is a social problem, requiring mobilization of all elements of 
government power. 85 
An Armed conflict (some scholars refers to armed conflict as 'Conventional war') 
is usually a direct clash with the government and the military. The conflict is 
normally between different military branches on uniform. They use more 
sophisticated weapons (air force, armour, artillery) than terrorists.86 
Currently, just like terrorism, there is no specific definition of "armed conflict" in 
international law, although the term 'armed conflict' is used in the Geneva 
Convention(s) and the Additional Protocols.87 Under the Geneva Convention, 
armed conflict is classified into two (2): International armed conflict and Non-
International armed conflict, but the terminology "armed Conflict" was not defined 
in the convention. 88 Although Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions did not explain 
the term, armed conflict, but it excluded situations of political unrest accompanied 
by nothing more than sporadic acts of violence. 89 Also Article 1 (2) of Additional 
85 Ganesh Sitraraman. Supra note 76. 
86 Ariel Merari. Supra note 75 at 11. 
87 See generally Geneva Convention I: Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Codition of the 
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field; 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S 31. Geneva Covention 
II: Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked 
Members of Armed Forces at Sea; 1949,6 U.ST. 3217,75 U.N.T.S. 85. Geneva Convention III: Geneva 
Convention Relative to the treatment of Prisoners of War: 1949, 6 U.S.T 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. Geneva 
Convention IV: Geneva Convention Relative to The Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War; 1949, 
6 U.S.T 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. Additional Protocol!: Protocol Additional to The Geneva Conventions; 
1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict; 1977 1125 U.N.T.S. 3. 
Additional Protocol II: Protocol Additional to The Geneva Conventions; 1949 and Relating to The 






Protocol II affirms this interpretation because it excludes from the 'material field of 
application' of the protocol 'situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as 
riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence of a similar nature, as not being armed 
conflicts. 90 
Article 3 ofthe Geneva Convention, 1949 states thus: 
90 !d. 
"In the case of armed conflict not of an international 
Character occurring in the territory of one of 
the High Contracting Parties, each party to the 
conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, 
the following provisions: 
(l)Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, 
Including members of armed forces who have 
laid their arms and those placed hors de combat 
by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, 
shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, 
without any adverse distinction founded on 
race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, 
or any other similar criteria. To this end, the following 
acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time 
and in any place whatsoever with respect to the 
above-mentioned persons: 
(a) violence to life and person, in particular 
murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel 
treatment and torture,· 
(b) taking of hostages; 
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular 
humiliating and degrading treatment; 
(d) the passing of sentences and carrying out of 
executions without previous judgement pronounced 
by a regularly constituted court, affording all the 
judicial guaranteeswhich are recognized as 
indispensable by civilized peoples. 
(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and 
cared for. An impartial humanitarian body, 
such as the International Committee of 
the Red Cross, may offer its services to 
the Parties to the conflict. The Parties to the 
conflicts should further endeavour to bring into 
force, by means of special agreement, all or part 
of the other provisions of the present Convention. 
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The application of the preceding provisions shall 
not affect the legal status of the Parties to the conflict. 
Insurgency has been defined as: 
"A general overarching concept that refers to a 
Coriflict between a government and an out group 
or opponent in which the latter uses both political 
resources and violence to change, reformulate, 
or uphold the legitimacy of one or more of four 
k .-r l. . ,9/ ey aspects o1 po ztzcs. 
In Prosecutor V Dusko Tadic, the court explained the existence of armed conflict 
thus: 
" .... exists whenever there is a resort to armed 
force between states or protracted armed 
violence between governmental authorities and 
. d d ,92 organzze arme groups .... 
Insurgency and Armed conflicts adhere to international norms regarding the law of 
war in achieving their goals, but terrorists are simply committing crimes under both 
civil and military legal codes.93 
Insurgency is neither terrorism nor armed conflict, though the three concepts share 
the same use of force to achieve political ends with different scales of violence. 
Both terrorism and insurgency needs support and finance to succeed, or else both 
will eventually succumb to the efforts of the State but insurgency has a distinct 
characteristic of support and mobilization from local populace which is a 
91 O'Neill B.E. Insurgency & Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse. 2005. 2"d ed. Washington D.C; 
Potomac Books Inc. 
92 Prosecutor V. Dusko Tadic. Case No. IT -94-1. Decision on the Defense Motion for Interlocutory 
Appeal on Jurisdiction; 1995 at par. 65-66. 
93 See generally the International terrorism and security research. Differences between terrorism and 
insurgency. http://www.unc.edu/depts!diplomat/item/2008/1 0 12/comm/smith defining.html 
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prerequisite for their success unlike terrorism.94 The supportive local populace 
provides the insurgents with intelligence, recruits and shelter. 95 
From the above analysis, one can be both a terrorist and a freedom fighter. The 
person can fight for freedom and adopt terrorism as a method of fighting.96 
Therefore, the lacuna of acceptable definition of terrorism in International law in 
contradiction to freedom or resistance fighters is clearly one of the contributing 
factors that encourage violence in the name of higher theological and ideological 
. . 1 97 prmc1p es. 
2.2. DOES TERRORISM HAVE JUSTIFICATION? 
Apart from the absence of universal acceptable definition of terrorism m 
international law, another perturbing question m the mind of average legal 
personnel is 'the justification of terrorism'. The members of the Security Council 
stated and reaffirmed, while commenting on attack in Somalia, that:98 
"terrorism in all its fOrms and manifestations 
< v 
constitutes one of the most serious threats 
to international peace and security, and 
that any acts of terrorism are criminal and 
unjustifiable regardless of their motivation, 
wherever and whenever and by whomever 
committed. " 
94 James D. Kiras.Irregular Warfare: Terrorism and Insurgency. 
http:/ /indianstrategicknow ledgeonline.com/web/bay 3 
95 Nathan A. Canestaro. Supra note 64. 
96 Igor Primoratz. A philosopher looks at contemporary terrorism. 29 CDZLR 33 at 3. 
97 Yonah Alexander and MichaelS. Swetnam. Supra note 71 at xiv. 
98 See Security Council Press statement on Terrorist attack in Somalia. SC/11300; AFR/2831. 
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Some terrorists claim justification on moral grounds, especially, Islamic extremists, 
who claim to be fighting just war in the name of jihad, re-echoing the cliche that 
'one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter'. 
In order to understand their point of view and actually deduce if there is any 
justification from their view, a brief summary of origin of just war and jihad may 
clarify what forms the intention or underlying motives of Islamic extremists in 
morally justifying terrorism. 
2.2.1. ORIGIN OF JUST WAR AND JIHAD. 
The theological challenges presented by modern terrorists, especially the Islamic 
extremists, like al-Qa'ida, justifying unlimited use of force against "enemies of 
God,"99 has made the globe to re-think about the fearful strategic dangers of the 
clash of civilization as demonstrated by the 'just war,' 'jihad' concepts and their 
relevancy to the 'battle of ideas' between the culture of life and the culture of 
death. 100 
The beginning of just war theory may be linked to the Romans. It originated in the 
Middle Ages as Christian theologians, such as Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, 
sought to determine under what conditions it would be morally right to engage in 
99 !d. at xviii. 
100 ld. 
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State violence war. 101 It was an outgrowth of the association of religions with 
international relations. The performance of such religious rites was assigned to the 
collegium fetaialium, the priests or fetiales were entrusted with the task of deciding 
if a foreign country had failed to perform its duties toward the Roman State. 102 If a 
foreign state subject to Roman rule refused to perform the specified religious rites, 
and no settlement was reached within an allocated period for negotiation and 
deliberation, a just cause of war was said to exist, and the matter was placed before 
the senate. 103Subsequently, Saint Augustine justified Christian participation in war 
on such grounds as injury to the country, or unjustified occupation of territory. 
While punishment out of all proportion to the act would be considered unjust, the 
redress of grievances was justifiable, the ultimate purpose of war being the 
achievement of peace. 104 
It was Thomas Aquinas who laid down three criteria for the justified initiation of 
war: First, it must be authorized by the prince; second, there must be a just cause for 
it, such as un-redressed grievances; and third, the belligerents must attempt to 
achieve a just peace. This theory was both used to curb feuds within a state and 
applied to conflicts between independent states. 105 
In the Middle Ages, Spanish jurists such as Francisco Victoria (circa 1480- 1546) 
held that not only is self-defense justifiable, but also defense of one's friends or 
101 Andrew Valls. Ethics in international Affairs, ed. 2000. 
102 Yonah Alexander and MichaelS. Swetnam. Supra note 71 at Xviii. 
103 Draper Gerald. Reflections on Law and Armed Conflicts; The Hague, Neitherlands: Kluwer Law 
International, 1998. 
104 Yonah Alexander and MichaelS. Swetnam. Supra note 71 at xviii. 




required to aid the belligerent whose cause was "just". Also, Emmerich de V attell 
(1714- 1767) held that the theory of a "just war" was moral, and did not affect the 
legality of the war. 109 By the beginning of the 19th century, the concept of a "just 
war" underwent a period of disuse. The theory that a war could be considered legal 
or illegal was discarded. It was replaced by the concept of supreme sovereignty. To 
judge the legality of a war would necessitate the deliberation and judgement of 
sovereignty by a third party, and this would be considered an impairment, as states 
were considered equal. This did not mean that violence was sanctioned, but rather, 
that the doctrine of "just war" no longer met the needs of the political actualities of 
Europe in the 19th century. Methods were adopted in an attempt to restrict the worst 
consequences of conflict, such as political alignments and the formulation of rules 
of warfare to reduce widespread destruction. 110 
The 20th century brought a revitalization and reformulation of the "just war" 
doctrine developed in earlier periods. It condemned certain wars and condoned 
others. It returned to the theory that wars of aggression were illegal, while self-
defense was justifiable. This theory was implemented in the Versailles Peace Treaty 
of 1919.111 The opinion of the Allies is clearly illustrated by George Clemenceau in 
the letter to the president of the German Delegation covering the Reply of the 
Allied and Associated powers: 
109 ld. 
IIO !d. at XX. 
Ill !d. 
"In the view of the Allied and Associated powers, 
the war which began on 1 August 1914, was the 
greatest crime against humanity ... that any nation ... 
46 
has ever consciously committed ... not less than 
several million dead lie buried inEurope ... 
Because Germany saw fit to gratifY her lust for 
tyranny by resorting to war ... the Allied and 
Associated Powers believe that they will be false 
To those who have given their all to the freedom 
of the world if they consent to treat this war on 
any other basis than as a crime against humanity 
and right". 112 
But certain wars were still considered to be just. Negotiations for the ratification of 
the Pact illustrated that the right to self-defense was not denied. In the words of US 
Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg: "Every nation is free at all times to defend its 
territory from attack or invasion, and it alone is competent to decide whether 
circumstances require recourse to war in self-defense." A signatory of the Pact of 
Paris could engage in a "just war" and yet remain within its terms.113 
The "just war" doctrine was invoked before the Second World War to justify 
American aid to the Allies, and after it to justify the punishment of those allegedly 
responsible for starting it. In 1945, the concept of "just war" had been embodied in 
the Charter of the UN. Although the Charter provides for arbitration and 
adjudication, the right of self-defense has been maintained. Article 51 provides thus: 
1121d. 
113 !d. at xxi. 
"Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the 
inherent right of individual or collective 
se(f-defense if an armed attack occurs against 
a member of the UN, until the Security Council 
has taken the measures necessary to maintain 
international peace and security". 
47 
The UN thus recognized 'just' wars begun in self-defense against armed aggression. 
These are, however, divergent opinion as to what constitutes "self-defense." The 
UN has been reluctant to recognize cases that may expand the definition of self-
defense. 114 
It is against the foregoing background of mostly "Western" perspectives and 
experiences of the "just war" concept that the "Jihad" doctrine must be understood. 
According to numerous Islamic scholars, it is apparent that Muslims have 
consistently used theologically based criteria for distinguishing between "just" and 
"unjust" violence. For instance, violence was justified to defend an Islamic society 
from "religious impurity" threats or from a foreign invading army. "Jihad" 
therefore, represented a sanctified form of resistance force directed against 
disobedience to the command of Allah. "Jihad's" comprehensive meaning thus 
represents a struggle for personal and public faithfulness rather than an inevitable 
call for war. In fact, Muslim communities are duty-bound to explore every peaceful 
means available for conflict resolution before resorting to violence. And then when 
hostilities are undertaken, the Muslims are obligated to utilize measured and 
proportional responses to threat. Their fighters are obligated during battles not to 
kill civilians, including women and children, and to treat prisoners of war 
humanely. 115 
114 !d. 
115 ld. at Xxii. 
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Regardless of record, for militant Islam as graphically illustrated by al-Qa'ida's 
declared intentions and actions, the concept of "jihad" has projected a new ominous 
level of brutalization against humanity. Its ideological foundation has been 
nourished by radical Islamic concepts, doctrines, and interpretations. For example, 
the Middle Age school of Salafiyya (the venerable forefathers) in advocating that 
Islam had been corrupted by idolatry and therefore must be purified has influenced 
al-Qa' ida's thinking. 
A more profound impact on al-Qa'ida's theological radicalization was made by 
Islamic scholars in the 20th century who argued that Islam was in real danger of 
being destroyed by Western influences. The teachings, for instance, of Maulana 
Maudoodi and Rashid Rida who developed the theory that modern Western culture 
represented the pre-Islamic period Gahiliyya) coupled with the assertions of Sayyid 
Qutb that the US is Islam's most challenging spiritual adversary have particularly 
impacted al-Qa'ida's extremist attitudes and violent actions against America and its 
friends and allies. 116 
Jihad organizations refer to the concept "jihad" as a religiously sanctioned military 
confrontation in a revolutionary sense. 117 In his book, 'Mu'Alin Fi Al-Tariq', 
Sayyid Qutb gave to the concept 'Jihad' a new revolutionary meaning: 'Jihad' 
religious war against Muslim leaders who fail to fulfil the tenets of Islam and are 
therefore to be considered infidels. The idea of jihad in this sense was first espoused 
1161d. 
117 Anneli Botha and Hussein Solomon. Terrorism in Africa. Centre for International Political 
studies(CIPS) at 5. 
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by the Islamic liberation party but was developed into a general concept and modus 
operandi by Muhammad Abd-Salarn Farji, the Jihad organization's ideologist, who 
assassinated Sadat in November, 1981. In his book, 'Al-Farihda Al-Ghayba' Farji 
explains the revolutionary meaning of jihad. 118 He accuses the religious sages of 
neglecting Jihad and sees it as the only way of reinstating Islam to its former glory, 
through: Using force against governments perceived as heretic, particularly because 
those in power neglected the duty of Islam in renewing the image of Islam; 
Establishing an Islamic state based on their interpretation of Islam; Giving higher 
priority to war against infidel Muslim leaders rather than war against foreign 
imperialism based on the assumption that imperialism sterns from the infidel rulers 
themselves; Organizing underground conditions into a military framework; Making 
a special effort to penetrate security power bases - the army and security forces - in 
order to acquire weapons and useful means to fight the particular regirnes. 119 
The afore-mentioned characteristics of the activities of Islamic extremism could be 
presented as: attempts to implement the Shari'a or Islamic Law and to tum 
countries into Islamic Republics. 120 These demands have been voiced in Nigeria, 
Senegal, Tanzania, Ethiopia and Sornalia. 121 Already adopted by Sudan and in part, 
by Nigeria; an attempt to destabilize the traditional orthodox establishment on all 
levels. This has been the case in Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania and Kenya, the 






deprivation of Muslims. In Tanzania, Senegal, Kenya, Nigeria and Uganda social 
ferment led to violence and riots. 122 
2.2.2. JUSTIFICATION OF TERRORISM. 
It is becoming obvious that some people, who try to justify terrorism seems to 
discuss insurgency in the name of terrorism. This is in accordance with the fact that, 
the terminologies "terrorism" and "insurgency" are often misused by some scholars, 
forgetting the fact that the two have distinct meanings. 
Igor Primoratz attempts to morally justify terrorism on two ethical theory of moral 
philosophy, namely; Consequentialism and Non-Consequentialism. 
Consequentialism advices to judge human action solely in terms of its 
consequences. When its consequences are good (on balance), an act or policy is 
right; when they are bad (on balance), it is wrong. Nothing is right or wrong, 
obligatory or prohibited, in itself, but only in the light of its consequences. The 
goodness or badness of consequences is understood in terms of how they affect 
those whom they affect. 
Terrorism, too, is judged in terms of its consequences, and in these terms only. 123 
A consequentialist justification of an act or policy of terrorism must show three 
things: that the aim sought is good enough to justify the harm inflicted; that the aim 
122ld. 
123 Igor Primoratz. Supra note 96. 
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will indeed be achieved by terrorism; and that it cannot be achieved in any other 
less costly way; example, liberation. 124 
The objection of consequentialism is that terrorist acts against innocent victims are 
justified because of moral defense put up by terrorists. Terrorism cannot be strictly 
judged by its consequences because it is wrong intrinsically for the fact that it is a 
violation of basic rights and a gross injustice. Actions should be judged by their 
consequences. In bringing hope, popular recognition, and ultimately relief to the 
plight of a group, terrorism is aimed at laudable objectives and can achieve 
sufficient good to outweigh the evil of its methods. The end does not justify the 
means. The consequences of any action are by no means clear. The success of 
terrorism is not guaranteed; it is an immoral gamble to kill people in the hope of 
achieving something else. And even if the goal was realised, the price paid is 
literally incalculable. 
Non-consequentialist theory is not of the opinion that consequences do not matter, 
but that, in addition, other considerations, such as justice and fights matters. Also 
that some acts or lines of action are right or wrong themselves, independently of 
their consequences. From their point of view, terrorism does appear as never, or 
hardly ever, morally justified. 125 
124 !d. 
125 Jd. 
Two central non-consequentialist objections to moral justification are: firstly, 
terrorism violates the fundamental moral principle of respect for persons. This 
principle of respect for persons can be interpreted in three ways; it enjoins respect 
for the core of individuality of each and every person, a concern for seeing things 
from the point of view of the other person, in terms of her character or "ground 
project." This is opposite of the impersonal, objective, calculating way in which 
terrorists consider, and treat, their victims. On another interpretation, respect for 
persons demands recognition and respect for certain basic human rights of every 
human being, which safeguard a certain area of personal freedom. Persons are to be 
respected as holders of rights. Terrorists cannot show this type ofrespect. 126 
On a third interpretation, showing respect for persons can be understood as not 
treating individuals as mere means. 
The second maJor non-consequentialist objection to terrorism is basic moral 
distinction which is the distinction between responsibility and lack of it, or between 
guilt and innocence. Its import is that hostile treatment of another human being 
must be justified by the fact that the person is responsible for some wrongdoing 
whose gravity is proportionate to the gravity of the response. Those who are not 
responsible for such wrongdoing should not be subjected to hostile treatment, and in 





All human beings are immune to start with; our right not to be attacked is a feature 
of normal human relationships."128 Yet, terrorists deliberately attack, kill, and 
otherwise severely harm innocent people; thus, the aim of intimidation and coercion 
they seek to achieve in this way, makes them terrorists. Terrorism is not wrong 
because it has bad consequences (on balance), and accordingly only insofar as it has 
such consequences. It is rather wrong in itself, because of what it is. Moreover, it is 
extremely morally wrong in itself. 
Igor rejects the consequentialist v1ew that terrorism is justified whenever its 
consequences are good (on balance), and gave two conditions under which 
terrorism may be justified. In certain extreme, terrorist acts may be defended on 
account of the moral disaster they prevent or stop. The two conditions are: (a) in the 
face of a moral disaster, understood in a special, highly restrictive sense as an 
imminent threat of extermination or ethnic cleansing of an entire people; and (b) 
when there are good reasons to believe that terrorism is indeed the only method 
available and likely to succeed in preventing the disaster, stopping it in its tracks, or 
. 'd f' 129 reversmg a w1 e range o 1ts consequences. 
Some scholars also argue that, it is legitimate and justified in extreme cases to resort 
to terrorism when peaceful and democratic methods have been exhausted. In cases 
of repression and suffering, with an implacably oppressive state and no obvious 
possibility of international relief, it is sometimes necessary to resort to violence to 
128 Michael Walzer. Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral argument with historical illustrations. 3'd Edition, 
2000 
129 Igor Primoratz. Supra note 96. 
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defend one's people and pursue one's cause. Therefore, terrorism is justified by its 
success in achieving results when peaceful means have failed. 
Some moral prohibitions are central to our moral experience, so deeply entrenched 
in it, that they "function in our moral thinking as a sort of touchstone of moral and 
intellectual health."130 Accordingly, the suspension of such a prohibition would 
"bring about an upheaval in the moral perspective." Its rejection would lead to "an 
imbalance and incoherence in moral thought and practice." 131 The prohibition of 
deliberately killing and maiming innocent people, against which the terrorist 
offends, is one such prohibition. Therefore, rejection of terrorism ought to be 
absolute. Igor concludes by saying that the correct position on the morality of 
terrorism, is that terrorism is almost absolutely wrong. 132 
Another interesting v1ew on justification of terrorism, apart from moral 
justification, is the issue of freedom fighters. It is argued that, terrorism can be 
justified on the ground of freedom fighters employing terrorism as a method of 
securing the liberation. Terrorist groups normally group themselves as National 
Liberation Movement Fighters against social, Economic, Religious, or Imperialist 
operation, or any combination of these. 133 
13° C.A.J. Coady & Michael 0' Keefe. Terrorism, Just War and Supreme Emergency, in Terrorism and 
Justice: Moral argument in a threatened world . 2002. 
131 Igor Primoratz. Supra note 96. 
132 ld. 
133Ariel Merari. Supra note 75. 
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Those who think that terrorists are freedom fighters may be right, but they fail to 
acknowledge the fact that some of these freedom fighters commit terrorist acts, 
thereby becoming terrorists. It is important to point out again that freedom fighters 
fight for freedom, but terrorists commit acts of terror. Obviously, freedom fighters 
and terrorists do exactly the same thing, 'fight'. How can one justify whether the 
cause is good or bad in order to deduce a terrorist act from that of freedom fighter. 
According to Hafiz al-Asad, former president of Syria, 
"a terrorist is a mercenary who is motivated by 
desire to kill, while those who struggle are 
freedom fighters who have a cause, in defense 
of which they exert all their spiritual and 
• l rt£ { " J 34 materza e11or s . 
The Arab reality of terrorism and its ability to act under the guise of freedom fighter 
negates regional responsibility of terrorists acts, which are aimed at colonial, and 
interventionist forces. Sheik Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah said that "they do not 
see themselves as terrorists because they do not believe in terrorism, they see 
themselves as mujihadeen who fight a holy war for the people". 135 Some people 
support what they think is right and will not tag it as terrorist acts, just as one man's 
fight is another man's terrorist. The difference is that we might support some causes 
and not others because we see them as morally virtuous or vices. 
The utilization of the term 'terrorism' is then a moral judgement; and if one party 
can successfully attach the label terrorist to its opponent, then it has indirectly 
134 Aaron M young sr and David H. Gray. Insurgency, Guerilla Warfare and Terrorism: Conflict and its 




persuaded others to adopt its moral view point. 136 Terrorists do have a mind and 
they honestly believe they are pursuing their cause in a justified way. Therefore, 
they will do anything humanly possible to obtain their aim, even if it leads to 
civilians' death and widespread destruction. 
Terrorism is not the monopoly of enemies of freedom. Indeed, many national 
liberation movements have made use of terrorism, whether occasionally or in a 
more systematic way; the Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN) in Algiers ... 137 This 
is in line with the mainstream view in just war theory: one does not lose one's 
immunity against acts of war only by fighting in an unjust war, but rather by 
fighting in any war. 138 
The killing of innocent people in the unjust war is also justified on the ground that 
they are not innocent because they are either directly or indirectly responsible for 
the appointment or approval of the 'target', whom the terrorists aims to fight. Igor 
gave some examples of such incidents as follows: Emile Henry was a French 
anarchist who lived in the nineteenth century, but engaged in terrorism of the 
twentieth-century type. He planted a bomb at the office of a mining company 
which, had it gone off, would probably have killed or maimed a number of people 
who were not party to the company's wrongdoings and merely happened to live in 
the same building. He also planted a bomb in a cafe that did go off, injuring twenty 
136 ld. 
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people, one of whom later died of his injuries. When explaining his actions in court, 
he said: 
"What about the innocent victims? ... The building 
where the Carmaux Company had its offices 
was inhabited only by bourgeois; hence there 
would be no innocent victims. The whole of the 
bourgeoisies lives by the exploitation of the 
,£ d h ld . . . h "139 un1 ortunate, an s ou expzate zts crzmes toget er. 
"Those good bourgeois who .... reap their 
dividends and live idly on the profits of the workers' 
toil, they also must take their share in the reprisals. 
And not only they, but all those who are satisfied 
with the existing order. who applaud the acts of 
the government and so become its accomplices ... 
in other words, the daily clientele of terminus and 
h h t ,.{" ,/40 t e ot er grea ca1 es. 
This goes in line with the view of responsibility and liability, justifying that there is 
nothing like innocent citizens in terrorist attacks. It says that all members of a social 
class-men and women, young and old, adults and children are liable to be killed or 
maimed. Some are guilty of operating the system of exploitation, others of 
benefiting from this exploitation, and still others of supporting the system. 141 
Another example is provided by Osama bin Laden in an interview in the aftermath 
of the attacks on September 11, 2001, where he said: "The American people should 
remember that they pay taxes to their government and that they voted for their 
president. Their government makes weapons and provides them to Isreal, which 
they use to kill Palestinian Muslims. Given that the American Congress is a 






American government proves that America in its entirety is responsible for the 
atrocities that it is committing against Muslims". 142 
The conceptually and morally decisive trait of terrorism is that it is violence against 
the innocent; that is, violence against those who, on any credible understanding of 
responsibility and liability, are not responsible, or not responsible enough, for the 
real or alleged injustice or suffering the terrorist fights against. Given this 
understanding of responsibility and liability, the victims of terrorist violence will 
not be found innocent from the terrorist's own point of view. 143 
Considering, this moral (religious) justification of terrorism, the God Almighty, or 
Allah (as popularly called by Muslims) will never command anybody to kill another 
in His name or in the name of worshiping Him. One of His ten commandments is 
that "Thou shall not kill" 144 It is not justifiable in all ramifications that men should 
be fighting for God by killing innocent people. God is so magnificent for mere 
mortals to fight for Him. Since He is all knowing and all powerful, He knows how 
best to fight His battles. 
Some scholars approach the question of justification of terrorism through 'Just War 
theory. The just war theory inquires into (i) the possible moral grounds for going to 
!42 !d. 
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war which is Jus Ad Bellum and (ii) the manner in which a just war must be carried 
out or fought, which is Jus In Bello. 
Terrorism is almost universally condemned, whereas violence by states, even when 
war has not been declared, is seen as legitimate, if not always justified. 145 For rules 
in jus ad bellum to be applicable in a just war, the following conditions must be 
present, (1) Just cause, (2) Right intention, (3) Competent authority Public 
declaration, ( 4) Last resort, ( 5) proportionality and ( 6) probability of success. 
A state is deemed to have a just cause when it defends itself against aggression. 146 
The just war theory holds that the state has a right to defend itself against the 
aggression of other states. 147 The states's moral status is a derivative and not 
foundational. It is derivative of the individuals within it. The right that is usually 
cited as being the ground for the state's right to defend itself is the right of self 
determination. 148 
Under some circumstances, some groups enjoy a right to self determination. The 
circumstances may include and, or limited to cases of injustice towards the 
group. 149 The right may be enjoyed by nations only or by any group within the 
territory. It may be that the right of self determination does not automatically grant 
a right to political independence, but if some form of self determination cannot be 
145 Andrew Valls. Supra note 101. 
146 Aggression, according to Andrew Valls, means, the violation of or the immenient threat of the 
violation of its territorial integrity or political independence. 




realized within an existing state, then it can, under these circumstances grant such a 
right. 150Groups other than those constituted by the state in which they live can have 
a just cause to defend their right to self-determination. 151 
The UN definition of 'just cause' recognizes the rights of peoples as well as states. 
In Article 7 of the definition of aggression, the UN refers to "the right of self 
determination, freedom and independence", as derived from the Charter of peoples 
being forcibly deprived of that right. So, both morally and legally, peoples or 
nations enjoy right to self determination and when that right is frustrated, they have 
the same just cause that states have when the self determination of their citizens is 
threatened. 152 
Normally, under the just war theory, A state may go to war only if the decision has 
been made by the appropriate authorities, according to the proper process, and made 
public, notably to its own citizens and to the enemy state(s). 153 
It therefore, follows that once it is acknowledged that stateless peoples may have 
right to self determination, it would render that right otiose to deny that the right 
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A state must intend to fight the war only for the sake of its own just cause and can 
only resort to war only if it has exhausted all plausible, peaceful alternatives to 
resolving the conflict in question. 155 The condition of probability of success under 
the just war theory must needs to be satisfied. If one judges that the end has little 
chance of being achieved through violence, the criterion requires that the violence 
not be commenced. 156 A state may not resort to war if it can reasonably predict that 
doing so will have no measurable impact in achieving the goal of the just cause as 
required by just war theory's condition ofproportionality. 157 
Applying these conditions of jus ad bellum in the present situations, terrorism can 
be said to meet some of the conditions, such as just cause, in a situation of radical 
self- defense. It may also satisfy the conditions of proportionality and last resort 
given that the aggression is unjustified and that standard measures of self-defense 
have been tried and failed. 158 
But what about the other conditions of jus ad bellum? Andrew Valls is of the 
opinion that if modem warfare is sometimes justified, terrorism, in which the 
violence is usually on a far smaller scale, can be justified as well. 159 
Under the jus in bello, the following conditions are applicable: (1) Proportionality, 
(2) Discrimination, (3) Legitimate means and (4) Benevolent Quarantine for POWs. 
155 Tom is Kapitan. Supra note 109. 
156Andrew Valls. Supra note 101. 
157 Tomis Kapitan. Supra note 109. 
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Unlike the proportionality condition under the jus ad bellum discussed supra, this 
proportionality requirement is applied to particular acts within the war. It forbids 
conducting the war in such a way that it involves inordinate costs, costs that are 
disproportionate to the gains. 160 
How will this condition be satisfied by terrorist in order to defend their act? Andrew 
Vails argues that, terrorist acts cannot satisfy this condition. Given that the scale of 
deaths and destruction usually involved in terrorist acts pales in comparison with 
that involved in wars commonly thought to be just, it would seem that terrorism 
would satisfy this requirement more easily than war (assuming the goods to be 
achieved are not dissimilar). So if the means of terrorism is what places it beyond 
the moral pale for many people, it is probably not because of its 
d. . 1. 161 1sproport10na 1ty. 
The principle of discrimination holds that Non-combatants should be immune from 
attack. However, there is some disagreement as to the moral basis of this 
distinction, which creates disagreement as to where exactly this line should be 
drawn. While usually based on the notion of moral innocence, non-combatant status 
can be said to have little to do with innocence, for often combatants are conscripts, 







The legitimate means condition ofjus in bello requires that there should be no use 
of evil weapons methods, such as rape, genocide and so on. Also prisoners of war 
must be treated humanely. While others argue that, there are situations in which it is 
morally justified, if not legally. Having laws against use of violence is of course 
eminently sensible, but laws can only be deemed legitimate if they serve to protect 
everybody, not simply the government itself or a favoured majority. Rebels who use 
illegal violence against the police or military in a dictatorship might be morally and 
politically justified as a last resort. 
Andrew Vails concludes that if war can be justified, then terrorism can be as 
well. 163 While terrorism often fails to be morally justified, this failure is contigent, 
not necessary. Terrorism cannot be defined into a moral comer where we do not 
have to worry any more about justification. 164 
Another justification of terrorism is that it attracts government's attention. Some 
argue that terrorism is justified on the ground that it is the best way to attract the 
government's attention if they want to achieve their aim, when the government 
ignore them. Though, it may be admitted that, terrorism can raise the profile of a 
neglected cause; example, the hi-jackings of the 1970s and 1980s brought publicity 
to the Palestinian cause, helping to bring it to the attention of the world. 




But, whatever approach these scholars had tried to justify terrorism, they always 
arrive at the conclusion that it can never be justified, after much analysis. How can 
terrorism be justified when it deprives people of their basic fundamental human 
rights? No one has a right, legally, morally or otherwise to kill and, or destroy 
another's property. 
2.3. TERRORISM AND VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS. 
Whether the actors are characterized as terrorists or freedom fighters, regardless of 
justification or moral equivalence, the acts themselves, directly or indirectly, results 
in attacks on human rights. Frequently, the counter-terrorism response is equally 
damaging. 165 
Absence of universal definition of terrorism has gravely affected the effectiveness 
of countering terrorism both in international law and domestic law and at the same 
time maintaining and abiding by the human rights obligations. 
International criminal law often prohibits conduct which infringes values protected 
by human rights law, without proclaiming those values directly. Numerous 
resolutions of General Assembly since 1970's and the UN Commision on Human 
Rights since the 1990's have asserted that terrorism threatens or destroys 
fundamental human rights and freedoms. 166 
165 Mark D. Kielsgard. A Human Rights Approach to Counter-Terrorism. 36 CA WILl 249 
166 Ben Saul. Three reasons for defining and criminalizing terrorism at 3. 
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The ultimate goal of law is to maintain justice by facilitating human dignity and 
worth, while defining substantive aspects of rights and duties of individuals and 
nations in the international legal context. 167 
One of the AU's primary concerns for combating terrorism is that terrorism violates 
basic human rights, particularly freedom of expression, freedom from fear, the right 
to life, right to development, the right to practice religion and the right to security. 
Terrorism also stands on the way of the aspirations of African peoples, particularly 
those envisaged in the Constitutive Act of the African Union and in other 
continental common frameworks. In adopting the 1999 Algers Convention, African 
Leaders were convinced that terrorism constitutes a serious violation of human 
rights, such as the right to physical intergrity, life, freedom and security. 168 
The members of the Security Council, while commenting on the terrorist attack in 
Somalia, reminded States that they must ensure strict adherence to their obligations 
under international law, in particular international human rights, refugee and 
humanitarian law. 169 
In as much as human rights and humanitarian laws are also necessary in terrorism 
cases, regardless, priority should be given to social stability, than securing an 
167 Upendra D. Acharya. Supra note 56. 
168 See African Union, the Peace Security Agenda. http:/Lwww.afr:kil: 
union .org/rootl au/ AU C/DepartmentsiPSCi counter ... 
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individual's right at a very critical moment, especially when the individual is the 
perpetrator of the terrorist act. 
Human Right Law (HRL) is applicable at all times, including during armed 
conflicts, while International Humanitarian Law (IHL) is applicable only during 
armed conflict. The two bodies of law, while complementary in some respects, 
often conflict with each other. 170IHL developed to address war between states-
international armed conflicts. However, by Common Article 3 of the four Geneva 
Conventions, basic protections have been extended to situations of non-
international-armed conflict, that is, where one of the parties is not a state. These 
protections were developed under Additional Protocol II of 1977. 171 
Through the United Nations, many resolutions have expressed the international 
community's opinion that terrorism is repugnant because it (1) seriously 
undermines human rights; (2) jeopardizes political order and peaceful deliberative 
politics and (3) can threaten international peace and security. 172 Kalliopi Koufa, the 
Special Rapporteur for the U.N sub-Commission on the promotion and protection 
of Human Rights (Special Rapporteur) has stated, "There is probably not a single 
human right exempt from the impact of terrorism." Not only do terrorist groups 
deprive individuals of their human rights, they drive states to take counter-terrorism 
170 Natasha Balendra. Defining Armed Conflict. 29 CDZLR 2461 at 2. 
171 See International Council on Human Rights. Talking about terrorism risks and choices for human 
rirhts organisations, at 30.The report can be found at www.ichrp.org/files/reports/35/129 report en.pdf 
17 Ben Saul. Supra note 65. 
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measures, which also serve to denigrate human rights. Thus, the pervasive impact of 
terrorism to human rights can be seen both directly and indirectly. 173 
The direct impact of terrorism is clearly illustrated by its immediate consequences. 
These consequences usually fall into three categories of violations: the right to "life, 
liberty, and dignity of human individual; the right to a democratic society; and ... 
rights relating to social peace and public order." 174 
Terrorist acts include, but not limited to, murder, kidnapping, and seriously injuring 
innocent parties, which all deny victims their human rights to life, liberty, and 
dignity. Terrorists seek to impose their will not only on states but also upon the 
individuals in those states. 175 The unwillingness of terrorists to submit to the 
democratic process and their attempts to thwart or disrupt that process are attempts 
to overthrow the democratic rights of the individuals in that state. The actions of 
terrorists not only deprive individuals of their rights to life, liberty, dignity, and 
democracy, but also foster an atmosphere of fear and dread that devastate social 
peace and public order. In this atmosphere, countermeasures and other precautions, 
which are perceived as safeguards, impede the essential functions of the social order 
and lead to inefficiency, lower standards of living, mutual distrust, and a fearful, 
brutish lifestyle. 176 






The indirect impact of terrorism sterns from overly intrusive, reactionary, counter-
terrorist measures. Terrorist acts frequently provoke states into overreacting by 
implementing serious breaches of human rights and freedoms. 177 Moreover, it 
should be remembered that an equitable maxim states that 'whoever comes into 
equity must come with clean hands'; therefore terrorists have no equitable 
justification of claiming breach of their fundamental right in combating their acts. 
Within the military paradigm, provisions of military aids to nations with a common 
goal of eradicating terrorism is a valid practice for developing states preventive 
capacity, but not if the aid is to be used to perpetrate greater human rights abuses 
d . 1 178 an st1rnu ate greater resentment. 
2.3.1. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS. 
The fight against terrorism is no longer a domestic criminal matter, but a global 
human rights issue. 179 In 1993, the Vienna Declaration served a junction between 
international counter-terrorist law and human rights law. Paragraph 17 of the 
Vienna Declaration explicitly linked terrorism with human rights and reflected 








In addition to dramatic advances in human rights law, this emerging worldview 
recognizes terrorism as an international scourge against human rights and allows for 
a global response that imposes greater scrutiny and state responsibility. 
Unfortunately, the domestic response to terrorism has been largely based on the law 
enforcement and military models, frequently at the cost of human rights. 181 
In contrast, Article 27 of the Convention of the Islamic Resistance Movement, 
Hamas states, "We will become its soldiers and fuel for its fire that will bum the 
enemies." 182 Therein lies the dichotomy; one side possesses unprecedented power 
and wealth that it refuses to relinquish, whereas the other possesses the desperation 
of peoples with nothing left to lose, and where compromise equals death. In this 
postmodern lion's den, it is understandable how consensus has eluded the United 
Nations. 183 
The UN counter-terrorist activity resulted from the remarkable world conference on 
human rights of Vienna Declaration of 1993. Paragraph 17 of the Vienna 
Declaration explicitly asserted the link between terrorism and human rights for the 
first time by affirming that terrorist acts "aim at the destruction of human rights, 
fundamental freedoms and democracy, threatening territorial integrity, security of 
states and destabilizing legitimately constituted Governments." 184 This assertion 
mandates that terrorism is a political and international issue and no longer merely a 
181 ld. 
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domestic criminal matter. Some of the conventions and resolutions ratified during 
this period reflect a more sophisticated approach to terrorism, such as the 
Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism and the International 
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing ofTerrorism. 185 
Notable development during this period was the proliferation of conventions 
adopted by the regional orga.'lizations in developing area, such as the League of 
Arab States and the OAU, now known as the African Union (AU) . The 
Constitutive Act of the African Union (AU) is one of the few treaties to specifically 
address the act of assassination. Article 4 recognizes a number of principles, 
including provision for "respect for the sanctity of human life, condemnation and 
rejection of impunity and political assassination, acts of terrorism and subversive 
activities." The impact ofthe Constitutive Act of the AU is limited, however, by the 
relatively small number of AU member states, and the fact that it is currently the 
only regional treaty that specifically addresses acts of assassination. 186 
But discourse on counter terrorism and human rights have become more interesting 
since the establishment of Counter Terrorism Committee (CTC) in Security Council 
resolution 1373, 2001. The Security Council Resolution 1456, 2003 and later 
resolutions, stated that "States must ensure that any measure taken to combat 
terrorism must comply with all their obligations under International Law and should 
185 Mark D. Kielsgard. Supra note 166. 
186 Mark V. Vlasic. 43 GEOJ!L 259 at 9. 
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adopt such measures in accordance with International Law, particularly 
International Human Rights, Refugee and Humanitarian Law". 
After the 9/11 attacks, the Security Council passed Resolutions 1368 and 1373 and 
the General Assembly adopted Resolution A/56/1. Resolutions 1368 and 1373 
designated acts of international terrorism threats to international peace and security 
as defined in Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. Articles 41 and 42 of that Charter 
authorize the Security Council to call on states to severe diplomatic ties, to impose 
economic sanctions, and to intervene militarily in response to threats to the peace. 
In addition, Resolution 1368 stresses the responsibility of states that host terrorist 
organizations, stating, 
"Those responsible for aiding, supporting or 
harbouring the perpetrators, organizers and 
sponsors of these acts will be held accountable ... " 
Resolution 1373, 2001's Preamble, reaffirms the need to combat by all means, "in 
accordance with the Charter of lJN" threats and International peace and security 
caused by terrorist acts. 
Security Council Resolution 1963, 2010, re-emphasis that counter-terrorism 
measures are more effective when there is respect for human rights. The resolution 
also emphasizes that respect for rule of law is necessary for effective combating of 
terrorism. 187 While categorically condemning terrorism and recognizing the duty of 
States to protect those living within their jurisdictions from terrorism, the UN has 
187Protecting human rights while countering terrorism.www.in.org/en/sc/ctc/rights.html 
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placed a priority on the question of protecting human rights in the context of 
counter-terrorism measures. 188 
Any measure taken to counter terrorism must be equal to our democratic value. In 
particular, laws designed to protect people from the threat of terrorism and 
enforcement of these laws must be compatible with people's right and freedom. 189 
It is essential to note that, although, immediately after September 11, 2001, 
emergency laws were passed which allowed for the indefinite detention of foreign 
nationals who were suspected of being terrorists without arraignment or conviction 
of the crime, but following the Counter review, most of such laws had been 
scraped. 190 
The human rights activists opines that most state governments hide under the cloak 
of combating terrorism and infringe on people's fundamental human rights, more 
especially for their political gains. Usually, members of the opposing political party 
are often denied their fundamental rights to freedom of speech and freedom of 
movement. This scenario can be clearly seen in the issue of Ethiopian journalists' 
trials that are subject of discussion for the human right activists. 
Terrorist acts constitute grave violations of human rights. Our responses to 
terrorism, as well as our efforts to thwart it and prevent it should uphold the human 
188 UN action to counter terrorism.www.un.org/terrorism-hr.shtml. 




rights that terrorists aim to destroy. Human rights, fundamental freedoms and the 
rule of law are essential tools in the effort to combat terrorism; not privileges to be 
sacrificed at a time of tension. 
Similarly, the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Louise Arbour, opined 
that in the long run, "a commitment to uphold respect for human rights and rule of 
law will be one of the keys to success in countering terrorism, not an impediment 
blocking our way." 191 These observations suggest that rather than fall victim to 
terrorism, human rights should be used affirmatively to conquer it. 192 
In 2004, the High- level panel proffered "a new vision of collective security for the 
21st century" in a report that included 101 recommendations for revitalizing the 
United Nations in order to make it capable of addressing modem threats and how to 
combat it without infringing on human's right. The key recommendations were 
contained in Secretary General's keynote speech at the International Summit on 
Democracy, Terrorism, and Security on March 10, 2005, in his article of five 
strategies, which he called the "five D's." 
The five D's are shared into 3 models. The first model, military intervention in 
response to terrorist acts or imminent threat, is grounded in Article 51 of the Charter 
of the United Nations. Law enforcement, the second model, is grounded in 
international criminal law and extant core anti-terrorism conventions. The third 




model, human rights, consists primarily of preventive measures and is grounded in 
applicable international and humanitarian law, as well as human rights conventions 
and jurisprudence. It addresses the causes of terrorism in order to "dissuade the 
disaffected from choosing terrorist tactics" and "defend human rights in the struggle 
against the scourge of terror." The High level Panel specifies numerous social and 
political justice issues, past grievances, and poverty issues that must be addressed in 
order to foster a new sense of tolerance in communities currently given to 
extremism. 193 
A human rights approach consists of a two-part initiative: stand-alone and 
integrated. The first initiative, a stand-alone approach, is designed to relieve the 
underlying suffering that foster terrorism. The second initiative, an integrated 
approach, calls for establishing human rights norms as an integral component in the 
other two models. To be effective, the law enforcement and military models must 
place primacy on human rights norms or the reaction to these models will multiply 
resistance. 
The 3 models of the five D's depend on each other for its effectiveness. Each model 
cannot stand alone on its own. Each model is less effective by itself; alone, the 
military model lacks prevention and moral certainty, the law enforcement model 
lacks strength to act globally against state-sponsored terrorism, and the human 





the High-level Panel's recommendation increase the effectiveness of the other 
models and represents a break from traditional counter-terrorism policy. It does so 
by ensuring that both law enforcement and military actions are performed in 
accordance with accepted human rights norms, thus limiting the negative 
consequences. 195 Conscientious and compassionate performance of duty by law 
enforcement and military personnel helps to avoid the conditions that promote 
terrorist recruitment. Because the integrated human rights initiative not only 
engenders more widespread human rights practices, but also serves to defuse anger 
and prevent the resort to extremism, it is integral to the struggle against terrorism. 196 
Kofi Annan, Secretary General, said that, "While we certainly need vigilance to 
prevent acts of terrorism,... it will be self-defeating if we sacrifice other key 
priorities, such as, human rights in the process. 197 
The United Nations has recognized that the solution to terrorism is more complex 
than an artificial prohibition and the use of a military or law enforcement approach. 
The High-level Panel's observation and recommendations make this recognition 
apparent. Terrorism is a human rights issue, and the model for a solution should be 
grounded in a human rights approach using human rights techniques, sensitivities, 
and jurisprudence. 198 Terrorism has a tremendous effect on human rights, both 







rights mechanism is manifest. Without a counter-terrorism solution grounded in 
human rights, the cure will result in greater depravation of civil liberties and in a 
Pandora's Box of atrocities. Developments in the "war on terror" support this 
prediction. 199 
Additionally, a human rights approach is consistent with the emergmg 
understanding that massrve human rights abuses may justify piercing national 
boundaries. Increased globalization creates a greater ripple effect with respect to 
human rights violations. 200 Universal adherence to human rights norms and two 
generations of human rights efforts have resulted in increased international scrutiny 
and allow for jurisdiction over egregious human rights depravations. The recent 
convergence of human rights instruments with counter-terrorism instruments further 
cements the link between human rights and terrorism and allows for jurisdiction 
over state sponsors of terrorism and the activities of non-state actors. Thus, there is 
a legal, intellectual, moral, and historical grounding for human rights approach to 
. 201 counter-terronsm. 
One of the most sustained critiques of the practice of human rights groups was 
made in Algeria during the 1990s, where rights and advocates were felt to have 
failed to respond adequately to massive abuses by armed group.202 Human rights 




202 International Council on Human Rights. Supra note 172 at 39. 
77 
with the crimes of the terrorists, and they fail to acknowledge that states have 
legitimate security concems.203 A subordinate criticism is that human rights 
organisations are obsessed by government and by government abuses of power. 
This blinds them to the fact that states have a clear duty to protect the security of 
those living within their jurisdiction and also play an essential role in protecting 
rights and freedoms. 204 
When democracies fight terrorism, they are defending the proposition that their 
political life should be free of violence. But defeating terror requires violence. It 
may also require coercion, secrecy, deception, even violation of rights. How can 
democracies resort to these means without destroying the values for which they 
stand? ... 205 But thinking about lesser evils is unavoidable. Sticking too firmly to the 
rule of law simply allows terrorists too much leeway to exploit our freedoms. 
Abandoning the rule of law altogether betrays our most valued institutions?06 
Resolutions 13 73 and 1624 both implicitly give fighting terrorism precedence over 
protecting human rights. Resolutions 1373 contains no language recalling states' 
human rights obligations and Sir Jeremy Green-stock, the first chairman of the 
Counter-Terrorism Committee created to monitor compliance with the resolution, 
initially made statements to the effect that making sure states continued to meet 
203 !d. at 40. 
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their obligations under international human rights conventions while implementing 
the resolution was beyond the Committee's mandate?07 The UN Security Council 
has recently, mandated that Boko Haram should be held accountable for what may 
amount to crimes against humanity and hinted at sanctions against the Islamist 
extremists. The statement approved by all 15 council members was the strongest by 
the UN' s most powerful body on terrorist attacks in Nigeria. The above statement 
obviously shows that, the Boko Haram' s act in Nigeria is also against the 
infringement of human rights. In such a situation for instance, why would 
combating Boko Haram be in adherence to human right while, they already violated 
same?08 
From the above analyses, it is safer to combat terrorism by all means, rather than 
adhere strictly to the human rights law. Many of the terrorist movements that have 
recently emerged are influenced by ideological assumptions that differ markedly 
from those governing the conduct of states, or those that inspire human rights 
law?09 Human rights groups have experience of trying to influence the behaviour of 
non-state armed groups unlike most of these terrorist groups that are not aware of 
human rights. Their organisational structure is less compatible with models of 
human rights accountability.210If there is seriously and genuinely concern about 
human rights, civil liberties and fundamental freedoms, priority is to be given to the 
207 Naomi Norberg. Terrorism and International Criminal Justice: Dim Prospect for a Future Together. 8 
SANCJIL 11 at 11 
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eradication ofthe root causes ofterrorism.211 "Terrorists" themselves are in breach 
of the said human rights when they deprive innocent people of their fundamental 
human rights. Strict application of human rights law will not be effective m 
combating terrorism. Equal or higher force measures should be applicable m 
combating terrorists' attacks. Therefore, human rights should not be prioritized over 
combating terrorism. Securing social stability of a State should always be 
paramount over securing an individual's fundamental human right when they do not 
even equitably deserve it. 
2.4. THE IMPACT OF WAR ON TERROR ON AFRICA STATES AND 
THEIR SECURITY. 
Africa has experienced various forms of terrorist acts. The 1998 embassy bombings 
in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania, which killed over 240 Africans 
and several thousands of others injured, remains the major act of terrorism in the 
continent.212 And it is not as if the continent had not been doing anything to combat 
terrorism. 
The increasing spread of extremism in Africa is the result of the socio-political 
ferment born out of poor socio- economic conditions, which has characterized 
African countries ever since independence. African countries are confronted by 
corruption, worsening these conditions are their government's inability to deal with 
211 Dr. Hans Koechler. The war on terror, its impact on the soverignity of states and its implications for 
human rights and civil liberties. 2002 at 12. 
212 Preventing and combating terrorism in Africa., http://www.africa-
union .org/root/ au/ AU C/Departments/PSC/Counte ... 
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extremism. These conditions made African regimes unable to offer solutions to 
every-day socio-economic conditions, again contributing to instability?13 
Terrorism has legal implications and serious impact on African countries. It has 
complicated their relations with neighbouring countries, forcing upon the former an 
agenda that may not always be compatible with regional peace and stability.214 
Terrorists have damaged infrastructure. Not only do they create anxiety in a 
targeted audience, but also disrupt the economy. Terrorists hope that economic 
costs when combined with human losses from economic-damaging attacks will 
pressure besieged governments to concede to their political demands.215 Evaluating 
the cost of terrorism in terms of loss to human life; international acts of terrorism, 
Africa recorded 5932 casualties out of 194 acts of terrorism between 1995 to 2001, 
making Africa the second continent after Asia, with the most casualties. Direct 
costs, in terms of devastation to infrastructure and indirect costs, through the 
withdrawal of investors and tourism, one of Africa's biggest industries cannot be 
calculated. 216 
Terrorism negatively influences a targeted country's economic growth through a 
number of channels: First, foreign investors will not be at peace investing in a 
terrorist country, they will rather divert their investments to a safer country. There 
213 Anneli Botha and Hussein Solomon. Supra note 117 at 16. 
"14 " Dr. Hans Koechler. Supra note 212 at 7. 
215 Gaibulloev, Khusrav and Sandler, Todd. The Adverse Effect of Transnational and Domestic Terrorism 
on Growth in Africa. 2010 at 1. http://research.create.usc.edu/published papers/152 
216 Anneli Botha and Hussein Solomon. Supra note 117 at 4. 
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are grounds for anticipating that transnational terrorism will be more detrimental 
than domestic terrorism on growth. When a terrorist event kills a foreigner or 
destroys property, there is a greater chance that this will negatively impact foreign 
assistance and, or foreign direct investment, which then reduces growth. Terrorists 
deliberately target assets to affect the country's economy adversely.217 
Second, augmented security outlays by a targeted government may crowd out 
productive public and private investment. Third, terrorist attacks may dampen 
growth by destroying or degrading social overhead capital that facilitates commerce 
and daily routines. Disruption to transportation, communication, and electricity 
infrastructure may have short- term dire economic consequences.218 
Consequently, Terrorist attacks in Africa have the potential to disrupt crucial supply 
lines to the industrial world, especially Nigeria, in West Africa that has rich crude 
oil growth.219 
Summarily, terrorism has led to large-scale political and social destabilization in 
gee-strategically sensitive regions; the impossibility of sustainable social and 
economic development; new divisions of society and political systems-internally 
and externally along religious, racial, ethnic lines; economic deprivation of the 
masses in the affected regions; marginalization of existing international structures. 
217 Gaibulloev, Khusrav and Sandler, Todd. Supra note 215 at 1. 
21s Id. 
219 ld. at 4. 
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It also has serious impact on the sovereignty of states and citizens alike, on national 
11 . d' 'd 1 . h 220 as we as on m 1v1 ua ng ts. 
Both terrorism and internal and external conflicts adversely affect income per capita 
h . A~. 221 growt m 1nca. 
2.4.1. SOME TERRORIST INCIDENTS IN AFRICAN COUNTRIES 
UNDER REVIEW. 
Africa is now a known continent for war on terrorism, since after 9/11. Sudan and 
Somalia are perceived as breeding ground for terrorists.222 But before 9111, despite 
the bombing of US Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya on August, 1998 that killed two 
hundred and thirteen (213) people, twelve (12) out of the 213 people were US 
citizens, as well as bombing of the same US Embassy in Dar Es Salaam Tanzania 
that killed 11 people223 , terrorism was not seen as a major threat to African's 
security. 
In June, 1995, some members of an Islamic Brotherhood allegedly originating in 
Egypt tried to assassinate President Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The 
weapons used in the assassination attempt were flown into Ethiopia by Sudan 
Airways. According to a UN report, the passports used by the terrorists were also 
220 Dr. Hans Koechler. Supra note 212 at I 0. 
221 Gaibulloev, Khusrav and Sandler, Todd. Supra note 215at 17. 
222 Prof. Knife Abraham., The challenge of terrorism to Africa and perspectives of African States. 2005 at 
2. 
223 !d., at 4. 
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prepared in Khartoum?24 Ethiopian Security forces killed five (5) of the failed 
assassins and captured three. Sudan refused to hand over the remaining terrorists 
when Ethiopia tried to secure their extradition per bilateral diplomatic channels in 
d b . h . . 225 or er to rmg t em to JUStice. 
Ethiopia took the case to UN Security Council. The UN Security Council passed 
three resolutions demanding the extradition of the three suspects to Ethiopia, yet, 
they did not comply. In April 1996, the UN Security Council imposed series of 
sanctions on the government of the Sudan.226 The sanction was lifted in September 
2001. 
Today, Africa rates as one of the major significant area in war of terrorism. Hom of 
Africa States and some sub-Sahel States of Africa are the major concerns of these 
terrorist activities. 
Three mam notorious terrorist groups m operation in Africa are the different 
Islamic sects known as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Meghreb, Boko-Haram and AI-
Shabaab. There are also other Islamic extremists that claim affiliation to either of 
these groups. Each asserts its justification for terrorizing the states in the name of 
'religion'. The havocs that had been caused and are still causing by these groups in 






essence, a response to the confusion and anxiety of modernity and can be described 
as a socio-political resistance movement based on religious concepts.227 
2.4.1.1. ETHIOPIA: 
The Islamic extremism in Ethiopia is mainly found in the Ogaden area in Eastern 
Ethiopia, among the groups of Somali and Oromo. Tribes resorted to terrorism and 
harassment against government targets and against civilians in the Ogaden area, 
preventing the orderly implementation of government in the area. Most radical 
Islamic activities in Ethiopia are being carried out by the following three 
organizations: Al-Itihad Al-Islami, whose origin and major infrastructure are in 
Somalia; The Islamic Liberation Front of Oromo (ILFO), its primary objective is 
self-determination for the Oromo and for transformation of Oromia to an Islamic 
State; and the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), which is considered to 
be a relatively moderate Islamic movement. The latter, however, formed a militant 
c: • h . . I . . G d 0 d 228 1act10n t at IS mam y active m o e, ga en. 
In October 2000 the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) formally 
announced the reunification of the Islamic Liberation Front of Oromo (ILFO), the 
Oromo Liberation Council (OLC), the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), the Oromo 
People's Liberation Organization (OPLO) and the United Oromo People's 
227 Anneli Botha and Hussein Solomon. Supra note 117. 
228 ld. at 14. 
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Liberation Front (UOPLF), and the formation of the joint United Liberation Front 
of Oromiya (ULF0)?29 
In 2007, five (5) Europeans and thirteen (13) Ethiopians were kidnapped in Afar. 
Ethiopia accused Eritrea of masterminding that kidnapping, but Eritrea blamed an 
Ethiopian rebel group. All of those hostages were released, though some of the 
Ethiopians were held more than a month.230 
There had been burning of more than fifty-nine (59) churches and displacement of 
three thousand (3,000) Christians in Ethiopia. On March 2, 2011, the Muslim 
youths attacked the community around Asendabo, near the capital of Ethiopia, 
Addis Ababa and killed one (I) Christian. The prime minister blamed the incidence 
on Muslim. He said that "elements of Kaiwarja sects and other extremists" had been 
preaching religious intolerance. 231 
In January 2012, gunmen attacked a group of European Tourists in Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia, killing five (5), wounding two (2) and kidnapping two (2). Two (2) 
Germans, two Hungarian and an Australian are the five ( 5) tourists that were shot. 
The Ethiopian government called the attack "an act of open terrorism" and said the 
229ld. 
230 Ethiopia terrorist attack leaves 5 tourists dead. www.CBSNews.com 2014. 
231 Aaron Maasho., Meles Zenawi blames Muslim sect over church attacks. March 13, 2011. 
www.ethiopiaforum.com/melesZenawi-blames-Muslim-sect-over-church-attacks 
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gunmen carne from neighboring country, Eritrea. Eritrea government refuted this 
claim by saying that it was Ethiopians' internal problern.232 
In mid October 2013, suspected Al-shabaab members in Addis Ababa tried to carry 
out terror attack against Ethiopian fans who were gathered to watch World Cup 
qualifier against Nigeria. However, their bomb blew up while they were making it 
killing two (2) of them. The victims were Somalia citizens. Police then took three 
(3) suspects into the custody_233 
There is also the presence of Al-lttihad al Islarniya (AlAI) terrorist organization in 
Ethiopia. In the mid 1990's, this group initiated several attacks against Ethiopian 
Security forces in Ethiopia and Ethiopian government fought them back. 234 
2.4.1.2. SOMALIA: 
Somalia's Muslim population is predominantly moderate, but since the breakdown 
of state authority with the fall of Mohammed Siad Barre's regime in January, 1991 
and the political void that it created, an opportunity has been presented to Islamic 
extremists to step up their activities. Radical Islamic organizations, which had 
previously operated in a limited and clandestine manner, began to function in the 
open. These organizations favour the spread of Islam, the conversion of Somalia 
into an Islamic Republic and support a stricter observance of Islamic law known as 
232 Ethiopia terrorist attack leaves 5 tourists dead., January 18,2012. www.cbsnews.com/8301-202 162-
57361145/Ethiopia-terrorist-attack-leaves-5-tourists-dead 
233 Tesfa-Alem Tekle Ethiopia accuses Eritrea, AI Shabaab of plotting attack, the Sudan Tribune, 2013 
234 Terrorist organization profile: al-Ihihaad, al-lslami; by National Consortium for the study of terrorism 
and responses to terrorism. 
www .start. umd.edu/start/ data_ co llections/topsiterrorist_ organization _profile.asp?id=4 3 29 terrorism 
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'Shari'a' as a means of instilling some form of law and order.235 Therefore, the 
origin of terrorism in Somalia started from political instability in the country, which 
gave birth to lack of recognised governance and the emergence of different 
. h 236 governments m t e same country. 
Somalia has played specialized roles in the activities of Islamic terrorism?37 It has 
primarily served as a transit point for the movement of people and materials through 
their unsecured and corrupt boarder between Somalia and Kenya, which has been a 
f' d . f . k 238 pre erre s1te o terronst attac . 
Al-lttihad Al Islamiya (AlAI), which is based in Somalia, and indigenous local 
groups including the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF),239 the militant wing of the 
Ogden Liberation Front and now quiescent Islamic Front for the Liberation of 
Oromo had carried out kidnappings, assassination attempts, mining of roads and 
bombing of bars, hotels and public buildings.240 AlAI distinguished itself by its 
development of an armed force and its focus on recruiting urban semi-educated 
youth. It also had plans to establish both a national and regional network including 
the Somali-inhabited areas of Ethiopia. It was responsible for several bombing 
235 Anneli Botha and Hussein Solomon. Supra note 117. 
236 Julie Cohn. Terrorism Havens: Somalia. Council on Foreign Relations, 2010 at I. 
237Prof. Knife Abraham, supra note 223 at 6. 
238 ld. at 5. 
239 The Oromo Liberation Front(OLF), is an organization established in 1973 by Oromo nationalists to 
promote self determination for its people against what they call "Abyssinian Colonial rule", but it has 
been outlawed and labeled terrorist organization by the Ethiopian government. 
240 Prof. Knife Abraham., supra note 223 at 5. 
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attacks in Ethiopia and Somalia. The state labelled AlAI a terrorist organization in 
1996.241 
AlAI's political platform is the imposition of an Islamic government in all 
Somalia-inhabited zones of the region, including Eastern Ethiopia. AlAI's aim is to 
integrate into local communities to avoid presenting itself as an easy target. It has 
adopted a long term strategy to prepare Somalia for Islamic rule by building up its 
activities in education, media, judiciary and commerce and has de-emphasized use 
of violence as a tactic?42 Some business owners are suspected of being sympathetic 
to members of AlAI. It is also possible that a few of the Islamic charities in Somalia 
b . d fi c . 243 may e m1suse as ronts 10r terronsts. 
Somalia is also home for Al-Shabaab. Al-Shabaab literally means 'the youth' ?44 
Al-Shabaab originated when it began its insurgency in late 2006, in opposition to 
Somalia government and it is one of the Africa's most fearsome militant Islamist 
groups. It contains much of the southern Somalia and has waged an insurgency 
against Somalia's transitional government and its Ethiopian supporters since 2006. 
It claims affiliation to Al-Qaeda.245 The leader of the group is Ahmed Abdi Godane, 
known as Sheik Mukhtar Abdirahman Abu Zubeyr. They have been terrorizing the 
Somalia public, chopping off hands, stoning people to death and banning 
241 Princeton N. Lyman. The war on terrorism in Africa. Africa in world politics by John Harbeson. 
Westview press. 
242 See Special Report: Terrorim in the Hom of Africa. United states institute of Peace. www.usip.org 
Jan. 2014 at 10. 
243 Prof. Knife Abraham., supra note 223 at 6. 
244 Julie Cohn. Supra note 237 at 4. 




televisions, music and even bars. They are so determined to turn Somalia into 
seventieth-century style Islamic State. Their acts caused full blown famine in some 
parts of the country and even blocked starving people from fleeing the country.246 
In February, 2008, the United States labelled the group terrorist group.247 
It had claimed responsibility for several suicide attacks, including the February 
2009, which killed eleven (11) Burundian soldiers in the deadliest attack on AU 
peacekeepers since their deployment. And following the lethal U.S attack on Saleh 
Ali Nabhan, a top leader of al-Queda, Al-Shabaab launched a suicide attack that 
killed seventeen (17) peacekeepers and a number of civilians.248 
In October 4, 2011, an enormous truck bomb was detonated right outside a highly 
fortified government compound in one of the few Mogadishu neighbourhoods that 
Somalia's transitional government actually controls. Dozens of people, of which 
many of them were students, standing around waiting for their results were killed, 
sending the signal that Al-Shabaab may be making a comeback after several months 
of losing grounds?49 Two weeks later, Kenya sent hundreds of troops into Southern 
Somalia. 250 
On 4 April, 2012, The National theatre of Magadishu, where the Transitional 
Federal Government (TFG) Prime Minister and other government officials were 
246 Id. 
247 Julie Cohn. Supra note 237 at 4. 
248 !d. 




attending a meeting was bombed, killing eight (8) people.251 In 12 September of the 
same year, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud survived an attempted assassination 
during a press conference with Kenya's foreign minister. Several AMISOM and 
TFG were killed in the suicide attack?52 
In January 1, 2014, two car-bombs exploded outside Jazira hotel in Mogadishu, 
capital city of Somalia, killing six (6) people and wounding eight (8). The said hotel 
is often used by foreigners and government officials. Two (2) men who appeared to 
be suicide bombers also died in the attack as they were shot by security forces when 
tried to force their way into the hotel.253 It was in this same hotel that an 
assassination attempt of Somalia's president took place in September, 2012, on his 
second day in office. 254 
In February 21, 2014, Nine (9) Al-Shabaab militants wearing military fatigues 
attacked President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, at presidential residence in 
Mogadishu, Somalia. The president was unharmed but two (2) government officials 
were killed, the former intelligence commander and an aide to the prime minister. 
The attack was in form of car bombs explosion in the compound of president and 
prime minister, which ended up killing the whole nine (9) terrorist group that came 
251 See U.S Department of States Diplomacy in Action, 2014. 
zs2 Id. 





for the attack.255 Weapons meant for the Somalia army could have been used by the 
"1" . h k 2S6 m1 1tants m t e attac . · 
In May 4, 2014, a remote controlled device was detonated on a crowded street in 
Mogadishu, killing six ( 6) people, including the targeted government officials; and 
injuring many. Suffice it to note also that, in the mid-April, two (2) Somali 
parliamentarians were killed in separate incidents of shooting and car bombing?57 
2.4.1.3. KENYA: 
Kenyan government admitted in May, 2003, that a key number of the al Qaeda 
terror network was plotting attacks on western targets, confirming al-Qaeda's 
presence in Kenya. 258 The trial of four men linked to the bombing of US Embassy 
in Kenya, discussed above, revealed a terror network that had grown in Kenya, 
because of the poor immigration and security laws.259 Two thousand (2,000) 
members of AlAI, the most powerful radical group in the Hom of Africa, was 
funded by Al-Qaeda in the past.260 Late Osama Bin Laden stated that261 'the 1998 
August terrorist bomb which destroyed the US embassy in Kenya and killed more 
than two hundred (200) Kenyans was a punishment by Al-Qaeda for Kenya's link 
255 The Associated Press. AI Shabab terrorists attack presidential palace in Somalia. 
http:/ (www .nvdai lynews.com/ news/world/ al-shabab-terrorists-attack -presidential-palace-somalia-article-
1.!622278 
256_(_d_._ 
257 United Nations News Centre-Somalia: Security Council condems latest terrorist bombing in Moga 
258 Prof. Knife Abraham., supra note 223 at 5. 
259 !d. 
260 !d. 
261 The founder and leader of Al-Qaeda, before he was killed in 20 II. 
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with the US?62 Terrorist bombing of Paradise Hotel in Mombasa in 2002 by 
members of Al-Qaeda was to punish the country for its link with the Israeli and the 
choice of hotel was not accidental because it was being owned by an Israeli.263 
Al-Shabaab staged attacks in Kenya since Nairobi sent troops into Somalia in 
October 2011, as mentioned supra, to pursue the group. The bomb blast incidence 
of March 31, 2012 at Coastal City, Mombasa in Kenya, killed one (1) person and 
injured thirty one (31 ). The attack was linked to Al-Shabaab terrorist group in 
Somalia.264 Tanzania is also being terrorized by this same Al-Shabaab group in 
Somalia. 
In September 21, 2013, the Al-Shabaab terrorist group in Somalia attacked 
Westgate shopping mall in Nairobi, Kenya. The attack lasted for three days. About 
sixty two (62) people were killed and many more injured by gun shots. 
On 4 May, 2014, bombs simultaneously exploded on two (2) buses travelling on 
Thika highway in Nairobi, leaving three (3) dead and sixty-two (62) injured?65 
Before this incidence, there was another incidence of bombing the previous day at 
Coastal town of Mombasa, that killed four ( 4) people. 266 
262 A terrorist attack on Kenya is inevitable/flashback. http//kenyastockholm.com/2010/01/27/a-terrorist-
attack-on-kenya-is-inevitable-tlashback 
263 Id. 
264 Kenya casts suspicion on Al-shabaab for blasts, April 1, 2012. http://news.yahoo.com/Kenva-casts-
suspicion-on-Al-shabaab-for-blasts 
265 Ed Adamczyk. Kenya bus bombing leave six dead and citizens worried. wvvw.upi.com 
266 James Ryder. Terrorist bombing attack in Kenya causes death and injury in Nairobi. Fox CNN world 




Sudan was the first African country to become deeply enmeshed in international 
terrorism. 267 The main reason for terrorism in Sudan is its geographical location, 
insufficient government control and a young Muslim population faced with 
inadequate socio-economic conditions, presents a breeding ground for extremism as 
well as a transit point for external elements into Africa?68 The Sudanese 
government has used its territory to provide safe haven, training bases and staging 
areas to numerous terrorist organisations, including Al-Qaeda, Egyptian Islamic 
Jihad (EIJ), Hezbollah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), Abu Nidal and 
Gama'at al Islamiyya.269 
The country is on the United States of America (US) list of States that sponsor 
terrorism, since 1993, because it openly harbored Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda from 
1991 to 1996,270 and had been sanctioned by the UN. Most of the terrorist attacks of 
the 1990's were linked, directly or otherwise to Sudan.271 
Late Osama Bin Laden lived in Khartoum, Sudan, where he was given authority to 
establish twenty-three (23) military training camps and bases of operation.272 Sudan 
had been regarded as a safe haven for terrorist. Three major factors that militate 
267 Princeton N. Lyman. Supra note 242. 
268 Anneli Botha and Hussein Solomon. Supra note 117. 
269 See Special Report. Supra note 243 at 14. 
270 Prof. Knife Abraham., supra note 223 at 6. 
271 !d. 
272 Jason R Waller., Forecasting effects of the Southern Secession . Sept.4, 2011. 
http// small wars journal. com/node/11416 
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against effective combating of terrorism in Sudan are, the country's strategic 
location, tolerant environment and porous borders. 273 
Also, there are humanitarian crises in Darfur, Sudan. Terrorist groups in operation 
in Sudan are Al-Qaeda, Hezbollah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, The Abu 
Nidal Organization, Jamaat Al-Islamiyya and Egypitian Islamic Jihad.274 
I In September 2, 2010, at the city of Tabra, Janjiweed militia on camels swept 
through a market and slaughtered over seventy (70) people including eighteen (18) 
children; and in August 23, 2012, at least one (1) person was reported killed when 
Arab militia invaded an African refugee camp in Kassab city and raped dozens of 
women and injuring twenty (20). Also, in October 28, 2012, the Islamic Republic of 
Sudan aerial bombed several Christian villages in Delami city, killing a one (1) year 
old baby, injuring nine (9). In November 2, 2012, Janjaweed militia attacked Sigili 
village and killed over a dozen residents and injured five (5). Same, in November 
17, 2012, three (3) Christian villagers were killed in two targeted bomb attacks by 
the Islamic republic. 275 
The second time, the US administration said in May 2014, that it was including 
Sudan on its list of countries aiding and abetting terrorism including Ugandan 
273 ld. 
274 State Sponsors: Sudan. www.cfi·.om/sudan~.tate.snon_sors-sudan 
275 See Islamic Terrorist Attacks in Sudan data,from September II, 2001 to December22, 2012 
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rebels ofthe Lord's Resistance Army (LRA).276 The US accused the government in 
Khartoum of Harbouring 'multinational foreigner terrorist' bases in Sudan which 
serve as logistics centres. It also said that, Sudan is involved in terrorist activities in 
Somalia, Mali, Kenya and other parts of the world and that many militants groups 
with Sudanese nationals are active members who fought in recent conflicts in West 
Africa, Somalia and Afghanistan.277 
Notably, in 2011 South Sudan got its independence. It is one of the least developed 
country, and recovering from twenty-two (22) years of civil war. 
2.4.1.5. NIGERIA: 
Nigeria has been rated as the fifth country with highest terrorist attack of the ten 
most countries with terrorist attacks.278 There are two types of terrorism going on 
in Nigeria and they can be best described as: Religious motivated terrorism on 
ethnic borders between Muslims and Christians. Kaduna in northern Nigeria forms 
the basis of conflict between Christians and Muslims; Economic motivated 
terrorism for control of oil reserves, particularly in southern Nigeria, directed 
against multi-national corporations,279 popularly known as 'Niger-Delta crises'. 
276 APA. Sudan harbouring terrorist bases- Washington report. www. washington-report-Africa-News-
starA frica.com 2014 at I. 
mw-~----
278 See page 4 of Annex of Statistical information Country reports on terrorism 2012, published by 
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, A department of Homeland 
Security Science and Technology centre of excellence based at the University of Maryland. It states that 
"the average lethality of terrorist attacks in Nigeria (2.54 deaths per attack) is more than 50 percent higher 
than the global average of 1.64. 
279 Anneli Botha and Hussein Solomon. Supra note 72 at I 0. 
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Therefore, Nigeria is beset by militant raids in Niger-Delta, by sectarian violence 
and by radical Islamist attacks in the Northern part of the country for some years 
now. However, these violent activities going on in the country did not make the 
country internationally recognized as a terrorist country, but now it is one of the 
most focused countries that have terrorist activities going on in it. 
The country became more conspicuous as a terrorist country on 25 December, 
2009, when 'the underwear suicide bomber', Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab280, a 
Nigerian citizen, attempted to explode Northwest Airline 253 en route Amsterdam 
to Detroit, Michigan. The fact that the underwear suicide bomber, Umar Farouk 
Abdulmutallab got his terrorist training in Yemen, and links with Al-Qaeda in the 
Arabian Peninsula, does not remove Nigeria from the terrorist watch list because he 
is a Nigeria citizen. 
Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab stated, before his sentencing, that "he was proud to 
kill in the name of God; today is a day of victory and God is great". He also said 
that "Al-Qaeda would one day be victorious" and that acts like his will continue 
280 Umar Farouk attended high school in Togo, later proceeded to University College London, where he 
obtained his degree in Mechanical Engineering in 2008. He was the president of the Islamic society in the 
University. He got his multiple visa entry to US from the US Embassy in United Kingdom in 2008. Later 
on in July of2009, he attended University of Wollongong in Dubai and in August the same year, he 
attended lman University, known to have links with al-Qaeda. On December 25, 2009, he boarded 
Northwest Airline 235 en route Amsterdam to Detroit and attempted to explode the flight with 76 grams 
ofpentaerythritol tetra nitrate, plastic explosive sewn in his underwear. He was arrested and arraigned in 
the federal High court of Detroit. He pleaded guilty to the charges and convicted of eight counts and 
sentenced to life imprisonment on Febuary 16,2012 at Federal High court Detroit. 
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until "the righteous servants of Allah inherit the world." He actually saw his failed 
suicide mission as a divinely inspired and continuous mission.281 
Also, the Islamic sect in the Northern Nigeria known as Boko-Haram is terrorizing 
the country, with their continuous bombing of people, places, especially Christian 
Churches, massacre of innocent citizens, especially Christians, continuous threat to 
the government, arsons, to name but a few. 'Boko-Haram' as the name implies, 
means "western education is a sacrilege". It is a jihadist terrorist organization based 
in Northern Nigeria, founded by Mohammed Yusuf in 2001. Mohammed Yusuf 
was killed in 2009, since then; there is no known leader of this Islamic terrorist sect. 
They have been known as "faceless" group of people. 
Boko-Haram became internationally known due to sectarian violence in Nigeria in 
2009. It is considered to be a major potential terrorist threat affecting Nigeria and 
other countries and believed to have link with Al-Qaeda. Boko-Haram claims to be 
prosecuting a holy war Gihad) against infidels on behalf of their god. One of their 
notorious terrorist acts was the trunk bomb planted by them in Ahuja, capital of 
Nigeria, in August 26, 2011, which killed dozens of people and destroyed much of 
UN country headquarters in Ahuja. This Islamic terrorist sect had vouched to 
continue their violence activities until the country is ruled by Sharia law.282 Boko 
281 Jason Ryan., Underwear bomber Abdulmuta!lab: "proud to kill in the name of God". Feb. 16,2012. 
http/ abcnews .go .com/b !otter/underwear-born ber -abdulmutallab-sentenced-life-prison/story?id= 1568157 6 
282 Monica Mark., Boko-Haram vows to fight until Nigeria establishes Sharia law. Guardian.co.uk. 




Haram rates second out of the ten perpetrator groups with the most attacks world 
wide, 2012?83 
In April 26, 2012, a suicide bomber drove into the office of THISDA Y Newspaper 
in Jabi district of Ahuja, the Nigerian capital, killing two (2) private security men 
and himself. The bomb blast affected some part of the building and that of the 
NIGERIAN-TRIBUNE Newspaper, located beside their building. More so, exactly 
the same day, at about the same time, another suicide bomber drove car into the 
office of the same THISDA Y Newspaper in Soji Plaza on Kontagora road in 
Kaduna State, Nigeria, killing three (3) passers-by and wounding several others.Z84 
The reason behind the terrorists targeting media houses are yet to be known. The 
president nevertheless stated unequivocally that Nigeria will continue to encourage 
freedom of speech in the country. 
In May, 2013, the Nigerian Government declared a state of emergency in some 
states of the country, namely, Bomo, Yobe and Adamawa because of the incessant 
attacks of this Islamic extremist. 
The worst of all terrorist attack by Boko Haram is the raiding and abduction of two 
hundred (200) girls from girls school in towns of Chibok and Gamboru Ngala in 
283 See Annex of Statistical information country reports on terrorism 2012. Supra note 217 at 7. It rated 
Boko Haram second after Taliban, with 364 total attacks, 1132 total killing and 3.11 Average number 
killed per attack. 
284 Nigerian Tribune., Black Thursday for media. As terrorist bomb THISDA Y offices in Kaduna, Abuja. 
5 killed, scored injured. Sun, Movement Newspaper affected. Johnathan, others condemn attack. How 





Nothern Nigeria, in April15, 2014 and threatened to sell them off as slaves. In May 
12, they released a video showing one hundred and thirty (130) of the girls that has 
being forcefully converted to Muslims, wearing Islamic clothing.285 A man 
claiming to be Shekau, said in the video released, 'I abducted your girls. I will sell 
them in the market, by Allah. There is a market for selling humans. Allah says I 
should sell. He commands me to sell. I will sell women. I will sell women. ' 286 
In 2006 however, a new group, calling itself the Taliban, launched an attack in the 
northeast city of Borno. In April 2007, the same group launched a more serious 
attack in Kano, killing thirteen (13) policemen and wounding five (5) more.287 
In 2013, the US State Department included the Nigerian extremists, Boko Haram on 
its official list of terrorist groups and placed seven million dollars ($7) bounty on 
the head of the leader Abubakar Shekau.288 
Again, in early May, 2014, the same Boko Haram attacked a boarding school in 
Northern Nigeria and slaughtered more than fifty (50) male students between the 
ages of 16 and 18. They let the female students go free and ordered them to get 
married. Also, a week before this attack, they set off suicide bombs at a bus 
285 The Yomiuri Shimbun. World must quickly help rescue of abuducted Nigerian school girls. The Japan 
News. May 15,2014. 
286 lsha Sessay and Viaimir Duthiers and Chelsea J. Carter. Boko Haram attacks Nigerian village used by 
military in search for abducted girls. Abuja, Nigeria. 
http :1 I edition.cnn .com/20 1 4/0 5/07/world/ africain i geri a-abducted-girls 
287 Princeton N. Lyman. Supra note 242. 
288 James Kitfield. A risky counterterrorism mission in Nigeria. www.yahoonews.com 
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terminal in Abuja, Capital territory of the country and attacked several major 
buildings.289 
In May 4, 2014, Boko Haram bombed a bridge linking the town of Gamboru to the 
Barno state capital, Maiduguri, the headquarters of the Nigeria Military offensive, 
killing about three hundred (300) people. This attack was commited on their way 
back from the attack on Gamboru's main market, where at least fifty (50) bodies 
have since been discovered from debris of burnt shops.290 
There emerged a new Islamic terrorist group in Nigeria, since 2012, known as 
Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis Sudan (Vanguard for the protection of Muslims in 
Black Africa); commonly called 'Ansaru'.291 They are also based in Northern 
Nigeria and broadly aligned with al Qaeda. They stated that their targets fur the 
attacks are the British and Western interests. Since 2012, they have kidnapped at 
least eight (8) hostages, mainly Europeans and are believed to have killed a good 
number of hostages, including two (2) British nationals. 292 The group claimed 
responsibility for the attack on a detention facility of the police special Anti-
Robbery Squad (SARS) in Abuja on 26 November 2012?93 
Some of the Ansaru's kidnap attacks in Nigeria are as follows: 
289 Scott Johnson. Nigeria's abducted girls are the latest victims of the country's religious divide. 
www.takepart.com 
290 America officials in Nigeria to help find kidnapped girls as report says government had warning of 
attack. wVvw.Foxnews.com 





-A British construction worker, held hostage in Nigeria and other six(6) foreign 
nationals in Bauchi State in Febuary 2013. 
- A French national worker kidnapped m his residence m Katsina State, m 
December, 2012, but he escaped in Noverneber 17, 2013. 
-The kidnapping and killing of Lebanese nationals in 2012 at Kaduna State. 
-Kidnapping and killing of a German national in January 2012. 
Furthermore, the long standing Niger-delta crises in Nigeria has turned that part of 
the country into terror. The killing and kidnapping of both foreign and indigenous 
citizens are on the increase. Nigeria is made up of thirty six (36) states and nine (9) 
states out of the thirty six states are known as the Niger-delta. The states are Abia, 
Akwa !born, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Irno, Ondo and Rivers. 
The area is characterized by ethnic pluralism as inhabited by Andoni, Bekwara, 
Bini. Efik, Egberna, Ekoi, Ibibio, Igbo, Ijaw, Isoko, Itsekiri, Ogoni, Urhobo and 
several others?94 
The crises in Niger-Delta can be regarded more as a political act. They involve in 
hostage taking of oil and oil related multinational company staff (both foreign and 
local), sabotage of company property, pipeline vandalisation, bombing of oil 
installations, kidnapping for ransom, sea piracy and robbery on the waterways. It is 
more or less conflict between local patriots and freedom fighters. 
294 See 0. Otite. Ethnic pluralism, Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflicts in Nigeria; 2000. 
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The Nigerian State formulated fiscal policies and laws such as the Petroleum Act, 
which gives the Federal Government the exclusive ownership of oil resources in 
Nigeria; the Land use Act which vests the ownership of lands on State 
Governments; The exclusive Economic Zone Act by which federal Government has 
exclusive right over all resources within 200 nautical miles from the coast to the 
sea, thus the dichotomy between on-shore and off-shore oil and so on. These laws 
and their operation are perceived by the ethnic group owners of their territories to 
be oppressive, derivational, and alienating. These views and experiences form the 
basis of agitation for demand over resource ownership and control by the people of 
the Niger Delta. 
The region produce over 90 percent of income to the country and yet they are not 
developed. Their resources are being used to develop the capital territory and places 
outside their own territory, to finance bureaucracies and personalised individual 
conspicuous consumption, official and non-official corruption. This infuriates the 
Niger Delta. 
The most serious kidnapping incident occurred on 31 July, 2000, when armed 
youths attacked two oil-drilling rigs and took one hundred and sixty five (165) 
hostages, including seven (7) US citizens and five (5) Britain. All hostages were 
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released unharmed on 4 August.295 They destroyed Gbaramutu Kingdom, expensive 
new king's palace in Ijaw and other community property in 2009.296 
On the other hand, fighting continued between two ethnic groups: Itsekiris and Ijaw 
residents of the Niger Delta. Tensions between the Itsekiris and the Ijaw 
communities remained high in 2003, with intermittent reports of violence. Tribal 
clashes in March 2003 forced the withdrawal of major oil companies from the area. 
Ethnic clashes in the region led to dozens of death, and forced multi-national oil 
giants to curtail operations in the area. Oil companies were forced to shut down 40 
percent of the country's output as the Ijaw and Itsekiris traded gunfire. Ethnic 
fighting resurfaced in Nigeria's oil-rich Niger Delta in mid-August 2003. This was 
the most serious fighting in the area since March. But in October 2003, James Ibori, 
the then governor of Delta State, brought the warring Ijaw and Itsekiri communities 
together to agree a fragile peace. Fighting between the two groups killed more than 
two hundred (200) people during 2003 and forced the government to send in troop 
reinforcements to restore order. 
What is now known as the Nigerian Oil Crisis began on 25 September, 2004 when 
the Niger Delta people's Volunteer Force (NDPVF) threatened to attack oil 
facilities and infrastructure in the Delta region. Royal Dutch Shell responded the 
next day by evacuating two hundred and thirty five (235) personnel from its oil 
fields. The NDPVF threatened to declare an all-out war against Olusegun 
295 Anneli Botha and Hussein Solomon. Supra note I I 7 at I 0. 





Obasanjo's government (the then president of Nigeria), on October 1, and told oil 
companies and their foreign workers to leave the Delta. Obasanjo entered into 
negotiations with the group and a ceasefire and disarmament plan were declared in 
September 29. 
By October, Alhaji Mujahid Dokubo-Asari, the leader of the NDPVF, withdrew 
from disarmament obligations. The rest of October was punctuated by a series of oil 
workers strikes and fluctuations in the global price of oil. In October 28, the 
NDPVF began to tum its weapons over to the government. 
In November, strikes continued and by the 151h, the government agreed to lower 
domestic oil prices. The unions suspended their strikes the next day. Unfortunately, 
fighting began anew when members of the Niger Delta Vigilante (NDV) attacked 
the Okirika region. The NDPVF responded by dropping out disarmament plans. In 
November 30, the Nigerian government revealed that over one million barrels of 
crude were lost each week during November. 
In January 2006, a new militant group, the Movement for the Emancipation of the 
Niger Delta (MEND), entered the fray. MEND is closely linked to the NDPVF and 
is demanding among other things the release of Asari, who was arrested for treason 
on 20 September 2005 and $1.5 billion in compensation from Sell for the pollution 
they claim it caused. 
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MEND's first significant act was an attack on Italy's Eni SpA petroleum company. 
The deaths of nine (9) Eni officials forced the company to evacuate its staff and 
contractors from the area. Along with further kidnappings and another withdrawal 
of Shell workers, it was estimated that the instability had resulted in a ten percent 
(10%) drop in Nigerian oil production.297 
2.5. CONCLUSION. 
The incessant terrorist acts' going on in most parts of African States has led to 
instability of security and economy in the continent. There is no justification for 
terrorism from whatever angle it is evaluated. A terrorist cannot claim an 
infringement of fundamental human right while he is also guilty of violation of 
human rights. The equitable maxim of 'whoever that comes into equity must come 
with clean hands" should not be dispensed with'. 
Under insurgency and armed conflicts, strict adherence to human rights should be 
adhered to but not in combating terrorism. 
Terrorist acts in Africa have seriously deterred the economic growth of the 
continent despite its natural resources. Most investors no longer consider some 
States in the continent safe enough to invest their money or establish business. In 
addition, the security laxities of some States in the continent are a deterrent factor to 
combating terrorism effectively, though, acceptable that poverty greatly affects 
297 Nigeria Niger Delta. www.bornblackmag.com/crises-Niger-Delta.html 
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security measures of a State. The challenge of terrorism in Africa is to balance a 
legitimate program of security improvements with a continuing and sustained attack 
on poor governance, poverty, and deprivation of human rights. 
Therefore, the focus should be in devising means of achieving the most effective 
method to combat and put to an end the increase of incessant terrorist acts in most 
African states, starting by re-viewing or re-assessing the existing laws on combating 
terrorism in Africa. 
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CHAPTER THREE. 
LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE OAU CONVENTION ON PREVENTING AND 
COMBATING TERRORISM. 
3.0. INTRODUCTION. 
The continent of Africa has a long history in making efforts to prevent and combat 
terrorism, which gave birth to the OAU Convention on Preventing and Combating 
Terrorism of 1999. It marked the first major comprehensive legislative approach to 
addressing the scourge of terrorism in Africa. The OAU Algiers Convention of 
1999 forms the major pillar for the enactment of other OAU (AU) legislations on 
peace and security in Africa. 
The AU at its 28th Ordinary Session held in Dakar, Senegal in 1992, adopted a 
resolution on the strengthening of cooperation and coordination among African 
States.298 Also, in its 30th Ordinary Session held in Tunis, Tunisia, in June 1994, it 
adopted the Declaration on the Code of Conduct for Inter-African relations,299 in 
which it rejected all forms of extremism and terrorism, whether under the pretext of 
sectarianism, tribalism, ethnicity or religion. The declaration also condemned as 
298See AHG/Res. 2 I 3 (Xxviii) in which the Union pledged to fight the phenomena of extremisim and 
terrorism. 
299 See AHG/Del.2 (Xxx). 
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criminal, all terrorist acts, methods and practices, and expressed its resolve to 
enhance cooperation to combat such acts. 300 
The OAU Algiers Convention of 1999 also states its believe in the principles of the 
International law, Charter of OAU and UN in combating terrorism. It provides thus: 
" ... Believing in the principles ofinternational 
law, the provisions of theCharters of the 
Organization of African Unity and of the United 
Nations and the latter's relevant resolutions on 
measures aimed at combating international terrorism 
and, in particular, resolution 49160 of the General 
Assembly of9 December, 1994; together with 
the annexed Declaration on Measures to Eliminate 
International Terrorism as well as resolution 511210 
ofthe General Assembly ofl7 December, 1996 and 
Declaration to Supplement the 1994 Declaration on 
Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, 
annexed thereto; "301 
The Convention further reaffirms the "legitimate right of peoples for self-
determination and independence pursuant to the principles of international law and 
the provisions of the Charter ofthe Organizations of African United Nations as well 
as the African Charter on Human and People's Rights."302 
OAU (AU) is also convinced that "terrorism constitutes a senous violation of 
human rights and, in particular, the rights to physical integrity, life, freedom, 
security, and impedes socio-economic development through destabilization of 
300 See also, The African Union Counter Terrorism framework. www.Caert.org.dz/official-
documents/ AU-CT-Framework.pdf 




States."303 It is also convinced that terrorism has no justification and should be 
combated by all means, which they are determined to do. 
"Convinced further that terrorism cannot be 
justified under any circumstances and, consequently, 
should be combated in all its forms and 
manifestations, including those in which states are 
involved directly or indirectly, without regard to 
its origin, causes and objectives. ,.Jo4 
The 1999 OAU Algiers Convention is divided into five (5) main parts with 23 
Articles and many paragraphs. Part I is the 'Scope of application' comprising of 
Articles 1 - 3. Part II is 'Areas of Cooperation' subdivided into Articles 4 and 5. 
The next part which is Part III deals with 'State jurisdiction and contains Articles 6 
and 7. Part IV is the 'Extradition' part, containing Articles 8- 13. Next to it is Part 
V which is the 'Extra-territorial investigations (Commission Rogaroire) and mutual 
legal assistance' that is subdivided into Articles 14 - 18. The final part is VI, 'The 
final provision' which is again subdivided into Articles 19 23. Then Annexed to 
the Convention is the list of international instruments. 
These Parts ofthe 1999 OAU Algiers Convention shall be the focus of discourse in 
this chapter, followed by OAU (AU) compliance with the international law (UN) 
requirements for combating terrorism and the effects of the existing convention on 





3.1. DISCOURSE ANALYSIS OF OAU ALGIERS CONVENTION OF 1999. 
3.1.1. DEFINITION OF TERRORISM UNDER THE 1999 OAU ALGIERS 
CONVENTION. 
The starting point for many definitions of terrorism is a violent act committed with 
the purpose of intimidating a population or compelling a government to do or 
abstain from doing something. Thus, the basic concept of the definition in the OAU 
Algiers Convention 1999 rests on two pillars: first, the commission of an act that 
causes or may cause death or injury; second, that the act was intended to intimidate 
the government, the population or disrupt any public service. 305 
In the OAU Algiers Convention 1999, terrorist act is defined in its Article 1 (3) (a) 
-(b) as: 
"(a) any act which is a violation ofthe criminal 
laws of a State Party and which may endanger 
the life, physical integrity or freedom of, or 
cause serious injury or death to, any person, 
any number or group of persons or causes 
or may cause damage to public or private 
property, natural resources, environment or 
cultural heritage and is calculated or intended to: 
(i)intimidate, put in fear, force, coerce or induce 
any government, body, institution, the 
general public or any segment thereof, 
to do or abstain from doing any act, or to 
adopt or abandon a particular standpoint, 
or to act according to certain principles; or 
305 S Jagwanth and F Soltau. Africa and terrorism, Joining Global Campaign. Terrorism and Human 
Rights in Africa. Published in Monograph No 74, July 2002, Chap.2 at 5. It can also be found at 




(ii) disrupt any public service, the delivery of 
any essential service to the public or to create 
a public emergency; or 
(iii) create general insurrection in a State. 
(b) any promotion, sponsoring, contribution to, 
command, aid, incitement, encouragement, attempt, 
threat, conspiracy, organizing, or procurement 
of any person, with the intent to commit any act 
referred to in paragraph (a) (i) to (iii). "306 
This definition can as well be construed under two arms: firstly, the terrorist act 
must be in "violation of criminal laws" of a State Party and secondly the terrorist 
act "may endanger the life, physical integrity .... " In other words, the two elements 
must be present for it to amount to a terrorist act. If the crime is not in violation of 
the criminal law of a nation, then it is not a terrorist act. 
How effective and justifiable will cooperation among State Parties be attained, 
when it is obvious that their respective national criminal laws are not the same? Is it 
not obvious that extradition may not be that easy among the Member States 
especially if the offence of which the extradition of a person is requested is not in 
violation of the criminal law of that nation? The definition should not include a 
prerequisite that an action must first be a violation of criminal law in order for it to 
amount to 'terrorist act'. Clear and specific obligations to adopt mandatory 
procedures to establish criminal jurisdiction are then needed to indict or extradite 
perpetrators. 307 
306 Part 1, Article 1 (3) (a) of the OAU Algiers Convention 1999. Supra note 26 




Further, the Convention in its Article 3, explicitly differentiated between acts that 
should be regarded as 'terrorist acts' from the ones that are 'liberation and self 
determination'. It states thus: 
"(I) Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 1, 
the struggle waged by peoples in accordance 
with the principles of international law for their 
liberation or self-determination, including armed 
struggle against colonialism, occupation, 
aggression and domination by foreign forces shall 
b .d d . ,3olf not e const ere as terrorzst acts. 
This exclusion is limited by the immediate following provision, which states that 
'Political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other motives shall 
not be a justifiable defence against a terrorist act. ' 309 
The broadness and vagueness of the definition of acts of terrorism needs attention 
and cannot be seen to be a legitimate limitation of rights. A basic tenet of the 
principle of legality is that legislation should not be vague and should define with 
reasonable precision the ambit of prohibited conduct. Under the definition of OAU 
Algiers Convention 1999, a strike by teachers or municipal workers, an action that 
could be interpreted as being 'calculated' to 'disrupt a public service' in the cause 
of which some incidental damage is caused to public or private property, could be 
construed as a 'terrorist act' .310 
308 Article 1 (3) (b) of the OAU Algiers Convention 1999. Supra note 26. 
309 Id. at Article 3. 




Nevertheless, some scholars had praised the OAU Algiers Convention 1999 as one 
of the best regional conventions on combating terrorism with a clearer definition of 
terrorist acts. No doubt the Convention provides a useable definition, but what 
seems like a noticeable pitfall from the definition is that the particular criminal act 
must already be defined as a crime under the national law, as stated in the beginning 
sentence of definition of terrorist act, in its Article 1 (3) (a), before it can qualify to 
be classified as a terrorist act. 
3.1.2. ROLES AND JURISDICTION OF MEMBER STATES ON 
TERRORIST ACTS. 
The Convention sets out detailed obligations of Member States for the purposes of 
the objectives set forth in the Convention. Article 2 of Part I of the OAU Algiers 
Convention 1999 stipulate what State Parties are required to do in compliance with 
the Convention. It states that they undertake to: 
''(a) review their national laws and establish 
criminal offences for terrorist acts as 
defined in this Convention and make 
such acts punishable by appropriate penalties 
that take into account the grave nature of 
such offences; 
(b )consider, as a matter of priority, the signing or 
ratification o.f or accession to, the international 
instruments listed in the Annexure, which they 
have not yet signed, ratified or acceded to; and 
(c)Implement the actions, including enactment 
of legislation and the establishment as 
criminal offences of certain acts as required in 
terms ofthe international instruments referred 
to in paragraph (b) and that States have rattfied 
and acceded to and makes such acts punishable by 
appropriate penalties which take into account 
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the grave nature of those offences; 
(d)Notifo the Secretary General ofthe OAU 
of all the legislative measures it has taken 
and the penalties imposed on terrorist acts 
within one year of its ratification of, or 
accession to, the convention. " 
Notably, "State Party" is defined in its Article 1 (2) as "any Member State of the 
Organization of African Unity which has ratified or acceded to this Convention and 
has deposited its instrument of ratification or accession with the Secretary general 
ofthe Organization of African Unity". 
Part II of the OAU Algiers Convention 1999 provides for areas of counter-terrorism 
cooperation among State Parties. Article 4 of the Convention states that Parties 
undertake to refrain from acting in such a way as to support the commission of 
terrorist acts, including the issuing of visas and travel documents; and are required 
to adopt legitimate measures to prevent and combat terrorism in accordance with 
their national structure and the provisions of the Convention, emphasizing on what 
they shall do in Article 4 (2). In the Convention's exact words, it provides thus: 
"(I) State Parties undertake to refrain from any 
acts aimed at organizing, supporting, financing, 
committing or inciting to commit terrorist acts 
or providing havens for terrorists, directly 
or indirectly, including the provision of 
weapons and their stockpiling in their 
countries and the issuing of visas and travel 
documents. 
(2)State Parties shall adopt any legitimate measures 
aimed at preventing and combating terrorist 
acts in accordance with the provisions of this 
Convention and their respective national 
legislation, in particular, they shall do 
the following: 
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(a) prevent their territories from being 
used as a base for planning, organization 
or execution of terrorists acts or for 
the participation or collaboration in these 
acts in any form whatsoever; 
(b) develop and strengthen method of 
monitoring and detecting plans or 
activities aimed at illegal cross-border 
transportation, importation, export, stockpiling 
and use of arms, ammunition and explosives 
and other materials and means of 
committing terrorists acts; 
(c) develop and strengthen methods or 
controlling and monitoring land, sea and 
their borders and customs and immigration 
check points in order to pre-empt any infiltration 
by individuals or groups involved in the 
planning, organization and execution or 
terrorist acts; 
(d) strengthen the protection and security 
of persons, diplomatic and consular 
missions, premises or regional and international 
organizations accredited to a State Party, 
in accordance with the relevant 
conventions and rules or international law; 
(e) promote the exchange of information 
and expertise acts and establish data bases 
for the collection and analysis of 
information and data on terrorist 
elements, groups, movements and organizations; 
(f) take all necessary measures to prevent 
the establishment terrorist support networks 
in any form whatsoever; 
(g) ascertain, when granting asylum, that the 
asylum seeker is not involved in any terrorist act; 
(h) arrest the perpetrators of terrorist acts and try 
them in accordance with national legislation, 
or extradite them in accordance with 
the provisions of this Convention or 
extradition treaties concluded between 
the requesting State and the requested State 
and, in the absence of a treaty, consider 
facilitating the extradition of persons suspected of 
having committed terrorist acts; and 
(i) establish effective co-operation between domestic 
security officials and services and the citizens of 
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the State Parties in a bid to enhance public 
awareness of the scourge of terrorist acts and the 
need to combat such acts, by providing guarantees 
and incentives that will encourage the population 
to give information on terrorist acts or other acts 
which may help to uncover such acts and arrest 
h . t t ,3/1 t ezr perpe ra ors. 
Therefore, summarily, State parties must refrain from encouraging terrorism in any 
form and shall adopt measures to prevent and combat terrorism by doing the 
following: Securing their boarder and territories from being used as a terrorist base 
or activities; Protect and strengthen their boarder control; Strengthen the security 
and protection of foreign diplomats in their nation in accordance with International 
Law; Promote exchange of information and ways of collecting and analysing 
information collected; Discourage establishment of any network that will encourage 
and support terrorism; Make sure that an asylum seeker is not a terrorist; Arresting 
and prosecuting a person alleged of committing terrorist act in accordance with the 
national law or extradite the person in accordance with the provisions of the OAU 
Algiers Convention 1999; Create awareness and effective cooperation among 
domestic security and citizens for combating terrorism. 
Under Article 5 ofthe same Part II ofthe OAU Algiers Convention 1999, Member 
States are encouraged to cooperate among themselves in preventing and 
combating terrorism in accordance with their national laws, strengthening their 
exchange of information by revealing terrorist groups, their leaders, camps and so 
on; communicating the modus oprandi used by the terrorists. 




" I. State Parties undertake to strengthen the 
exchange of information among them regarding: 
(a) acts and crimes committed by terrorists groups, 
their leaders and elements, their headquarters 
and training camps, their means and 
sources of funding and acquisition of arms, 
the types of arms, ammunition and explosives 
used, and other means in their possession; 
(b) the communication and propaganda 
methods and techniques used by the terrorist 
groups, the behaviour of these groups, 
the movement of the leaders and elements, 
as well as their travel documents. "312 
Member States shall also exchange information leading to the arrest of any person 
charged with terrorist act against any State Party or the nation; secure and 
confiscate the arms and ammunitions used by the terrorist. 
"I. States Parties undertake to exchange any 
information that leads to: 
(a) the arrest of any person charged with a 
terrorist act against the interest ofa 
State Party or against its nationals, 
or attempted to commit such an act or 
participated in it as an accomplice or an 
instigator; 
(b) the seizure and confiscation of any type 
of arms, ammunition, explosives, devices 
or funds or other instrumentalities of crime 
used to commit a terrorist act or intended 
for that purpose. "313 
The Member States undertakes also to keep all the information received and 
exchanged confidential within the nations and only the concerned Member States. 
The paragraph states that the 'State Parties undertake to respect the confidentiality 
of the information exchanged among them and not to provide such information to 
312Id. at Article 5 (1) (a) (b). 
313 Id at Article 5 (2) (a) (b). 
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another State that is not party to this Convention, or to a third State Party, without 
the prior consent of the State from where such information originated.' 314 
Member States are further encouraged to cooperate with one another in regard to 
arresting and prosecuting terrorist acts in accordance with the national law. 
"4. State Parties undertake to promote co-operation 
Among them and to help each other with 
regard to procedures relating to the investigation 
and arrest of persons suspected of, charged 
with or convicted of terrorist acts, in conformity 
with the national law of each State. 
5. State Parties shall co-operate among themselves 
in conducting and exchanging studies and 
researches on how to combat terrorist acts 
and to exchange expertise relating to control 
of terrorist acts. "3 rs 
Member States are also required to cooperate among themselves in providing 
technical assistance to one another. The Article provides that 'State Parties shall co-
operate among themselves, where possible, in providing any available technical 
assistance in drawing up programmes or organizing, where necessary, and for the 
benefit of their personnel, joint training courses involving one or several State 
Parties in the area of control of terrorist acts, in order to improve their scientific, 
technical and operational capacities to prevent and combat such acts.d 16 
Article 5 above focuses mainly on respective Member States' national laws in 
combating terrorism. What then is the fate of Member States that are financially 
incapacitated to follow the necessary procedures for prosecuting terrorist acts 
314 Id. at Article 5 (3). 
315 Id. at Article 5 (4) & (5) 
316 Id. at Article 5 (6). 
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effectively in their nations? Or what about nations, whose functioning arms of 
government are greatly affected by presence of terrorist groups in their nation (for 
instance, Somalia discussed in chapter 2 supra)? Why is it not necessary that a 
general regional procedures and Court be created to help such Member States 
combat terrorism effectively, rather than leaving it at national levels while 
encouraging other Member States to help? These questions need to be addressed by 
AU, if it really desires to combat terrorism effectively. 
Part III of the same Convention deals with jurisdiction of trial of the terrorist 
offence, how and when a state has the power to adjudicate on a terrorist offence. 
Article 6 ( 1) (a)-( c) provides for direct territorial jurisdiction of a Member State. It 
states thus: 
"1. Each State Party has jurisdiction over terrorist 
acts defined in Article 1 when.' the act is 
committed in the territory ofthat State 
and the perpetrator of the act is arrested in 
its territory or outside it if this is punishable 
by its national law; 
(a) the act is committed on board a vessel 
or a ship flying the flag of the State or 
an aircraft which is registered under the 
laws of that State at the time the 
offence is committed; or 
(b) the act is committed by a national or group 
of nationals of that State. " 
While, Article 6 (2) (a)-(e) covers instances where a state shall have the power to 
assume jurisdiction in trial of terrorist offence, stating that: 
"2. A State Party may also establish its jurisdiction 
over any offence when: 
(a) the act is committed against a national of 
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that State; or 
(b) the act is committed against a State or 
government facility of that State abroad, 
including an embassy or other diplomatic 
or consular premises, and any other 
property, of that State; 
(c) the act is committed by a stateless person who 
has his or her habitual residence in the territory 
ofthat State; or 
(d) the act is committed on board an aircraft which 
is operated by any carrier of that State; and 
(e) the act is committed against the security of 
the State Party." 
Further, State Parties are mandated in Paragraph 3 of the same Article 6, to notify 
the secretary general of the jurisdiction taken in accordance with sub-section 2 of 
this Article 6. 'Upon ratifying or acceding to this Convention, each State Party shall 
notify the Secretary General of the Organization of African Unity of the 
jurisdiction it has established in accordance with paragraph 2 under its national law. 
Should any change take place, the State Party concerned shall immediately notify 
the Secretary General. ' 317 
State parties are also mandated to establish jurisdiction over the acts set forth in 
Article 1 of the Convention where extradition is not required. Paragraph 4 of Article 
6 provides that: 
317 !d. at Article 6 (3). 
318 !d. at Article 6 (4). 
"Each State Party shall likewise take such measures 
as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction 
over the acts set forth in Article I in cases where 
the alleged offender is present in its territory and it 
does not extradite that person to any of the State 
Parties which have established their jurisdiction in 
accordance with paragraphs I or 2. "318 
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Article 7 of the same Part III provides for procedures a State Party shall undertake 
to investigate the presence of a person alleged to have committed any terrorist act. It 
states thus: 
"1. Upon receiving information that a person who has 
committed or who is alleged to have committed 
any terrorist act as defined in Article 1 may be 
present in its territory, the State Party concerned 
shall take such measures as may be necessary 
under its national law to investigate the facts 
contained in the information. 
2. Upon being satisfied that the circumstances so 
warrant, the State Party in whose territory the 
offender or alleged offender is present shall take 
the appropriate measures under its national law so 
as to ensure that person 's presence for the purpose 
{ 
. ,J/9 q prosecutzon. 
The alleged person's rights are also stipulated under Article 7(3) (a)-(d) and which 
said rights shall be exercised in accordance with the national law of the state in 
which the person is present as stipulated in paragraph 4 of the same Article 7; 
"3. Any person against whom the measures referred 
to in paragraph 2 are being taken shall be 
entitled to: 
(a) communicate without delay to the nearest 
appropriate representative of the State of 
which that person is a national or which is 
otherwise entitled, to protect that person's rights 
or, if that person is a stateless person, the 
State in whose territory that person 
habitually resides; 
(b) be visited by a representative of that State,· 
(c) be assisted by a lawyer of his or her choice; 
(d) be informed of his or her rights under sub-
paragraphs (a), (b) and (c). 
4. The rights referred to in paragraph 3 shall be 
exercised in conformity with the national law of 
the State in whose territory the offender or 
alleged offender is present; subject to the 
provision that the said laws must enable full 
319 !d. at Article 7 (l) & (2). 
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effect to be given to the purposes for which 
the rights accorded under paragraph 3 are 
intended. "320 
The Convention, in enacting paragraph 3 of Article 7, escapes accusation of 
infringement on fundamental human right of an accused person under domestic and 
international law. 
3.1.3. EXTRADITION OF TERRORISTS. 
Under international law, extradition is a necessary element of international 
cooperation in combating international terrorism. Extradition is generally described 
as "the process by which a person charged with or convicted of a crime under the 
laws of one state is arrested in another state and returned to the former state for a 
trial or punishment"321 • Since there is no universal rule binding states to extradite 
accused offenders, the practice of extradition is predominantly founded upon the 
notion of mutuality. In theory, alleged criminals, including terrorists, would not be 
able to flee prosecution by escaping to another state?22 
General international law prohibits a State in the absence of a treaty, from taking 
measures on the territory of another State to enforce its national laws without the 
consent of the latter. One State may not arrest a person or serve summons on him or 
320 Id at Article 7 (3) & (4). 
321 Black's Law Dictionary 623. 81h Ed. 2004. 
322 Carol A. Bahan. International terrorism: the legitimization of safe harbour states in international 
law; 2009/2010. 54 NYLSLR 333. 
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execute an order for the production of documents on the territory of another except 
under terms of a treaty or other forms of authorization. This flows from the 
proposition that jurisdiction is territorial and remains the best foundation for 
internationallaw.323 A State cannot demand the surrender of an alleged criminal as 
of right, subject of course to the exception of crimes under international law, such 
as war crimes, crimes against humanity and crimes against peace. States must 
depend on the cooperation of other States to obtain surrender of suspected or 
convicted criminals who are or have fled overseas.324 
The principles of extradition law provide the procedure to regulate such mutual 
cooperation, based, in part, on reciprocity. Globalisation has not changed this rule; 
on the contrary, it has made it more relevant. The Convention, thus, confers on each 
Member State the right to request for the extradition of persons alleged to commit 
offences falling within the ambit of the Convention. 325 
The Convention, thus, serves as the legal basis for Member States to make 
extradition request from each other irrespective of whether or not there has been a 
previous extradition treaty between them.326 Member States are also requested 
under Article 9 of the OAU Algiers Convention 1999, to incorporate terrorist acts 
covered by the Convention into their national laws as extraditable offences. 
323 Nsongurua J. Udombana. Fighting Corruption Seriously? Africa's Anti-corruption Convention, 






Acceding to a request for extradition is not automatic. Thus, where there is a 
request for extradition, a requested State may, if it has within its territory any 
person charged with or convicted of offences, refuse to extradite the person on the 
ground that it has jurisdiction over the offences.327 Where that happens, then the 
requested State shall, without fail and delay, submit the case to its competent 
authorities for prosecution unless otherwise agreed with the requesting State. 
Under Part IV, Article 8 ofthe OAU Algiers Convention 1999, Member States shall 
extradite any person charged or convicted within the territory of terrorist act in the 
territory of another Member State if the State requests and it shall be in accordance 
with this Convention or extradition agreement between the Member States, if any. 
Article 8 stipulates that: 
"1. Subject to the provision of paragraph 2 and 3 
of this article, the States Parties shall 
undertake to extradite any person charged 
with or convicted of any terrorist act carried 
out on the territory of another State Party 
and whose extradition is requested by one 
of the State Parties in conformity with the 
rules and conditions provided for in this 
Convention or under extradition agreements 
between the State Parties and within the 
l . . f h . . ll ,328 rmrts q t err natzona aws. 
Member State has a right to enact a legislation under which extradition shall be 
granted in its nation and transmit same to the Secretary General, who shall circulate 
same to all Member States as stated in paragraph 2 of the same Article 8 that; 
327 !d. 
"2. Any State Party may, at the time of the deposit 
of its instruments of ratification or accession, 
328 Article 8 (1) ofthe OAU Algiers Convention 1999. Supra note 26. 
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transmit to the Secretary General of the OA U 
the grounds on which extradition may not be 
granted and shall at the same time indicate the 
legal basis in its national legislation or 
international conventions to which it is a 
party which excludes such extradition. The 
Secretary General shall forward these grounds 
to the State Parties. "329 
Article 8 (3) stipulates limitations to granting extradition as follows: 
"3. Extradition shall not be granted if final 
Judgement has been passed by a competent 
authority of the requested State upon the person 
in respect of the terrorist act or acts for which 
extradition is requested. Extradition may also 
be refused if the competent authority of the 
requested State has decided either not to institute 
or terminate proceedings in respect of the same act 
or acts." 
A Member State is bound to prosecute the alleged offender without delay if 
extradition was not granted by it. 'A State Party in whose territory an alleged 
offender is present shall be obliged, whether or not the offence was committed in its 
territory, to submit the case without undue delay to its competent authorities for the 
purpose of prosecution if it does not extradite that person. ' 330 
Member States are mandated to include 'terrorist act' as defined in Article 1 of this 
Convention as an extraditable offence in its national law. 'Each State Party 
undertakes to include as an extraditable offence any terrorist act as defined in 
329 Id. at Article 8 (2). 
330 Id. at Article 8 (4). 
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Article 1, in any extradition treaty existing between any State Parties before or after 
the entry into force of this Convention. ' 331 
Article 10 provides for means of exchanging extradition request between Member 
states. It states that 'exchange of extradition requests between the State Parties to 
this Convention shall be effected directly either through diplomatic channels or 
other appropriate organs in the concerned States.' 
Article 11 further stipulates procedures and contents of extradition request as 
follows: 
"Extradition requests shall be in writing, and 
shall be accompanied in particular by the 
following: 
(a) an original or authenticated copy 
of the sentence, warrant of arrest or 
any order or other judicial decision 
made, in accordance with the procedures 
laid down in the laws of the requesting 
State; 
(b) a statement describing the offencesfor 
which extradition is being requested, 
indicating the date and place of its 
commission, the offence committed, 
any convictions made and a copy of 
the provisions of the applicable law; 
and 
(c) as comprehensive a description as possible 
of the wanted together with any other may 
assist in establishing the person's identity 
and nationality. " 
Article 12 provides for method of extradition under urgent cases. The competent 
authority may in urgent cases request for the arrest of the alleged offender in 
331 Id. at Article 9. 
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writing for reasonable period in accordance with the national law of the requesting 
state. It states thus: 
" In urgent cases, the competent authority of 
the State making the extradition may, in writing, 
request that the State seized of the extradition 
request arrest the person in question provisionally. 
Such provisional arrest shall be for a reasonable 
period in accordance with the national law of the 
requested State. " 
Furthermore, in a situation where a Member State receives requests from different 
Member States for extradition of a particular person, the Member State shall decide 
which of the Member States to extradite the alleged offender to, considering the 
dates of request and shall in addition deliver to the state the funds and materials for 
the commission of the offense. The Art. provides that: 
" 1. Where a State Party receives several 
extradition requests from different States Parties 
in respect of the same suspect and for the same 
or different terrorist acts, it shall decide on these 
requests having regard to all the prevailing 
circumstances, particularly the possibility 
of subsequent extradition, the respective dates 
of recipt of the requests, and the degree of 
seriousness of the crime. 
2. Upon agreeing to extradite, States Parties 
shall seize and transmit all funds and 
related materials purportedly used in the 
commission of the terrorist act to the requesting 
State as well as relevant incriminating evidence. 
3. Such funds, incriminating evidences and 
related materials, upon confirmation of 
their use in the terrorist act by the requested 
State, shall be transmitted to the requesting 
State even if, for reasons of death or escape 
of the accused, the extradition in question cannot 
take place. 
4. The provisions in paragraphs 1,2 and 3 of this 
Article shall not affect the rights of any of 




regardin~ the materials or revenues mentioned 
above. "3 2 
Generally, extradition treaties intend to play a particularly important role in the 
cooperative efforts to combat terrorism. Yet, their effectiveness has been hampered 
by the fact that the political offence exception contained in all extradition treaties, 
protects from extradition of political offenders of all types, non-violent and violent 
alike, including terrorists.333 Practice has shown that extradition is far from perfect, 
as various obstacles can prevent the successful extradition of criminals. With regard 
to international terrorism, extradition can be hindered by a number of obstacles 
including the principle of aut dedere aut judicare334, the political offence exception 
and state-sponsored terrorism. 335 
332 See Article 13 (I)- (4) of the OAU Algiers Convention 1999. Supra note 26. 
333 Antje C. Petersen. Extradition and the Political offense exception in the Suppression ofterrorism; 
1992,67 Ind. L.J. 767. 
334 The principle of aut dedere aut judicare is the duty to extradite or prosecute. It is a component of 
extradition. The principle permits a custodial state, which has established jurisdiction over the 
offense, to exercise its sovereignty by either extraditing the alleged offender to a requesting state or 
prosecuting the alleged offender under its domestic laws. Although the principle is based in treaty 
law as it is included in at least seventy seventy international treaties and conventions, there is an 
ongoing debate as to whether it should qualify as a norm of customary international law. As pertains 
to universal jurisdiction for international crimes ( example, war crimes and crimes against 
humanity), the obligation of aut dedere aut judicare is compulsory for all states regardless of their 
legal obligations or the source of law for the designated crimes treaty or customary international law. 
Currently, the international law commission (ILC) has undertaken an effort to investigate whether 
aut dedere aut judicare may qualify as such norm. Yet states seem hesitant to extend the binding 
obligations of customary international law to aut dedere aut judicare due to its predominant 
formulation by treaties. Hence aut dedere aut judicare has yet to gain the requisite status under 
customary international law to bind states regardless of their treaty obligations or lack thereof. See 
Carol A. Bahan; Supra note 322. 
With regard to international terrorism, the principle aut dedere aut judicare is a significant obstacle 
to the effective enforcement of the multilateral conventions. The framework of principle as applied 
to terrorist acts was first established in the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of 
Aircraft, also known as The Hague Convention or the Unlawful Seizure Convention. See Carol A. 
Bahan; Supra note 322. 
335 Carol A. Bahan. Supra note 322. 
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Therefore, the problem with extradition in this OAU Algiers Convention 1999 as 
well as international law is that some States that have interest in that particular 
terrorist act committed by the alleged offender may refuse to extradite the offender 
and opt to try the offender by itself as required under Article 8 ( 4) of the 
Convention. The law is that, the contracting state in the territory of which the 
alleged offender is found shall, if it does not extradite him, be obliged, without 
exception whatsoever and whether or not the offence was committed in its territory, 
to submit the case to the appropriate authorities for the purpose of prosecution. 
Those authorities shall take their decision in the same manner as in the case of any 
ordinary offence of a serious nature under the law of that state. 336 
Although, the theory of extradition is that no terrorist can escape prosecution by 
fleeing to another Member State because that State would have the obligation to 
prosecute him if it chooses not to extradite him, regardless of the state's reason for 
refusal, but that is not obtainable in practice. The requirement under Article 8 ( 4) of 
the OAU Algiers Convention 1999 is that the State should immediately submit to 
competent authority for prosecution. There is no indication that the case must 
proceed past the investigative inquiry stage, as the investigation will be dictated by 
domestic evidentiary and procedural law. Another problem is that there will 
probably be insufficient evidence available in the state seeking prosecution.337 So, 
despite the principle of good faith present in all international treaties, two legal 
336 See Article 7 of Convention for Suppression of Unlawful seizure of Aircraft, 1971. 




scholars have essentially labelled aut dedere aut judicare in its current application 
as 'little more than a fayade of justice'. 338 
In other words, no matter how cooperative Member States are required to be among 
them by the Convention, extradition is not free from bias, especially in cases of 
State sponsored terrorism. It can thus be rightly said that extradition can as well 
create safe haven for terrorists. Basically, an offender who succeeds in placing 
himself outside the territory of the state where he committed the crime also places 
himself beyond the reach of the law that he violated.339 
3.1.4. EXTRA-TERRITORIAL INVESTIGATIONS (COMMISSION 
REGATOIRE) AND MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE. 
Commission Regatoire is a French word which literally means "letter of request". It 
means a formal request from a court to a foreign court for some type of judicial 
assistance. Extra-territoriality is jurisdiction exercised by a nation in other countries 
by treaty or by its own ministers or consuls in foreign lands. Impliedly, domestic 
law can be applied beyond the State's geographical boundaries. This concept stems 
from the writings of French legal theorist and jurist Pierre Ayrant, who proposed 
the theory that certain persons and things, while within the territory of a foreign 
sovereign state, remained outside the reach of local judicial process. 
338 Id. 
339 Christopher C. Joyner. International extradition and global terrorism: Bringing international 
criminals to justice; 2003. 25 Loy. L.A Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 
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The Letter of request or commission regatoire usually contains: 
Names of the Member State requesting its execution and the Member State 
requested to execute. 
The names and addresses of the parties to be investigated and their 
representatives. 
The nature of the investigation that 1s required, g1vmg all necessary 
information in the regard thereto. 
Other evidence to be obtained or other judicial act to be performed. 
The questions to be put to the person to be investigated or a statement of the 
subject-matter about which they are to be investigated 
The document or other property, real or personal to be inspected. 
Any requirement that the evidence is to be given on oath or affirmation. 
Any special method or procedure to be followed. 340 
Part V, Articles 14-18 of the OAU Algiers Convention 1999 provides for Extra-
territorial investigations (Commission Regatoire) and mutual legal assistance like 
its counterparts in counter-terrorism legislations. Member States has a right to 
request each other's assistance and cooperation in allowing the State to come into 
the latter's territory to investigate any judicial proceeding concerning an alleged 
terrorist offender while recognising the sovereign rights of the State Party. The 
Convention provides thus: 





"Any State Party may, while recognizing the 
Sovereign rights of States Parties in matters 
of criminal investigation, request any other State 
Party to carry out, with its assistance and 
cooperation, on the latter's territory, criminal 
investigations related to any judicial proceedings 
concerning alleged terrorist acts and, in particular; 
(a) the examination of witnesses and transcripts 
of statements made as evidence; 
(b) the opening ofjudicial information. 
(c) the initiation of investigation processes; 
(d) the collection of documents and recordings or, 
in their absence, authenticated copies thereof; 
(e) conducting inspections and tracing of 
assets for evidentiary purposes; 
(f) executing searches and seizures; and 
(g) service ofjudicial documents. "341 
Article 15 provides for grounds on which commission regatoire may be refused. It 
states that: 
"A commission rogatoire may be refused: 
(a) where each of the State Parties has to execute 
a commission rogatoire relating to the same 
terrorist acts; 
(b) if that request may affect efforts to expose 
crimes, impede investigations or the indictment 
of the accused in the country requesting the 
commission rogatoire; 
(b) if the execution of the request would affect 
the sovereignty of the requested State, its 
security or public order. " 
The Extra-territorial investigation shall be in accordance with the requested state's 
national laws and principles of bank's confidentiality shall not be a ground for 
refusing such commission. 'The extra-territorial investigation (commission 
rogatoire) shall be executed in compliance with the provisions of national laws of 
the requested State. The request for extra-territorial investigation (commission 
rogatoire) relating to a terrorist act shall not be rejected on the grounds of the 
341 Part V, Article 13 ofthe OAU Algiers Convention 1999. Supra note 26. 
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principle of confidentiality of bank operations or financial institutions, where 
applicable. "342 
Articles 1 7 and 18 provides for more cordial cooperation needed by Member States 
for effective Extra-territorial investigation. The Articles stipulates that: 
"The State Parties shall extend to each other the 
best possible mutual police and judicial assistance 
for any investigation, criminal prosecution or 
extradition proceedings relating to the terrorist 
acts as set forth in this Convention. "343 
"The State Parties undertake to develop, if necessary, 
especially by concluding bilateral and multilateral 
agreements and arrangements, mutual legal assistance 
procedures aimed at facilitating and speeding up 
investigations and collecting evidence, as 
well as cooperation between law enforcement 
agencies in order to detect and prevent terrorist 
acts. n344 
Therefore, extra-territoriality can also be seen as the right or privilege of a state 
to exercise authority in certain circumstances beyond the limits of its territory. 
Its investigation involves concurrent jurisdiction, which inevitably produces 
occasion of tension. The manner in which some Member States will respond to 
it often impedes the effectiveness of extra- territorialism. 
Generally, commission regatoire is time consuming. When a prosecutor wants a 
particular piece of evidence for use at a trial that is set for a date certain, 
342 ld. at Article 16. 
343 Id. at Article 17. 




chances are that the prosecutor may not get the evidence on time before the trial 
date that had been set. 
3.1.5. FINAL PROVISION. 
The final part of the Convention which is Part VI, provides for procedures for 
Member States' ratification or accession to the Convention, method of 
withdrawing their membership and enforcement of the Convention. It provides 
thus: 
"1. This Convention shall be open to signature, 
ratification or accession by the Member 
States of the Organization of African Unity. 
2. The instruments of ratification or accession to 
the present Convention shall be deposited with 
the Secretary General of Organization of African 
Unity. 
3. The Secretary General of the Organization of 
African Unity shall inform Member States of 
the Organization of the deposit of each 
instrument of ratification or accession. 
4. No State Party may enter a reservation 
which is incompatible with the objects and 
purposes of this Convention. 
5. No State Party may withdraw from this 
Convention except on the basis of a written 
request addressed to the Secretary General 
of the Organization of African Unity. The 
withdrawal shall take effect six months 
after the date of receipt of the written request 
by the Secretary General of the Organization 
of African Unity. "345 
345 I d. at Article 19 (1) (5). 
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Article 20 provides for effective date of the Convention entering into force and 
State's effectiveness to membership after ratification as follows: 
"I. The Convention shall enter into force thirty 
days after the deposit of the fifteenth 
instrument of ratification with the Secretary 
General of the Organization of African Unity. 
2. For each of the States that shall ratify or 
accede to this Convention, shall enter into 
force thirty days after the date of the deposit 
by that State Party of its instrument of 
ratification or accession. " 
The Convention was adopted on 14 June 1999 and entered into force on 6 
December, 2002 in accordance with Article 20 (1) ofthe Convention stated supra. 
Article 21 is what shall be called the 'special provision' that provides for the 
amendment of this Convention if need arises. It also provides steps or procedures 
for such amendment. 
"I. Special protocols or agreements may, if 
necessary, supplement the provisions of this 
Convention. 
2 This Convention may be amended if a State Party 
makes a written request to that effect to the 
Secretary General of the Organization of African 
Unity. The assembly of Heads of State and 
Government may only consider the 
proposed amendment after all the States 
Parties have been duly informed of it at least 
three months in advance. 
3 The amendment shall be approved by a simple 
majority of the State Parties. It shall come into 
force for each State which has accepted it in 
accordance with its constitutional procedures 
three months after the Secretary General has 
received notice of the acceptance. " 
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Article 21 is 'special' in the sense that it creates the avenue under which the thesis 
of this dissertation can be achieved by amending the Convention to include a 
universal Court for trial of terrorist acts, rather than leaving it on the hands of 
domestic courts of Member States. 
The Convention stipulates, in Article 22, how the contents of this Convention shall 
be interpreted. It provides that the Convention shall not be interpreted as derogating 
from the general principles of international law and African Charter. If there is any 
dispute between Member States in interpreting this Convention, it shall be amicably 
settled between them by direct agreement. Failure to reach a consensus by the 
Member States, they can then refer to International Court of Justice for 
interpretation of the Convention. The wordings of the said article are: 
"1. Nothing in this Convention shall be 
interpreted as derogating from the general 
principles of international law, in particular 
the principles of international humanitarian law, 
as well as the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples' Rights. 
2. Any dispute that may arise between the 
States Parties regarding the interpretation or 
application of this Convention shall be amicably 
settled by direct agreement between them. Failing 
such settlement, any one of the State Parties may 
refer the dispute to the International Court of 
Justice in conformity with the Statute of the 
Court or by arbitration by other States 
P . h" c . 346 artres to t zs onventzon. 
Article 23 provides different official languages of the OAU (AU) Member 
States, in which the original version of this Convention was written and 
deposited with the secretary general of the Organization. 
346 !d. at Article 22 (1) & (2). 
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"The Original of this Convention, of which the 
Arabic, English,French and Portuguese texts 
are equally authentic, shall be deposited with 
the Secretary General of the Organization of 
African Unity. " 
The Convention ends with an Annex, containing the list of all international 
instruments.347 
3.2. OAU (AU) COMPLIANCE WITH THE UNITED NATIONS 
REQUIREMENTS FOR COMBATING TERRORISM. 
Is the OAU Algiers Convention 1999 in compliance with the UN requirements? In 
2001, a Counter Terrorism Committee (CTC) was created by Resolution 1373 to 
monitor all member states counter terrorism ratification as required by UN. 
The OAU Algiers Convention 1999 is a regional treaty, which finds its basis in the 
numerous United Nations Conventions and Resolutions that deal with counter-
347 (a) Tokyo Convention of Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft of 1963; 
(b) Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation 
of 1971 and the Protocol thereto of 1984; (c) New York Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of Crimes against International Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents of 1973; 
(d) International Convention against the Taking of Hostages of 1979; (e) Convention on the Physical 
Protection ofNuclear Materials of 1979; (f) United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 
1982; (g) Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving 
International Civil Aviation, supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 
against the Safety of Civil Aviation of 1988; (h) Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 
against the Safety of Fixed Platforms located on the Continental Shelf of 1988; (i) Convention for 
the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against Maritime Navigation of 1988; G) Convention on the 
Making of Plastic Explosives of 1991; (k) International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist 
Explosive Bombs of 1997; (I) Convention on the Prohibition of the use, Stockpiling, Production and 
Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction of 1997. See Annex ofOAU Convention 
on Preventing and Combating Terrorism. 
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terrorism measures. The OAU Algiers Convention of 1999 states categorically 
among other preambles that, 
"Believing in the principles of international law, 
the charter .... and the latter's relevant resolutions 
on measures aimed at combating international 
terrorism and, in particular, resolutions 49/60 of 
the General assembly of 9 December, 1994 ... 
as well as resolution 511210 of the General 
Assembly ... "348 
On the 84th plenary meeting of the General Assembly, the resolution 49/60, known 
as Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, held on December 9, 1994349, 
urged all United Nations Member States in accordance with the provisions of the 
Declaration, to take all appropriate measure at the national and international levels 
to eliminate terrorism with immediate effect. 350 In its Annex, it recalls and is 
concerned by the increase in many regions of the world, of acts of terrorism based 
on intolerance and extremism, firmly determined to eliminate international 
terrorism in all its forms and manifestations; 'Convinced also, that the suppression 
of acts of international terrorism, including those in which States are directly or 
indirectly involved, is an essential element for the maintenance of international 
d 
. ,351 peace an secunty 
The resolution also declares that: 
"States must also fulfill their obligations under 
the Charter of the United Nations and other 
provisions of international law with respect 
to combating international terrorism and are 
348 See the preamble ofOAU Convention on preventing and Combating ofTerrorism, 1999. 
349 See A/RES/49/60 
350 I d., at 4. 
351 See the Annex of A/RES/49/60. 
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urged to take effective and resolute measures 
in accordance with the relevant provisions of 
international law and international standards 
of human rights for the speedy andfinal 
l . . . if. . l . ,352 e zmznatzon o znternatzona terrorzsm .... 
Additionally, in Resolution 511210, Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, 
the General Assembly at its ggth plenary meeting of 17 December, 1996, recalled its 
resolution 49/60, supra. It recalled that in the Declaration on Measures to Eliminate 
International Terrorism, the General Assembly "encouraged States to review 
urgently the scope of the existing international legal provisions on the prevention, 
repression and elimination of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, with the 
aim of ensuring that there was a comprehensive legal framework covering all the 
aspects of the matter."353 It also reaffirmed the declaration on Measures to 
Eliminate International Terrorism contained in the annex to resolution 49/60.354 
These two resolutions and other international legal provisions formed the core basis 
for enacting the OAU Algiers Convention, 1999. Also, wordings of Article 22 of 
the OAU Convention stated above, shows that OAU Convention is an instrument 
enacted in accordance with the requirements of international law in combating 
terrorism and should not be interpreted as derogating from the general principles of 
international law, particularly principles of international humanitarian law and 
African charter on Human and peoples' right. 
352 !d., at 5. 
353 A/RES/51/21 0. 
354 !d., at 7. 
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Therefore, suffice it to say that the enactment ofthe OAU Algiers Convention 1999 
is in compliance with the United Nations requirement for combating terrorism. 
3.3. EFFECTS OF THE OAU ALGIERS CONVENTION 1999. 
The main point lies not in enactment of the law, but the enforceability of the 
enacted law. As far back as 1985, on the 401h anniversary of the signing of the UN 
Charter, the then Secretary General, Javier Perez de Cuellar stated that: 
"Mere condemnation of .... terrorist acts is 
insufficient. Effective international action 
is required. Resolutions and conventions have 
been adopted in the past ... These provide a vital 
framework for countermeasure. It is tragically 
evident, however, the new, multilaterally coordinated 
efforts are urgently required to deal with the terrible 
phenomenon, which is beyol}d the capacity of any one 
country to handle alone. "35) 
Did Javier Perez de Cuellar's statement supra make any impact in enactment of 
counter-terrorism laws in UN and at world at large? How has the OAU Convention 
impacted Africa in preventing and combating terrorism? 
The UN Counter-Terrorism Committee ( CTC) was created in 2001 to monitor the 
implementation of Security Council Resolution 13 73. The CTC Consists of all 15 
members of the Security Council. They took the unprecedented step of imposing 
355 Dr Paul Nonnan. The United Nations and Counter-terrorism After September 11: towards the 
assessment of the impact and prospects of counter-terror 'spilll-over' into international criminal 
justice cooperation. Paper presented to British Society of Criminology conference 6-91h July 2004 at 
University of Portsmouth. 004, Jan 2005, Vol. 2.0. 
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uniform obligations on all UN Member States356 and enforce Member States to 
ratify all existing UN and regional legal instruments on terrorism and to enact 
domestic legislation necessary for their enforcement. 
Then, as a result of concern, that the 1999 OAU Algiers Convention had inherent 
weaknesses which could impair its implementation by the Union, the AU enacted 
Protocol to the OAU Convention on Prevention and Combating of Terrorism for the 
effective implementation of the Convention in 2004. 
The preamble of the Protocol states that the Union is: 
"Gravely concerned at the increasing incidence 
of terrorist acts worldwide, including in Africa, 
and the growing risk of linkages between 
terrorism and mercenarism, weapons of mass 
destruction, drug trafficking, corruption, 
transnational organized crimes, money 
laundering, and the illicit proliferation of arms; 
Determined to combat terrorism in all its forms 
and manifestations and any support thereto in Africa; 
... Guided by the principles and regulations enshrined 
in international conventions and the relevant decisions 
of the United Nations (UN) to prevent and combat 
terrorism, including resolution 1373 adopted by the 
Security Council on 28 September 2001, and relevant 
General Assembly resolutions; 
Reaffirming our commitment to the OA U Convention 
for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa, adopted 
in Libreville, Gabon, in July 1977; 
... Reaffirming our commitment to OA U Convention on 
the Prevention and Combating of terrorism adopted by 
356 Eric Rosand. Security Council Resolution 1373, the Counter-Terrorism Committee, and the fight 
against terror; 2003, American Journal of International Law 97 at 333. 
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the 35th OA U Summit in Algiers, Algeria, in July 1999; 
... Further Recalling the plan of Action for the 
Prevention and Combating ofTerrorism adopted by 
the intergovernmental High Level meeting of 
Member States of the African Union, held in Algiers, 
Algeria, in September2002; 
.... Stressing the imperative for all Member States of 
the African Union to take all necessary measures to 
protect their populations from acts of terrorism and 
to implement all relevant continental and 
international humanitarian and human rights 
instruments; and 
Desirous ofensuring the effective implementation of 
the OA U Convention on the Prevention and 
Combating of Terrorism. "357 
Apparently, the main purpose of the protocol 1s to enhance the effective 
implementation of the Convention and to give effect to Article 3( d) of the Protocol 
Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the 
African Union, on the need to coordinate and harmonize continental efforts in the 
prevention and combating of terrorism in all its aspects, as well as in the 
implementation of other relevant international instruments.358 The Protocol also 
provides for the mechanism for implementation of the OAU Algiers Convention 
1999 in its Article 4 (a)-( f), which states thus: 
"The Peace and Security Council (PSC) shall be 
responsible for harmonizing and coordinating 
continental efforts in the prevention and 
combating of terrorism. In pursuing the endeavor, 
the PSC shall: 
(a) establish operating procedure for information 
gathering, processing and dissemination; 
(b) establish mechanisms to facilitate the 
357 See the preamble of the protocol to the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of 
Terrorism. 
358 Id at Article 2 (2). 
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exchange of information among States Parties 
on patterns and trends in terrorist acts and 
activities of terrorist groups and on successful 
practices on combating terrorism; 
(c) present annual report to the Assembly of the 
Union on the situation of terrorism on the 
continent; 
(d)monitor, evaluate and make recommendations 
on the implementation of the Plan of Action and 
programmes adopted by the African Union; 
(e) examine all reports submitted by States Parties 
on the implementation of the provisions of this 
Protocol; and 
(f) establish an information network with national, 
regional and international focal points on terrorism. "359 
The PSC is the supreme organ of the AU charged with the responsibility to prevent 
and combat terrorism in Africa. Article 7(i) of the Protocol Relating to the 
Establishment of the PSC gives it the power to ensure the implementation of the 
Algiers Convention and other relevant international, continental and regional 
conventions and instruments, as well as harmonise and coordinate efforts at the 
regional levels to combat international terrorism. 
International concern about Africa has more to do with its weak states providing 
safe haven for terrorists, from which to finance and launch terrorist attacks or hide 
from international retribution?60The most glaring omission from the OAU Algiers 
Convention of 1999 is any reference to monitoring or compliance mechanisms. The 
Article 23 (2) of the Constitutive Act ofthe African Union, 2000, closes this gap, in 
theory, by providing for sanctions against a Member State which "fails to comply 
359 ld at Article 4 (a)-(t) 
36° Kathryn Sturman. The AU Plan on Terrorism. Joining the global war or leading an African Battle. 
The Essay can be found on www.issafrica.org/armsnetafrica/sites/default/files/sturman 
144 
I 
with the decisions and policies of the Union". In practice, however, the AU has no 
precedent and little power to enforce compliance. 
The AU Plan of Action is premised on the need to strengthen the capacity of 
African States through intergovernmental co-operation and co-
ordination.361 Ratification and implementation of the OAU Algiers Convention, 
1999 is the first undertaking of the Plan of Action. A primary objective of the AU 
Commission and the Institute for Security Studies (who were partners in the 
project) in convening the Algiers Senior Officials' Meeting was to build up 
momentum for the 15 ratifications required for the Convention to enter into force. 
This target was met and exceeded at the said Algiers meeting of 2002, with South 
Africa being the 15th Member State to ratify the Convention. 
Although it is not mandatory, the plan of Action specifically sets out a monitoring 
and enforcement role for the new Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the 
commission of the AU. Under Article 7 of the Protocol relating to the 
Establishment of the PSC, adopted at the AU Summit in Durban, July 2002, the 
PSC is specifically charged to ensure the implementation of the Algiers Convention 
and other relevant international, regional and sub-regional instruments to combat 
terrorism.362 The PSC (or the existing Central Organ of the OAU Mechanism for 
Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution) shall request all Member States 
to report annually on the steps they have taken to prevent and combat terrorism, and 
361 See the preamble and Article (7) Plan of Action of the African Union for the Prevention and 
Combating Terrorism, adopted at Algers on 14 August 2002. it can also be found on www.iss.co.za 




specifically, to implement the Algiers Convention, 1999; present an annual report 
on terrorism to the Assembly or the Union; and monitor and make 
recommendations on the implementation of the AU Plan of Action on the 
Prevention and Combating of Terrorism. The AU Commissioner in charge of Peace 
and Security will also examine and follow up on the reports submitted by Member 
States, and "provide advice on matters pertaining to counter-terrorism action 
including preparation of model legislation and guidelines to assist Member 
States". 363 
Another important proposal which was accepted in the meeting is the establishment 
of African Research Centre on Terrorism; therefore, the African Centre for the 
Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) was established through the AU plan of 
Action meeting, 2002. The ACSRT provides forum for interaction and cooperation 
among Member States and Regional mechanism. The centre is considered part of 
the Peace and Security Department of the AU Commission and plays an important 
role in guiding the AU's counter-terrorism efforts and implementing the AU 
counter-terrorism framework. It works in collaboration with a number of regional 
and international partners to ensure coherent and co-ordinated counter-terrorism 
efforts in the continent. 364 
363 Plan of Action of the African Union for the Prevention and Combating Terrorism. Supra note 361 
at Article 16 (b)-( d). 
364See Dr Liess Bourka' address in the meeting on Resolution 1373(2001) held on 10 June 2010 at 
UN Heaquarter, New York by UN Security Counil Counter-Terrorism Committee. 
www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/docs/20 10/201.0 06 l 0 acsrt.pdf 
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The mandate of the ACSRT is to centralize information, studies of and analyses of 
terrorism and terrorist groups, as well as to initiate research and develop training 
programmes by organizing training schedules, meetings and symposia with the 
assistance of international partners, with the view to raise maximum awareness, 
prevent and eliminate the threat of terrorism in the continent. The ACSR T is 
envisaged to provide the AU with the necessary expertise for realising the AU's 
Counter-terrorism objectives as well as translating the continental and international 
I . f h M b S . . 365 commitments o t e em er tates mto concrete actiOns. 
Paragraph 17 of the OAU Plan of Action and Article 5 of the Protocol to the OAU 
Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism specify the 
responsibilities of the AU Commission as well. Their duties includes: the provision 
of technical assistance on legal and law enforcement matters, including matters 
related to combating the financing of terrorism; the preparation of model laws and 
guidelines to help Member States to formulate legislation and related measures for 
preventing and combating terrorism; and follow-up with Member States and with 
regional mechanisms on the implementation of decisions taken by the PSC and 
other organs of the AU on terrorism- related matters. 
Despite the Protocol and AU's Action Plan for the effective implementation of the 
1999 OAU Algiers Convention 1999, there are still incessant terrorist acts going on 
in Africa. The current debacle in Somalia may have dragged the AU into an 




organization as a force for peacemaking and improved governance. 366 The main 
challenge remains the full implementation of the counter-terrorism instruments and 
relevant decisions of the AU policy organs. 
Funding is necessary for more effective compliance with the OAU(AU) Convention 
on counter-terrorism especially among the weak states. Economic instability is the 
major factor that affects effective implementation of counter terrorism legislations. 
Another major challenges encountered by the AU in implementing its counter-
terrorism agenda is the lack of adequate human and financial resources. While this 
problem is not peculiar to counter-terrorism, it is, however, a severe stumbling-
block to fully and timely realise the AU's counter-terrorism objectives, especially if 
the Union is to be proactive in its response to terrorism.367 
The AU is also unable to verify which Member States are complying with or 
actually implementing the AU and international counter-terrorism regimes and 
which ones are not. Though Member States are required to report to the chairperson 
of the commission on their activities, many are still reluctant to do so, complaining 
and reporting fatigue. 368 
The AU still lacks the capacity to develop a list of perpetrators of terrorist acts as 
provided for in the Plan of Action. This is compounded by lack of a regional or 
366 Princeton N Lyman. Supra note 242. 
367 Martin Ewi and Kwesi Aning. Asseseing the role of the African Union in preventing and 
combating terrorism in Africa. Institute for Security studies; African Security Review 15.3. 
368 !d. 
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continental arrest warrant which could permit the AU to investigate arrest and 
d . d d f . 369 etam persons accuse or suspecte o terronst acts. 
Though, OAU (AU) needs to be praised for drafting the Convention for preventing 
and combating of terrorism, but implementation of the said convention is still 
ineffective for combating terrorism in the continent. 
I 
3.4. CONCLUSION. 
In as much as priority should be given to effective combating of terrorism over 
human rights law, however, in-depth review of this Convention shows that 
combating terrorism will likely clash with principles of international humanitarian 
law, notwithstanding that Article 22 of the Convention states otherwise. 
The OAU Algiers Convention 1999 requires States Parties to proscribe terrorist 
acts, punish them with penalties taking 'into account the grave nature of such 
offences'. Some human right activitists argue that, while acts of terrorism may be 
very grave, States should bear in mind that the death penalty is an extreme 
exception to the right to life and should be applied only to the most serious 
crimes.370 
369 Id. 
370 S. Iagwanth and F Soltau. Supra note 305. 
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But these human right activists should also bear in mind that terrorist is a serious 
crime that deprives people of their basic fundamental human rights as well. 
The OAU Algiers Convention 1999 entrench the principle of 'extradite or punish'. 
The extradition provision of the Convention have the potential to clash with the 
human rights commitments by states not to extradite alleged offenders to 
jurisdictions where they could face the death penalty.371 Therefore, even on paper, 
the Convention is not in all ramifications, compliance with the requirements of 
international law in combating terrorism, same as the applicability of the stated 
Convention. 
The Convention mandates Member States to enact their national legislations in 
combating terrorism as required by the UN Security Council, without actually 
considering how some poor Member States will effectively combat such grievous 
offense as terrorism. What then happens to such Member States that does not have 
capability of prosecuting and convicting terrorists due to its economic power? Why 
should the continent not provide a universal court vested with terrorist jurisdiction 
for the AU and mandates all State Members to refer such offence to the court? 
Notably, the AU's Charter stated among other objectives, that their union will 
promote unity and solidarity of African States, co-ordinate and intensify their 
cooperation and efforts to achieve better life for people of Africa. Article 5 of the 
OAU Algiers Convention of 1999, focuses on Member States' cooperation in 
preventing and combating terrorist acts in their national levels; which could be so 




easily attained in regional level since the region already has an agreed and 
acceptable definition of "terrorist acts". This definition is binding on all the 
Member States that have ratified the Convention in accordance with Article 1 (2) of 
the convention and shall not make any national law contrary to this regional 
convention. 
Certainly, some Member States are economically down and enmeshed with terrorist 
activities (for example Somalia), how can one expect an effective prevention and 
combating of terrorism in that state, when the arms of government are already 
suffering, or in Senegal and Mozambique that are overwhelmed with the 
catastrophic effects of genocide, drought and HIV/Aids? If only the OAU/AU can 
establish a regional court, it will be easier for such weak nations, such as Somalia, 
Senegal, Mozambique, etcetera, to combat terrorism more effectively. 
Therefore, what has been provided so far in Africa regional counter-terrorism 
instruments remains largely to be translated into action. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE OAU CONVENTION ON 
PREVENTING AND COMBATING OF TERRORISM AND SOME OTHER 
CONVENTIONS ON COUNTER-TERRORISM WITH SOME AFRICAN 
ORIGIN. 
4.0. INTRODUCTION. 
So many countries adopted similar laws in such a short time after 9111 because of 
the development of legal resemblance of anti terrorism laws that has a different 
cause. For the first time in history and at a fastest speed, legal systems around the 
globe adapted to a changed world by responding to the same threat, for the same 
reason, all States were ordered to fight terrorism in a common template forged by 
international organizations; and most States actually did.372 
But this is not the case for African continent; long before the 9111 incidence, Africa 
as a region and some organizations with Africa origin already adopted anti-
terrorism legislations. Some of the laws are: Arab Convention on the Suppression of 
Terrorism, 1998, known as 'Arab Convention', which is chronologically the first 
out of the three Conventions to be discussed in this chapter. The Arab Convention 
was adopted in April, 1998 at Cairo by the Council of Arab Ministers of Justice and 
was later revised on 28 March, 2008. Convention of the Organization of the Islamic 





Conference on Combating International Terrorism came next in 1999. It is known 
as 'OIC Convention' and was adopted at the 26 session of the Organization of 
Islamic Conference of foreign ministers at Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso in July, 
1999; then followed by the OAU Convention on the Preventing and Combating of 
Terrorism, 1999, adopted in Algiers, Algeria on 14 July 1999 as discussed in 
previous chapters. 
These three Conventions (Arab Convention, OIC and OAU Algiers Conventions) 
have so much in common with the UN Security Council and General Assembly 
declarations on terrorism. They also share common elements with the international 
conventions and protocols. All the three Conventions , explicitly or implicitly, 
condemn terrorism to be a criminal act that is not to be considered a political crime; 
state the aim of multilateral co-operation; make provision for preventive measures; 
call for the exchange of information and co-operation for preventing and combating 
terrorist crimes; and establish common prosecution and extradition procedures. The 
most noticeable differences relate to their definitions (or lack of formal 
definition(s)) of terrorism and the extent to which they make provision for 
exceptions relating to the right to self-determination.373 
This chapter begins with a brief history of the Arab League Organization and 
Organization of Islamic Conference, followed by discourse on their respective anti-
terrorism Conventions before making a comparative analysis of the three 
373 DuPlessis, Anton. Global and regional initiatives to combat terror, 2005 WLNR 
26454593,Chap. 4 at 16 
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Conventions in order to ascertain the originality of the OAU Algiers Convention 
1999 or to otherwise conclude that it is a duplicate of the Arab Convention and OIC 
Convention. 
Further, under this same chapter, some State Party's (Ethiopia, Somalia, Kenya, 
Sudan and Nigeria) response to the Convention is assessed to certify compliance 
with their obligations under the OAU Algiers Convention 1999 ; and to determine 
the effectiveness of approaches they are using (if any) in combating terrorism in 
their respective nations. 
4.1. BRIEF HISTORY OF THE ARAB LEAGUE AND ORGANIZATION 
OF ISLAMIC CONFERENCE. 
4.1.1. ARAB LEAGUE: 
The Arab League officially called 'The League of Arab States', is a voluntary 
association of countries whose peoples are mainly Arabic speaking or where Arabic 
is an official language. The League of Arab States was created to "strengthen the 
close relations and numerous ties which bind the Arab States" and "direct their 
efforts towards the goal of the welfare of all Arab States ... [and] the guarantee of 
their future and the realization of their aspirations," and today, primarily serves to 
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promote political, economic, cultural, and scientific cooperation among Arab 
states.374 
The idea of the Arab League was mooted in 1942 by the British, who wanted to 
rally Arab countries against the Axis powers. However, the league did not take off 
until March 1945, just before the end of World War II. At that time the issues that 
dominated the League's agenda were freeing those Arab countries still under 
colonial rule, and preventing the Jewish community in Palestine from creating a 
Jewish state. 
The Organization started off with six (6) members namely, Egypt, Iraq, Transjordan 
(renamed Jordan in 1949), Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Syria. Currently, the League 
has 22 Member States namely; Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, 
Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen. 
Syria's participation has been suspended since November 2011, as a consequence 
of their government's repression during the ongoing uprising and civil war. 
The highest body of the league is the Council, composed of representatives of 
Member States, usually foreign ministers, their representatives or permanent 
delegates.375 The daily affairs of the league are coordinated by the General 
Secretariat, headed by a Secretary-General. The General Secretariat is the 
374 See Article 2 of Pact of The League of Arab States, March 22, 1945. 
375 Id. at Article 3 
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administrative body of the league, the executive body of the council and the 
specialized ministerial councils.376 
4.1.2. ORGANIZATION OF ISLAMIC COOPERATION (OIC): 
The OIC is an inter-governmental organization, comprised of Islamic states with its 
headquarters in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. It is the second largest inter-governmental 
organization, after the United Nations, with membership of fifty seven (57) States 
spread over four continents.377 OIC was founded on 25 September 1969, following 
an appeal from the former Mufti of Jerusalem to all Islamic States to join the First 
Islamic Summit at Rabat, Morocco. 
The summit was held in response to the August arson attack on the holy al-Aqsa 
Mosque in Jerusalem. This historic meeting was instrumental in the formation of 
the OIC, and Islamic Solidarity became the framework to increase cooperation and 
exchange among the Islamic states. In 1971, the Islamic Foreign Ministers' 
Conference formally established the OIC by approving the Charter, which a 
majority of Member States had ratified by February 1973.378 
The present Charter of the Organization was adopted by the 11th Islamic Summit 
held on 13 and 14 March 2008 which laid down the objectives and principles of the 
376 Id. at Article 12. 
377 See the article on 'About OIC' found at http://.oicun.org/2/23/ 
378 Devon A. Hansen and Mohammad Hemmasi. The State of the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference (OIC) at the dawn of the millennium. www.gcsu.edu/ .. ./state/20of 20the 20world 
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organization and fundamental purposes to strengthen Islamic solidarity and 
cooperation among the Member States. Over the last forty ( 40) years, the 
membership has grown from its founding members of twenty five (25) to fifty 
seven (57) states.379 
Although not clearly defined by the Charter, the term 'Muslim State' implies where 
Muslims are majority. To become an OIC member, a Muslim State submits an 
application expressing its willingness to adopt the Charter. One of the main goals of 
the OIC is to reduce the gross inequalities among Islamic Member States.380 
The Member States are: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, 
Bangladeshi, Benin, Brunei, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Comoros, Cote 
d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Gabon, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, 
Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Kyrgystan, Lebanon, Libya, 
Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, 
Oman, Pakistan, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, 
Sudan, Surinam, Syria, Tajikistan, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, 
United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan and Yemen; although Nigeria renounced its 
membership in 1991, the OIC has not recognized this decision. 
Some of the objectives among others under the OIC charter are to strengthen 
Islamic solidarity among Member States; to consolidate cooperation in the political, 
379 About OIC. Supra note 377. 
380 Devon A Hansen and Mohammad Hemmasi. Supra note 378. 
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economic, social, cultural and scientific fields; to safeguard the dignity, 
independence, and national rights of Muslim people; to safeguard the Holy Places 
and support the struggle of the Palestine people; to eliminate racial discrimination 
and all forms of colonialism; and, to promote cooperation and understanding 
between Member States and others.381 
In order to realize these objectives, Member States shall act in accordance with the 
following principles: 
All Member States commit themselves to the purposes 
and principles of the United Nations Charter; All 
Member States shall settle disputes through peaceful 
means and refrain from use or threat of use of force 
in their relations; All member States undertake 
to respect national sovereignty, independence 
and territorial integrity of other Member States and 
shall refrain from interfering in the internal affairs 
of others; Member States shall uphold and promote, 
atthe national and international level, good 
governance, democracy, human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, and the rule of law. 382 
The principal institutional framework of the OIC is comprised of three parts. First, 
the Conference of Kings and Heads of State and Government defines the strategy 
for Islamic policies. Second, the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers examines 
the progress on implementing the Islamic Summit's decisions. Finally, the General 
Secretariat is the executive organ of the OIC and headed by a Secretary General, 
381 See Chapter 1, Article lofthe Charter ofthe Organisation ofthe Islamic Conference, 2004. 
382 Id. at Article 2. 
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who executes the decisions of the Islamic Summit and the Islamic Conference of 
Foreign Ministers?83 
The Organization of Islamic Conference changed name into Organization of Islamic 
Cooperation in June 2011, at the 38th session of the Council of Foreign Ministers. 
"OIC" as an acronym remains in use?84 
4.2. ARAB CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF TERRORISM, 
1998 (ARAB CONVENTION) 
4.2.1. AN OVERVIEW OF THE ARAB CONVENTION: 
The Arab Convention is divided into four (4) main parts and the parts are further 
divided into chapters, sections, 42 Articles and paragraphs. Part I is the 'Definition 
and General Provision' that comes after the Preamble. It is subdivided into Articles 
1 and 2. 
Part II concentrates on the 'Principles of Arab Cooperation for the Suppression of 
Terrorism'. It is divided into two (2) Chapters with five (5) sections which are 
further subdivided into Articles and paragraphs. First Chapter focuses on 'The 
security field' and Section I of Chapter I is on 'Measures for the Prevention and 
383 Id. at Chapters III- XI. 
384 DA Hansen. Amserdam Law forum. www.Pcag.uwinnipeg.ca/prairie-perspectives/pp-
vo104/Hqmen-H~mmasi.pqf 
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Suppression of terrorist offences, containing Article 3; Section II is on 'Arab 
Cooperation for the Prevention and Suppression of terrorist offences containing 
Article 4 with sub-headings and paragraphs. Chapter II of Part II centres on 'The 
judicial field' and contains five (5) Sections. Section I is on 'Extradition of 
Offenders' containing Articles 5-8; Section II is the 'Judicial Delegation' 
containing Articles 9-12; Section III is on 'Judicial Cooperation' containing 
Articles 13-18; Section VI is the 'Seizure of assets and proceeds derived from the 
offence' containing Articles 19 and 20 and; Section Vis on 'Exchange of evidence 
containing only Article 20. 
Part III focuses on 'Mechanism for Implementing Cooperation'. It is divided into 
three (3) major Chapters. Chapter I is the 'Extradition Procedures' containing 
Articles 22-28; Chapter II is on 'Procedures for Judicial Delegation containing 
Articles 29-33 and Chapter III is the 'Measures for the Protection of Witnesses and 
Experts containing Articles 34-38. The final part is Part Four, titled 'Final 
Provision' containing Articles 39-42. 
4.2.2. REVIEW OF THE ARAB CONVENTION: 
The Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism (the Arab Convention) was 
the first comprehensive attempt by Arab states to legislate collectively against 




the cooperation between Member States; nevertheless it did not overlook the 
importance of reaching out, participating and consolidating forces in the 
international efforts to combat terrorism.385 
Its preamble states among others thus: 
" .... promote mutual cooperation in the suppression 
of terrorist offences, which pose a threat to the security 
m1d stability of the Arab Nation and endanger its vital 
interests, 
Being committed to the highest moral and religious 
Principles and, in particular, to the tenets of 
the Islamic Sharia, as well as to the humanitarian 
heritage of an Arab Nation that rejects all forms of 
violence and terrorism and advocates the protection 
of human rights, with which precepts the principles 
of international law conform, based as they are on 
cooperation among peoples in the promotion of peace; 
Beingfurther committed to the Pact of the Arab 
States, the Charter of the United Nations 
and all other international convents and instruments 
to which the Contracting States to this Convention 
. ,386 are partzes. . ... 
Article 1 ( 1) defines 'Contracting Parties' as 'Member States'. The Arab Convention 
further set out a definition of 'terrorism' in Article 1 (2) as discussed in chapter two 
supra, while Article 1(3) defines 'Terrorist Offence' as also cited in the same 
Chapter two of this dissertation?87 It is important to note that this Article 1 (3) 
385 See International Co-operation in Counter terrorism: The United Nations Regional Organizations 
in the fighting against terrorism; as edited by Edith Nesi, 2006, Published by Ashgate Publishing 
Ltd. ISBN: 0-7546-4755-2. 
386 See generally the preamble of The Arab Convention for The Suppression of Terrorism, 1998, 
supra note 70. 
387 See supra note 70. 
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incorporated the definition of terrorism in the mentioned Conventions as definition 
of terrorist offences too, therefore, making the definition cumbersome. 
The definition is immediately followed by an article that expressly excludes acts 
that are undertaken as part of a struggle against foreign occupation. That exclusion 
is underlined in the preamble, which affirms the rights of peoples to combat foreign 
occupation and aggression by any means, including armed struggle, in order to 
liberate their territories and secure their right to self-determination and 
independence. However, that right must be exercised in accordance with the 
purposes and principles of the Charter of the UN and with the UN' s resolutions but 
it does not exclude "any act prejudicing the territorial integrity of any Arab 
State".388 These references to the right to armed struggle against oppression suggest 
where some of the difficulties may lie in achieving a universal definition of 
'terrorism' .389 
Article 3, Part II of the Convention deals with obligations and duties of Contracting 
States. It is divided into two major paragraphs. Paragraph I calls on the Contracting 
States to take preventive measures against perpetrating of terrorist acts in its 
territory and ensure safety of diplomats in its territory. Paragraph II which is on 
measures of suppression mandates Contracting States to arrest, investigate, 
communicate and prosecute terrorist offences in accordance with the national law or 
extradition in accordance with the Convention. 
388 See Article 2 (a) and Article 2 (b) (i)-(vi) of the Arab Convention. Supra note 70. 
389 Dr. Myra Williamson. Terrorism, War and International Law: The Legality of the Use of Force 




Article 4 requires the Member States to cooperate for prevention and suppression of 
terrorist offences in accordance with their national law by exchanging information, 
investigations and exchange of expertise.390 
Article 5 provides for extradition, just like in the 1999 OAU Algiers Convention's 
extradition section. It states thus; "Contracting States shall undertake to extradite 
those indicted for or convicted of terrorist offences whose extradition is requested 
by any of these States in accordance with the rules and conditions stipulated in this 
convention". Article 6 stipulate conditions and circumstances under which 
extradition shall not be granted.391 
Article 9 focuses on mutual legal assistance between Member States, while Article 
1 0 discusses grounds on which legal assistance may be refused. Article 11 provides 
that such request shall be granted in accordance with the municipal law of the 
requested State and at a convenient time for the requested State to execute the 
request. 
Articles13-17 urges Member States for judicial cooperation by assisting each other 
for investigations and prosecutions relating to terrorist offences and Article 18 states 
that this judicial cooperation shall not hinder the victim of the offence from 
claiming his civil law rights. 
390 Article 4(1)-(Ill) of the Arab Convention. Supra note 70. 
391 ld. at Article 6 (a)-(h). 
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Article 19 further buttress extradition proceedings. It states that in an extradition 
request, the requested state shall extradite alongside with the alleged offender, all 
property and money relating to the commission of the terrorist offence for which the 
victim is being extradited. One of the concerns raised by Amnesty International is 
that the Convention includes wide extradition powers, "there is a risk that 
individuals might be returned to countries where they will face serious human rights 
abuses, including being subjected to torture, unfair trials, or the death penalty."392 
Article 20 immediately limits the provision of Article 19 by providing reasons 
under which assets and proceeds derived from the offence cannot be handed over to 
the requesting . State. Then, Article 21 encourages Member States to exchange 
information by commission Rogatoire. 
Part III provides generally for rules in application of legal mutual assistance 
between Member States. Part III, Chapter I, Articles 22-28 stipulates the 
requirements and procedures for extradition. Article 26 specifically provides that 
persons may be detained without trail for up to sixty (60) days pending 
extradition.393 Prolonged detention without charge or trial is drastic erosion into the 
right to liberty and must be seen as a measure of last resort. Under any 
circumstances, compelling reasons needs to be presented before resorting to 
detention without trial because of its potential for the use of torture. 394 
392 The Arab Convention for Suppression of Terrorism, a serious threat to human rights. 
www .shrc.org/en/?p= 19869 
393 Article 26 of the Arab Convention. Supra note 70. 




Article 11 of the Convention Against Torture and Other cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Punishment requires States Parties to keep under 'systematic review 
interrogation rules, instructions, methods and practices as well as arrangements for 
the custody and treatment of persons subjected to any form of arrest and detention 
with the aim of preventing any cases of torture. The Human Rights Committee, 
commenting on Article 9 of International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR), has stated that the period of custody before an individual must be brought 
before court may not exceed a few days.395 
Also, the Human Rights Committee, addressing the question of derogations from 
rights under Article 4, held that: "State Parties may in no circumstances invoke 
Article 4 of the Convenant as justification for acting in violation of humanitarian 
law or pre-emptory norms of international law, for instance ... through arbitrary 
deprivations of liberty or by deviating from fundamental principles of a fair trial, 
including the presumption of innocence". 396 
Further, the committee underlined that for non derogable rights to be upheld, 
recourse to a court to decide the legality of detention had to be preserved when a 
State decided to derogate from the Convenant. 397 
Chapter II, Articles 29-33 of the Arab Convention provides for judicial delegations 






focuses on measures for protecting the witnesses and experts in requesting States' 
territory, provides that, if a requesting State requests for an appearance of a witness 
and expert from a requested State, the former shall undertake to pay for travel and 
subsistence expenses. Article35 states that if a witness refuses to appear despite the 
summons, he shall not be guilty of any offence and if he decided to appear on his 
own accord in the requesting State, he should be bound with the domestic 
legislation of that state. Further, Article 36 provides for the immunity an expert or a 
witness acquires while in the requesting State, which the said immunity lapses thirty 
(30) days after his presence is no longer required in the requesting State's 
territory.398 
Under Part IV, the final provisions, Article 39 discusses the ratification of the 
Convention by Member States, while Article 40 stipulates how and when the 
Convention shall enter into force. Article 40 states thus: 
"1. This convention shall enter into force on the 
thirtieth day after the date as of which 
instruments of ratification, acceptance or 
approval have been deposited by seven Arab 
States. 
2. This Convention shall enter into force for any 
. other Arab State only after the instrument of 
ratification, acceptance or approval has been 
deposited and 30 days have elapsed from 
the date of that deposit. " 
Article 42 provides that "no Contracting State may make any reservation that 
explicitly or implicitly violates the provisions of this Convention or is incompatible 
with its objectives". 
398 Article 36 (1)-(3) of the Arab Convention. Supra note 70. 
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Arab League received numerous criticism due to the Convention, no wonder it took 
a long time for it to enter into force. 
In March 2002, in an additional effort to further the effectiveness of the 
Convention, the Arab League Council decided to include the following acts within 
the scope of the Convention: Incitement and applauding terrorism; Printing and 
distribution of documents supporting terrorism; Collecting charity contributions for 
the benefit of terrorism; The acquisition and usage of property for terrorism. 
Consequently, a drafting committee formulated an amendment to the Convention 
that corresponds with the Council's decision and that was finally adopted; but, the 
adoption of the Convention in 1998 presented an outstanding example for regional 
cooperation in combating terrorism, paving the way for other regional organizations 
to realize the possibility of achieving such levels of cooperation and thus being 
encouraged to follow. 399 
Nevertheless, the Arab Ministers of interior during their meeting on measures to 
combat terrorism in January, 2004 at Tunis, Tunisia, noted that "many of the 
provisions of the Convention do not conform with the obligations of Member States 
of the Arab League under the UN Charter and international human rights law. The 
399 Edith Nesi. Supra note 385. 
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Convention also fails to recognize and maintain many other rights and obligations 
enshrined in human rights and humanitarian law".400 
Further, the Amnesty International called for amendment of the Arab Convention 
and raised so many concerns with the existing Convention. Among the concerns 
raised by Amnesty international are: 
"The definition of 'terrorism' in the Convention is so broad that it lends itself to 
wide interpretation and abuse." Other terms in the Convention, including 
"violence", "terrorist purposes", and "terrorist groups" are not defined.401 
Some provisions of the convention clearly threaten the right to freedom of 
expression, including those measures that, according to the Convention, aim to 
strengthen the "media services" of the security forces. In the absence of a clear 
definition of these measures, there is a serious risk that they could be interpreted to 
allow for censorship and interference with freedom of expression, imposed or 
required by the respective authorities in the region, on the pretext of"security".402 
The Convention does not require judicial review or prior judicial authorization 
when surveillance and monitoring measures are used against individuals and 
groups. The authorities, therefore, would be collecting and exchanging information 






about people who are otherwise engaged in peaceful legitimate activities, and where 
the methods used to collect information may violate the right to privacy.403 
There are no safeguards in relation to surrender of individuals or extradition in the 
Convention. Amnesty International believes that surrender and extradition must not 
be carried out to a jurisdiction where alleged suspects would become prisoners of 
conscience, subject to the imposition of death penalty, or torture, cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment. The organization insists that alleged 
perpetrators should have a fair trial. Although the Convention details measures for 
the arrest and trial of accused persons, it is totally silent about guarantees for fair 
trial for those accused of crimes of "terrorism", and in some cases includes 
provisions that actually undermine such safeguards.404 
The Convention fails to incorporate safeguards for the rights of detainees, including 
guarantees for the right to be promptly brought before a judge, and to be tried 
within a reasonable time, or released. It does not include a prohibition of arbitrary 
detention, or a clear prohibition torture. There are no provisions to allow for 
challenging the lawfulness of detention. 405 Under the pretext of punishing crimes of 
"terrorism", the convention widens the scope of the death penalty in many countries 
and does not prohibit its imposition against minors, pregnant women and mentally 





as it violates the right to life and is the ultimate cruel, inhuman and degrading 
punishment. 406 
Some provisions in the Convention could provide impunity for perpetrators of 
certain crimes, including the crimes that fall clearly under the responsibility of the 
international community to investigate, and where there is sufficient evidence; 
prosecute on the basis of universal jurisdiction. 
Furthermore, the Convention specifically does not allow for extradition in cases 
when an amnesty has been issued covering the perpetrators of these crimes in the 
requesting State.407 Arab league still need to review their existing Convention on 
Terrorism to ensure its compliance with international law and UN requirements. 
4.3. CONVENTION OF THE ORGANISATION OF THE ISLAMIC 
CONFERENCE ON COMBATING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 
(OIC). 
4.3.1. AN OVERVIEW OF THE OIC CONVENTION: 
It will not be an understatement to say that OIC is simply a replica of Arab 
Convention. It is similar to the later in all ramifications except for some wordings 
which are differently construed but resultantly almost the same, if not same. 




Convention supra, nevertheless it will still be briefly discussed especially on areas 
that portray slight difference with the later. 
Like the Arab Convention, OIC also has four (4) major parts, sections, 42 Articles 
and paragraphs. Part I which is the 'Definition of General Provisions' follows the 
preamble. The part contains Articles 1 and 2 with paragraphs. 
Part II is the 'Foundation of Islamic Cooperation for Combating Terrorism' and is 
subdivided into two (2) Chapters, Divisions, sections, Articles containing 
paragraphs. Chapter I of the part is the 'Field of Security' that is divided into two 
(2) divisions. Division I is on 'Measures to prevent and Combat Terrorist Crimes'; 
it contains Article 3(A) and (B) with paragraphs. Division II is on 'Areas oflslamic 
Cooperation for preventing and combating terrorist crimes' containing Article 4 
with its sub-paragraphs. Chapter II of the same Part II focuses on 'the Judicial 
field'. It contains five (5) sections. Section I is on 'Extraditing Criminals' which is 
made up of Articles 5-8; Section II is on 'Rogatory Commission' containing 
Articles 9-13; Section 3 is the 'Judicial Cooperation', which contains Articles 14-
18; Section 4 is on 'Seized Assets and Proceeds of the Crime' containing Articles 
19 and 20. Section 5 is 'Exchange ofEvidence' which contains Article 21 only. 
Part III centres on 'Mechanism for Implementing Cooperation' which is further 
divided into three (3) Chapters, Articles and paragraphs. Chapter I is the 
'Extradition Procedures' containing Articles 22-28; Chapter II is on 'Mechanism 
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for Rogatory Commission' with Articles 29-33. Chapter III is on 'Measures for 
protecting Witnesses and Experts' and Articles 34-38 makes up the Chapter. 
Finally, Part IV is the 'Final Provisions containing Articles 39-42. 
4.3.2. ANALYSIS OF THE OIC CONVENTION: 
In 1999, the OIC adopted "the Convention of the Organization of Islamic 
Conference on Combating International Terrorism". The Convention entered into 
force in 2002 after the deposit of the seventh instrument of ratification in 
accordance with Article 40 of the Convention. The Convention contains two 
particular points of friction with general international law on terrorism. One is the 
broad definition of terrorism and the second is the exemption of certain causes for 
terrorism which the OIC endorses.408 
Article 1 of OIC Convention follow the same way in its definition of terrorism as 
that of Arab Convention except that it additionally defined 'Terrorist Crimes' while 
the later defined 'Terrorist Offences'. The preamble confirms the legitimacy of the 
right of peoples to struggle against foreign occupation and colonialist and racist 
regimes by all means, including armed struggle'. Some part of the preamble 
provides as follows: 
" .... Adhering to the principles of International Law 
408 DA Hansen. Supra note 384. 
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and the United Nations Charter as well as all 
relevant UN resolutions on procedures aimed 
at eliminating international terrorism, and 
all other conventions and international instruments 
to which states acceding to this Convention are 
parties and which call, inter alia, for the observance of 
the sovereignty, stability, territorial integrity, 
political independence and security of states 
and non-intervention in their international 
affairs; 
Desiring to promote cooperation among them 
for combating terrorist crimes that threaten the 
security and stability of the Islamic States and 
endanger their vital interests; 
Being committed to combating all forms and 
manifestations of terrorism and eliminating 
its objectives and causes which target the 
lives and properties of people; .... " 
'Terrorism' is defined in Article 1(2) and goes on to extend the elements of such a 
plan to include also harming people's honour, freedoms, security or rights, exposing 
the environment or any public or private property to hazards, occupying or seizing 
property, endangering national resources or international facilities, or threatening 
the stability, territorial integrity, political unity or sovereignty of any state. 409 
The definition of 'terrorism' in the Convention is extensive but inadequately 
defined. For example, the notion of harm to people's rights or of exposure of the 
environment to hazards are extraordinarily vague and do not adequately describe 
acts of violence. The inclusion of threats to the political unity of a state would 
encompass separatist movements regardless of their peaceful means, pre-judging 
409 See supra note 69 for the definition of Terrorism in the Convention of the Organisation of the 
Islamic Conference on Combating International Terrorism. 
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the legitimacy of political motivation. Thus, in addition to being vague, the OIC 
Convention definition has a steep political slant and is not objective.410 
The OIC Convention provides a separate definition of a 'terrorist crime' and also 
stipulates that crimes against UN terrorism-related conventions are considered to be 
'terrorist crimes' .411 It defines "terrorist crime" more broadly as any crime 
perpetrated, commenced or participated in to realize a terrorist objective in any 
Contracting State or against its nationals, assets, interests or foreign facilities, 
punishable by its national laws. The prerequisite of criminality under the national 
legislation of the OIC Convention Contracting Parties also renders the definition 
b. . 412 su ~ectiVe. 
Struggle, including .armed struggle, by people against foreign occupation, 
aggression, colonialism and hegemony, aimed at liberation and self-determination 
in accordance with the principles of international law, is not to be considered a 
terrorist crime.413 
Article 1 ( 4) lists crimes stipulated in various multilateral conventions and deems 
those acts to be "terrorist crime", but only if the conventions were ratified by the 
party concemed.414 The utility of the cross-reference to multilateral conventions is 
410 Gregory Rose and Diana Nestorovska. Supra note 307. 
411 Article 1(3) of the OIC. Supra note 69. 
412 Gregory Rose and Diana Nestorovska. Supra note 307. 
413 Id. at Article 2. 
414 See Art.icle I (4) of the OIC. Supra note 69. 
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undercut by excluding application to non-parties to those conventions.415 This 
implies that the Convention incorporated the definitions of terrorist crimes defined 
in the above stipulated Conventions as terrorist crimes just exactly the same manner 
in which Arab Convention incorporated same. 
Article 2 provides for exceptions to what shall be deemed as terrorist cnmes 
thereby limiting the ambit of Article 1(3) and (4). Article 2 (a) of the OIC 
Convention provides that a peoples' struggle "including armed struggle against 
foreign occupation, aggression, colonialism, and hegemony, aimed at liberation and 
self-determination in accordance with principles of international law shall not be 
considered a terrorist crime". This exception contemplates that acts that would 
otherwise be considered terrorist are condoned for a wide range of purposes. The 
purposes are broad and imprecise. 416 
Further, Article 2 (d) stipulates that all "international crimes" aimed at financing 
terrorist objectives shall themselves be classed as terrorist crimes. This part of the 
definition extends the meaning of "terrorist crime" to include other criminal 
activities, such as trafficking in narcotics and human beings, that are intended to 
finance terrorist plans. 
Part II of the OIC Convention sets out extensive areas of cooperation required by 
Member States to combat and prevent terrorist crimes. Article 3 (1) calls upon the 




member parties not to support terrorist acts and Article 3 (II)(A) lists the preventive 
measures that each Member Party "shall see to". These include barring their 
territories from being used as arenas for planning, organizing and executing terrorist 
crimes; developing and strengthening border control and surveillance on transfer or 
stockpiling of weapons; and strengthening security of protected persons, 
international organizations, vital installations and public transport facilities. Article 
3 (II) (B) of the OIC Convention lists "combating measures" as an area for 
cooperation that includes arresting perpetrators of terrorist crimes, ensuring 
protection of witnesses and investigators to terrorist crimes, and establishing 
effective cooperation between the concerned government agencies and the citizens 
for combating terrorism. 
Under Article 4 Member States are encouraged to exchange information regarding 
terrorist activities and legal assistance in prosecuting terrorist activities. Members 
are also encouraged to incorporate in researches and studies that will help to combat 
terrorism. 
Article 5 makes provision for the extradition of alleged terrorists within Member 
States. Member States undertake to extradite those indicted or convicted of terrorist 
crimes. Article 6 further sets out circumstances under which extradition should not 
be granted. Extradition may be refused if the crime for which extradition is 




nature,417 as political crimes is exempted from terrorist crimes under Article 2 (b) of 
the Convention. The only situation which can be contemplated under Article 6 to 
legally compel the requesting State to extradite is when the crime has been 
committed in the requesting State's territory by a person who is not a national of the 
requested State.418 Article 7 provides that if a person requested to be extradited is 
under trial, the extradition shall be postponed. 
Section III of Chapter II centres on judicial cooperation among Member States. It 
provides that a Member State may request another state to prosecute the alleged 
terrorist in its country on the requesting State's behalf.419The national law of the 
Member State, where the trial is taking place shall be followed. 420 
Article 19 is the handing over of property and money along with the alleged 
offender for extradition under the Convention. A proceeding in handing over the 
required assets and grounds on which it may be withheld is provided for under 
Article 20. Further exchange of protection and evidence obtained are covered under 
Article 21. 
Part III stipulates procedures for implementing cooperation among Member States. 
Extradition procedures and requirements are provided under its Articles 22-28. 
Article 23 provides that any request for extradition must be accompanied by the 
417 Article 6 (I) ofthe OIC Convention. Supra note 69. 
418 Edith Nesi. Supra note 385. 
419 Article 15 of the OIC Convention. Supra note 69. 
420 Id. at Article 17 
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original or an authenticated copy of the indictment or arrest order issued in 
accordance with the conditions stipulated in the requesting State's legislation. 
Parties must also provide a statement of the acts for which extradition is sought, 
which specifies details such as dates and places, and a description of the subject 
wanted for extradition. These procedural requirements are specific, which is 
advantageous in the absence of other extradition arrangements.421 Articles 29-32 
stipulate procedures and requirements for Rogatory commissions. Art. 33 require an 
explanation for refusal of Rogatory Commission. The Article provides thus "any 
refusal for Rogatory commission shall be explained." 
Just like Arab Convention the wellbeing of witnesses and experts while in the 
territory of a requesting State is covered under Articles 34-37 of Chapter III of the 
Convention. Article 38 provides that a summoned witness or an expert who is 
already in prison of the requested State can be transferred provisionally to the 
location of the hearing. The same Article 3 8 provides grounds on which such a 
request may be denied as follows: 
"(a) If the witness or expert refuses. 
(b) If his presence is necessary for undertaking 
Criminal procedures in the territory of the 
requested State. 
(c) If his transfer would prolong his imprisonment. 
(d) If there are considerations militating against his 
transfer." 
Article 39 of the final part is the ratification of the Convention by Member States 
while Article 40 provides for the entry into force of the Convention. Article41 urges 
Member States not to make any reservation contrary to this Convention and Article 
421 Gregory Rose and Diana Nestorovska. Supra note 307. 
178 
I 
42 stipulates the procedure to be followed by a Member State who wishes to 
withdraw from this Convention. 
OIC Convention has been criticised by some authors and Human Right Watch 
(HRW). The OIC Convention provides two separate, yet, overlapping definitions 
for the terms 'terrorism' and 'terrorist crimes'. Such a distinction is problematic and 
creates difficulty in the application of an instrument dedicated primarily to law 
enforcement.422 In addition, the definition of the term 'terrorism' is wide and 
encompasses certain ambiguous and sometimes political concepts, thus adding to 
the difficulty in applying and enforcing the Convention.423 
HR W noted that international law prohibits attacks against civilians no matter the 
circumstances, and requested the OIC to amend its definition of terrorism "to clarify 
that its condemnation of terrorism makes no exemptions, even if in the name of 
causes that OIC Member States endorse".424 HRW also criticised the OIC 
Convention for using vague language which has led the definition to go beyond the 
generally accepted understandings of the concept of terrorism and suggested that 
the definition be amended to cover only those acts committed with the intention of 
causing death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, which is in line with 
the statements by the UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism.425 
422 Edith Nesi. Supra note 385. 
423 Id. 
424DA Hansen. Supra note 384. 
425 Id. 
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On the prosecution side, the OIC Convention provides for a general obligation on 
the Member States to prosecute or extradite, however, without requiring the states 
to establish the terrorist acts as a crime under national law or subject to criminal 
jurisdiction. This has legal implications for cooperation and extradition processes, 
especially when viewed in light of the definition of terrorism in Article 1 which 
may be subject to states' different interpretations. For example, under Article 6, the 
only situation where a state is legally compelled to extradite is when the crime has 
been committed in the requesting state's territory by a person who is not a national 
of the requested state.426 The lack of effective law enforcement instruments can 
allow perpetrators of terrorist acts to escape punishment and prevent a state from 
exercising national jurisdiction on a terrorist crime it may consider within it 
competence. 427 
The Convention is very ambitious in the extent of obligations of prevention and 
combating to be fulfilled. However, it is left to the discretion of each Contracting 
State to decide how to fulfil the obligations to cooperate. Unless it was the common 
interest of the relevant States to cooperate in certain aspects of a certain case, such 
cooperation may not be achieved solely on the basis of the legal nature of the 
bl. . 428 o 1gat10n. 
426 ld. 
427 !d. 
428Edith Nesi. Supra note 385 
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Like Arab Convention, the Convention also needs to be reviewed by the OIC in 
order to make it an effective law enforcement instrument for combating terrorism. 
Such a review should include redefining terrorism and terrorist acts and unifying 
the two terms; revising the issue of political crimes; establishing terrorist acts as 
crimes under national laws and providing for the situations where jurisdiction must 
be established; refining the language of the Convention to overcome ambiguities 
d 1 1 
. . 429 an ega uncertamtles. 
4.4. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE THREE CONVENTIONS 
(ARAB CONVENTION, OIC AND OAU ALGIERS CONVENTION) 
ON COMATING TERRORISM. 
The 1998 Arab Convention informs the 1999 OIC Convention and the two are 
virtually identical.430 The parties to the Arab Convention are also parties to the OIC 
Convention, which has double the membership of the Arab League. Furthermore, 
some of them with the double membership are also members of the OAU Algiers 
Convention 1999. 
There are many similarities and relatively minor differences between the three 
Conventions, especially as it relates to Arab Convention and OIC Convention. The 
drafting of the OAU Algiers Convention 1999 is noticeably different from the other 
429 !d. 
430 Gregory Ross and Diana Nestorovska. Supra note 307 
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two, despite the undeniable fact that the former two Conventions inform its ideas. 
Some of these similarities and differences are discussed below. 
The OIC Convention condemns terrorism and stresses its unjustifiable nature. It 
also sweepingly defines it but explicitly excludes, in a nod to, among others, 
Peoples' struggle including armed struggle against foreign occupation, aggression, 
colonialism, and hegemony, aimed at liberation and self-determination in 
I accordance with the principles of international law". The Arab Convention takes 
essentially the same position in that it excludes "all cases of struggle by whatever 
means, including armed struggle, against foreign occupation and aggression for 
liberation and self-determination, in accordance with the principles of international 
law". Likewise, the detailed definition of terrorism in the OAU Algiers Convention 
1999 is qualified by its exclusion of the "struggle waged by peoples in accordance 
with the principles of international law for their liberation or self-determination, 
including armed struggle against colonialism, occupation and domination by 
foreign forces". 431 
Under the OIC Convention, the meaning of "international crimes" is not clear and 
does not address the financing by simple donation of funds by supporters, perhaps 
the most ubiquitous form of financing. It casts "terrorism", "terrorist crime", 
"international crimes", as well as 'ordinary and political crimes', together into one 
conceptual swamp. The vague sweep of this definition is unsatisfactory.432This is 
431 Robert P. Barnidge, Jr. Supra note 54. 
432Gregory Ross and Diana Nestorovska. Supra note 307. 
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one of the main differences between Arab Convention, OIC Convention and OAU 
Algiers Convention 1999. OAU Algiers Convention of 1999, defined 'terrorist acts' 
only; OIC defines both 'terrorism' and terrorist crimes' while the former defines 
'terrorism' and 'terrorist offences' 
The three regional conventions 'carving out' acts committed by liberation 
movements in the pursuit of self-determination, implies that violence in pursuit of 
certain just causes should not be classified as terrorism.433 One ofthe exemptions is 
also rather self-serving. The Arab Convention exempts liberation violence from 
being regarded as terrorism, but where it is not directed against Arab States 
themselves. In principle, it might be thought that the Arab States have already 
attained self-determination during decolonization, and thus that there could not exist 
any legitimate self-determination claim against the independent Arab States.434 
Suffice it to say that, the sweeping exclusion clauses in these three Conventions, 
reflecting as they do, the political and ideological sympathies of the OIC, the Arab 
League, and the OAU (AU), almost swallow the rule condemning terrorism, thus 
meaning that all such "legitimate" forms of violence fall outside the OIC, Arab, and 
OAU Algiers Conventions simply because of the conventions' exculpatory 
language.435 
433 Ben Saul. Counter Terrorism: International Law Practice. Edited by Ana Maria Salnus, De Frias 
Karja L H Samuel and Nyel D White. Oxford University Press. ISBN: 978-19-960892-8. 
434 Id. 
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The three Conventions usefully identify common areas for cooperation m 
preventive measures, as being the stockpiling of weapons, border controls over 
dangerous goods and suspected persons, and security for protected persons. None of 
these Conventions address the prevention of terrorist financing and none provide 
strong models for implementation of preventive measures.436 
Provisions to suppress the financing of terrorism are found in the OAU 
Conventions, where Parties undertake to refrain from financing terrorist acts.437 A 
terrorist act is defined to include "sponsoring".438 The OIC Convention also 
contains relevant provisions but merges money laundering with terrorist acts where 
it states that money laundering aimed at financing terrorism is itself to be 
considered a terrorist crime.439 It would seem a better approach to prosecute 
perpetrators of money laundering activities intended to finance terrorist acts under 
the two separate charges of money laundering and of terrorist financing so as to 
maintain the conceptual distinction between money laundering and terrorist 
fi . 440 mancmg. 
Under Article 5 of OAU Algiers Convention 1999, Parties undertake to strengthen 
the exchange of information among them regarding acts and crimes committed by 
terrorist groups and the communication methods used by such groups.441 Both the 
436 !d. 
437 Article 4 (I) ofthe OAU Algiers Convention 1999. Supra note 26. 
438 !d. at Article 3 (b). 
439 Article 2(d) of the OIC. Supra note 69. 
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OIC and OAU Algiers Conventions oblige the Parties to respect the confidentiality 
of any information passed to them. 
Although Articles 9 and 10 of the Arab Convention which is on 'Judicial 
delegation' is a bit different from Part V of the OAU Algiers Convention 1999 on 
'Extra-Territorial Investigations (Commission Rogatoire) and Legal Mutual 
Assistance'; but its Article 14 is almost the same meaning with Articles 9 and 10, 
only that the wordings are different. The said Article 14 of the OIC Convention 
provides that each party shall extend to the other every possible assistance for 
investigation or trial proceedings related to terrorist crimes. OAU Algiers 
Convention Parties undertake to exchange information leading either to the arrest of 
any person charged with a terrorist act against the interest of a Party, or to the 
seizure of arms. 442 
Part V of the OIC Convention outlines procedures in relation to extra-territorial 
investigations and mutual legal assistance. Article 14 ( 1) provides that any Party 
may request another Party to carry out, with its assistance and cooperation, on the 
latter's territory, criminal investigations related to judicial proceedings concerning 
alleged terrorist acts. 443 
The three Conventions are impliedly the same, even though the sectional 
arrangements and some wordings are different. 
442 Article 5 (2) of the OAU Algiers Convention 1999. Supra note 26. 
443 Gregory Ross and Diana Nestorovska. Supra note 307. 
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4.5. THE ORIGINALITY OF THE OAU CONVENTION ON PREVENTING 
AND COMABTING TERRORISM 1999. 
Many of the regional conventions are modelled after the multilateral conventions, 
covering proscribed offences; establishing jurisdiction and extradition elements; 
and calling on Member States to combat terrorism.444 In 2006, the UN General 
Assembly formerly adopted the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy.445 The 
Strategy essentially call upon Member States to actively combat International 
terrorism by taking various types of measures. The measures and their requisite 
actions, are categorized as follows: 
"(1) measures to address the conditions conducive 
to the spread of terrorism; 
(2) measures to prevent and combat terrorism; 
(3) measures to build states' capacity to prevent and 
Combat terrorism and to strengthen the role 
of the UN system in this regard; and 
(4) measures to ensure respect for human rights all 
and the rule of law as the fundamental basis 
of the fight against terrorism. " 
Thus, while ambitious, the Strategy thus provides some guidance to both Member 
States and UN institutions, in order to take the necessary steps, to not only combat 
. . 1 . b . 11 446 mtematwna terronsm, ut to prevent 1t as we . 
444 Carol A. Bahan. Supra note 322. 
445 G.A. Res. 60/288, U.N. Doc. A/Res/60/288 (2006). According to the UN, the strategy is the "first 
ever comprehensive , collective and internationally approved global framework for tackling the 
problem of terrorism." UN Peace and security Section, UN Action to Counter-Terrorism Strategy 
(2009), http://www. un.org/terrorism/pdfs/CT _ factsheet_ March2009 .pdf 




But, before the 2006 UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, OAU Convention on 
Preventing and Combating Terrorism, under review, was already enacted in 1999, 
after the Arab Convention of 1998 and the ore Convention of 1999; and it seems to 
be in line with the prescribed measures by UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy 
of2006. But the question is: how original is the OAU Algiers Convention of 1999? 
From, the above discussion on comparative analysis of the three Conventions, it is 
clear that OAU Algiers Convention 1999 is not 'unique' per se but rather a 
duplicate of Arab Convention and ore Convention. Its underlying ideas are that of 
Arab Convention and ore Convention. Although, it is drafted slightly different 
from the other two conventions, the contents are almost the same. For example; 
Article 1 of the three conventions are drafted the same way by firstly defining 
convention, followed by the meaning of 'Member States', then terrorist acts or 
terrorism, but in different wordings. The noticeable differences are, as stated before, 
while Arab Convention and OIC Conventions defined terrorism in addition to 
'terrorist offence' and 'terrorist crime' respectively, OAU Algiers Convention 1999 
defined only 'terrorist act'. Again, it did not import other definitions of terrorism in 
other Conventions as part of its definition of 'terrorist act' in the convention, like its 
counter parts (Arab Convention and OIC Convention),447 rather, it replaced it by 
mandating the Member States to review their national laws and include 'terrorist 
act' defined in this Convention, as a criminal offence in their national laws;448 
447 See Article 1(3) of the Arab Convention; Supra note 70 and Art. 1(4) of the OIC Convention; 
Supra note 69. 
448 Article 2 of the OAU Algiers Convention 1999. Supra note 26. 
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though, it listed other Conventions in its Annex, 449 but made no reference to them in 
other parts of its Convention. OAU Algiers Convention 1999 exempted liberation 
for self-determination including armed struggle against colonialism from its 
definition of 'terrorist act' just like Arab Convention and OIC Convention. 
Another example of derivative idea can be seen in the Part II of the OAU Algiers 
Convention 1999, which is the same as Part II of the other two conventions except 
that OAU Algiers Convention 1999 titled its own Part II 'Area of Cooperation' 
while the other two titled their own 'Measures for Prevention and Suppression of 
Terrorist Offences (Terrorist Crimes)', but the law in Part II of the three 
conventions are the same. In the said Part II of the three conventions, the Member 
States agree not to use or allow the usage of their territory for any act of terrorism. 
Further, 1999 OAU Algiers Convention Part III which is 'States Jurisdiction' is the 
same as the 'Judicial Field' of Arab Convention in its Chapter two of Part II. The 
extradition provisions of the three conventions are almost the same, only that the 
drafting and the required procedures for achieving extradition in OAU Algiers 
Convention of 1999 is different from that of the Arab Convention and OIC 
Convention. Also, there is no exemption to the specific types of crimes that should 
be extradited under OAU Algiers Convention 1999 like its other counterparts that 
listed circumstances under which extradition shall not be granted. 
449 See the Annex of the OAU Algiers Convention 1999. Supra note 347. 
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More so, final provisions of the three conventions are the same only that the 
sectional arrangements are different. Another noticeable difference between the 
three conventions is the obvious fact that Arab Convention and OIC Convention 
contains 42 Articles each while OAU Algiers Convention 1999 has 23 Articles; but 
the content remains almost the same. 
It is therefore conclusive to state unequivocally, that OAU Algiers Convention 1999 
is not 'original per se' but an imitative and modified version of Arab Convention 
and OIC convention. 
4.6. THE STATE PARTIES' RESPONSES TO TERRORISM. 
Since the OAU Algiers Convention of 1999 mandates Member States to criminalize 
and combat terrorism in their different nations, what are these States' responses to 
acts of terrorism in their countries? How effective are these responses if any? Could 
it be better if responded and handled as one crime in regional level and by a 
centralized regional court? Or should it be included in the jurisdiction of the ICC, or 
that of the African Court of Human and Peoples' Right (AfCHPR),450 or create 
another Special Court vested with jurisdiction for terrorist cases in the Region, since 
450 The African Court of Human and Peoples Right (AFCHPR) was created by Article 1 of 'The 
Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights with reference to the 
constitution of a single court of justice in Article 3 of the AU Constitutive Act of2000. The 
AFCHPR complements the protective mandate of the African Commission on Human and People's 




there is definition of terrorist act in the OAU Algiers Convention 1999451 that is 
acceptable by the Member States? And, have the Member States complied with the 
requirements of the OAU Convention 1999? 
The OAU Algiers Convention of 1999, urged all Member States to 
"review their national laws and establish criminal 
offences for terrorist acts as defined in this convention 
and make such acts punishable by appropriate 
penalties that take into account the grave 
nature of such offenses "452 
In response to the mandate, some African States have responded by enacting 
counter-terrorism legislations and taking some other measures in combating 
terrorism. For instance, some Member States of the Inter-governmental Authority 
on Development (IGAD), comprising of Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Sudan, Eritrea, 
Djibouti and Somalia, have taken measures to counter terrorism because their 
population have sustained the loss of thousands of lives and considerable 
destruction of property in recent years.453 IGAD countries had held meetings on 
combating of terrorism. The issue on combating of terrorism was firstly introduced 
at IGAD Council of Ministers' Meeting held in Khartoum in January 2002, and was 
discussed in details at the Addis Ababa meeting from 25 to 27 June, 2003. IGAD 
members are of the opinion that terrorism can be effectively combated if they team 
up as one, than fighting it in national levels. An Ethiopian government official 
451 OAU Algiers Convention 1999; Supra note 14 at Article 1 (3). 
452 ld., at Article 2 (a). 
453 Prof. Knife Abraham., supra note 21 at 9. 
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stated clearly that, 'it is obvious that no matter how economically and militarily 
strong a state may be, it cannot, alone, fight terrorism".454 
The countries under-review in this dissertation has responded in the following 
ways: 
4.6.1. ETHIOPIA: 
After signing onto the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of 
Terrorism, Ethiopia passed a new anti-terrorism law known as "A Proclamation on 
Anti-Terrorism No:652/2009" in accordance with Article 55(1) of the Constitution 
of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, signed into law by their president, 
Girma Woldegiorgis in 2009. 
The Proclamation on Anti-Terrorism No: 652/2009 is divided into five parts. In the 
preamble of the Anti-terrorism Proclamation 652/2009, the country noted that it is 
necessary to enact adequate legal provisions "since the laws presently in force in the 
country are not sufficient to prevent and control terrorism"455 . The Act in its 
definition section, defined terrorist organizations but did not define 'terrorism' ;456 it 
also defined terrorist acts457 and related offences.458 The Act also went well beyond 
even the AU's broad definition, specifying that terrorist acts are "acts that might 
454 Id. at 11. 
455see preamble part of A Proclamation on Anti-Terrorism No:652/200 of Ethiopia 
456 A Proclamation on Anti-Terrorism No:652/200, at part 1 (2) 
457 I d. at Part 1 (3). 




endanger or increase a risk of persons, property, public services, and environmental 
resources while the perpetrators was attempting to coerce the government or 
intimidate a segment of the population".459 In addition to criminalizing terrorism, 
the law also criminalizes planning, preparation, conspiracy, attempt, rendering 
support, encouragement, and other acts. Moreover, the crime of terrorism is 
punishable by death.460 
The Proclamation gave the House of People's Representatives the power "upon 
submission by the government to proscribe and de-proscribe an organization as 
terrorist organization."461 The Act also provides for penalties for terrorist acts. 
In Part 6 (31) of the Proclamation, both the Federal High Court and the Supreme 
Court are vested with jurisdiction to try terrorist cases. It also declared in the same 
sub-section 31 that 
"Articles 13 and 17 (1) (b) of the 2004 Criminal 
Code of the Federal Republic of Ethiopia relating 
to jurisdiction shall also include terrorism offences. " 
Since February 12, 2012, the UN Human Rights activists have been voicing against 
the use of the anti-terrorism laws to curb the freedom of speech in Ethiopia. Human 
Rights Watch has condemned the law by saying that It provides "the Ethiopian 
government with a potent instrument to crack down on political dissent .... It would 
permit long-term imprisonment and even the death penalty for 'crimes' that bear no 
459 Id. at Part 2, Article 3. 
460 ld. at Article 4. 




resemblance, under any credible definition, to terrorism".462 Several journalists 
were sentenced to prison for no just cause under such legislation. Ethiopia should 
apply the Anti-Terrorism legislation cautiously and in accordance with the 
country's International Human Rights obligations.463 
Most of the human rights activists are actually blaming the Prime Minister Meles 
Zenawi for using his position in mis-application of the anti-terrorism law by 
infringing on the fundamental human rights of the people in the country. 
Ethiopian Penal Code includes a list of acts that constitute terrorist acts if they are 
perpetrated against an individual or group with the aim of seriously disrupting 
public order. Among the list are "deliberate attacks on human life", deliberate 
attacks on the physical integrity of the person", "theft" and "destruction". 
Other measures Ethiopia had taken in combating terrorism is by being a party to 
many International Conventions and Protocols relating to terrorism. It motivated the 
adoption of the OAU Algiers Convention 1999 and ratified same in 2003. Article 9 
(4) of the Constitution of Federal Republic of Ethiopia made international and 
regional instruments relating to combating of terrorism part and parcel of their 
national law.464 The country also entrusted the National bank of Ethiopia with the 
responsibility of overseeing banking and monetary activities in the country to 
462 Kim Lane Scheppele. Supra note 372. 
463 Frank La Rue., Ethiopia's Anti-Terrorism Laws must not be misused to curb rights-UN; 
http/www. UN.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsiD=4l112&Cr=journalist&Cr I= 
464Prof. Knife Abraham., supra note 21 at 13. 
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ensure no illegal transfer of funds and to avoid sponsoring of terrorism. It has also 
tightened its boarder control system.465 
Ethiopia is also a Member State of the Inter-Governmental Authority on 
Development and participated actively in its Security Sector Program, which builds 
the capacity of its Member States to mitigate, detect and deter advances by 
terrorists. Ethiopia was an active participant in the AU's counter-terrorism efforts 
and participated in its Centre for Study and Research on Terrorism and in meetings 
of the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa. 466 
The Ethiopian government froze assets allegedly used in planning terrorist acts, 
pending investigation as to whether those assets can be legally confiscated. The 
Government of Ethiopia's Charity and Societies Agency is responsible for 
monitoring non-profit organizations to prevent misuse of funds and terrorist 
fi . 467 mancmg. 
Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia and Sudan are members of Partnership for Regional East 
African Counter-terrorism (PREACT). PREACT, formally known as the East 
African Regional Strategy Initiative, is the East Africa counterpart to the Trans-
Sahara Counter-terrorism Partnership (TSCTP). PREACT, first established in 2009, 
is a US funded and implemented multi-year, multi-faceted program designed to 
465 Id., at 14. 
466 See Chapter 2 of US Department of Sate: Diplomacy in action. It can be found at 
www.state.gov> ... >country reports on terrorism 2012 . 
467 ld. 
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build the counter-terrorism capacity and capability of Member countries to thwart 
short-term terrorist threats, counter violent extremism and address longer-term 
1 b.l. . 468 vu nera 1 1t1es. 
4.6.2. SOMALIA: 
I Somalia has no anti-terrorism legislation yet, though the Somalia's Cabinet has 
recently submitted an anti-terrorism law to the Parliament for their approval. This 
could be as a result of the present unrest in the country caused by Al-Shabaab 
Islamic extremist group terrorizing the country as discussed in Chapter two. The 
country is a member of many Regional and International Conventions on terrorism. 
Only those International and Regional Conventions that the country is a party to, is 
sustaining the country right now in terms of combating terrorism. Kenya, its 
neighbouring country, is also helping them fight the terrorist Islamic sect by 
sending some troops into the country. 
I 
In 2012, the Somalia government worked with international and regional partners, 
including Kenya, Ethiopia, the AU, and the UN to degrade al-Shabaab as a 
domestic threat to stability and a terrorist threat abroad. Somalia is a member of the 
AU, the Inter-governmental Authority on Development, the League of Arab States, 
and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. The Puntland regional government 





report any actions they believed could lead to insecurity or may be linked to or 
assist al-Shabaab.469 
From August 2012, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the 
Government of Somalia along with regional governments, continued to pursue al-
Shabaab suspects throughout the year. In partnership with African Union Mission in 
Somalia (AMISOM) and neighbours, the government conducted a successful 
military campaign against al-Shabaab strongholds in southern and central Somalia, 
capturing al-Shabaab strongholds of Baidoa, Afgoye, Afmadow, Balad, Lanta 
Buuro, Merca, Miido, Wanla, Weyn and Jowhar. Their most significant victory was 
the September 28 capture of the port-city of Kismayo, which al-shabaab has used as 
a primary source of revenue through extortion activities and charging of duties, in 
particular on the export of charcoal. 470 
The Somalia government has increasingly become more adept at proactively 
countering al-Shabaab's violent extremist messaging. Examples of successful 
counter-messaging included the countering Violent Extremism programs on Radio 
Mogadishu and the state-owned TV station. In 2010, the TFG's Ministry of 
Information and Telecommunications began airing the Islamic Lecture Series 
(ILS)471 in Mogadishu, a program which has since expanded to include former al-
Shabaab strongholds of Baidoa, Beledwyne, Dhusamareb, and Abudwaq. 
469 Id. 
47o Id. 
471 ILS is a one-hour, call-in radio program designed to undercut al-Shabaab's effort to acquire 
religious legitimacy for its violent extremist ideology. See supra note 467. 
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4.7.3. KENYA: 
Kenya have series of legislative Acts or laws relating to terrorist acts, examples, 
Penal Code (Cap 63) oflaws of Kenya, Anti-Money laundering and Crime proceeds 
of Crime Bill, Criminal Procedure Code (Cap75) and so on. 
In 1998, Kenya revoked the registration of muslim NGO's, including Al-Haramin, 
because of their links to terrorism. In Febuary 2003, the government formed an 
Anti-Terrorist Police Unit composed of officers trained in anti-terrorism. At the 
same time, the cabinet authorised negotiations between the executive and legislative 
branches on legislation to detect and punish suspected terrorists. In June 2003, 
foreign minister Musyoka called on parliaments to expeditiously pass an Anti-
Terrorism Bill. This led to the enactment of Suppression of Terrorism Bill, 
published in Kenya, 2003, which was rejected after fierce opposition from Human 
Rights activists in Kenya. They are of the opinion that the provisions of the bill 
conflicts with basic human rights because it provides for indefinite detention of 
terrorist suspects and confiscation of their assets among other provisions.472 But in 
October, 2011, the Bill was discussed again in the conference of Kenyan activists 
and legal experts.473 
On 12 October, 2012, the President of the country signed 'The Prevention of 
Terrorism Act, 2012, No 30 of 2012' which is an act of parliament to provide 





measures for the detection and prevention of terrorist activities; to amend the 
extradition (Commonwealth Countries) Act and the Extradition (Contiguous and 
foreign Countries) Act, and for connected purpose.474 It is made up of six (6) parts 
with fifty-three (53) Sections. The Act became effective on 24 October, 2012. 
Section 2 (m) (a) contains the definition of 'terrorist Act' and commission of 
terrorist act is provided under Section 4 of Part III of the Act. 
Nevertheless, Kenya has demonstrated its commitment to combat terrorism together 
with Uganda and Tanzania via the establishment of a joint East African Community 
(EAC) committee which coordinates activities against terrorism.475 Kenya has also 
expressed willingness to collaborate with the other IGAD Member States to fight 
terrorism. Just like Ethiopia, Kenya is also a party to many Protocols and 
Conventions relating to terrorism. 
In August 2010, Kenya passed a new Constitution, which allows it to apply 
International laws within its jurisdiction.476 They believe that the provision will be 
of immense help to the country in combating terrorism and other international 
crimes. They can prosecute terrorism using the provisions of the Money laundering 
law and organized crimes law, which was passed by Kenya's parliament.477 
474 See the beginning part of Kenya's Prevention of Terrorist Act, 2012, No 30 of2012. 
475 Prof. Knife Abraham., supra note 21 at 15. 
476The Constitution of Kenya, 2010. 
477 Kenya: law reforms boasts fight against terrorism and crimes. May 20, 2011. 
www.hiiraan.com/news/20 11 /may/kenya_ law _reforms_ boasts _fight_ against_terrorism _and_ crimes 
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Kenya's Prevention of Terrorism Act, marked a key legislative milestone in the 
fight against terrorism. Combined with the 2009 proceeds of crime and Anti-Money 
Laundering Act and the 201 0 Prevention of Organized Crime Act, Kenyan 
prosecutors have a robust suite of tools for bringing individuals and organizations to 
justice; tools which will also greatly facilitate international cooperation and mutual 
legal assistance in terrorism cases. Even, prior to the passage of the new law, 
Kenyan authorities began prosecution of two ongoing high-profile terrorist cases 
against Iranian citizens and alleged Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods 
Forces; persons Ahmad Abolfathi and Sayed Mansouri on explosive charges, and 
against British citizen Jern1aine Grant on charges of plotting to kill Western tourists 
on behalf of al-Qa'ida. 
Kenya is also a member of the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money 
Laundering Groups, a Financial Action Task Force (F ATF)-style regional body. 
The F ATF had previously highlighted the deficiencies in Kenya's anti-money 
laundering/combating the financing of terrorism regime and intimated possible 
counter-measures against Kenya. In response, Kenyan authorities developed and 
made significant progress on an action plan to address those deficiencies, including 
the establishment of the Financial Reporting Centre (FRC) and adoption of the 
Prevention ofTerrorism Act (POTA) in October.478 
Other measures within the State in combating terrorism are: the Ministry of Finance 
establishment of Task Force on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the 




Financing of Terrorism, consisting of representatives from finance, trade and 
foreign affairs ministries; the Central Bank; the police, the criminal investigation 
department (CID); and the National security intelligence service. These team seeks 
to review existing legislation and recommend a national policy on combating the 
fi . f . 479 mancmg o terronsm. 
Kenya is an important partner in the U.S Combined Joint Task Force-Hom of 
Africa (CJTF-HOA) in Dgibouti that seeks to check terrorism. This program 
envisages the U.S training of regional militaries in counter-terrorism procedures. 
Furthermore, as part of the multinational campaign, a special Anti-terrorism Squad, 
composed of the German Naval Air Wing, is currently based in Mombassa to 
monitor ships plying the gulf of Aden and the Somalia coast.480 
Kenya was an active law enforcement partner and participated in the Department of 
State's Anti-terrorism Assistance (ATA) program. ATA programs focused on 
strengthening border security, enhancing investigative capacity, promoting respect 
for human rights, and building critical incident response capacity through training, 
mentoring, advising and equipping Kenyan counter-terrorism- focused law-
enforcement agencies. Kenya also continued its partnership with the United States 
on expanding Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System, 
PISCES, border controls to additional ports of entry.481 
479 Special report: Terrorism in horn of Africa. Supra note 243. 
4so Id. 
481 U.S Department of State. Supra note 466. 
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Kenya is also a member of the AU, the Inter-Governmental Authority on 
Development, the Community of Eastern and Southern African, and the East 
African Community. The Kenyan government coordinated with these groups 
significantly during its military campaign against al-Shabaab militants in Somalia. 
Kenyan law enforcement agencies worked closely with the international 
community, including the United States, to increase their counter-terrorism abilities, 
secure porous land borders, and improve maritime security. Kenya hosted numerous 
trainings involving law enforcement professionals from neighbouring nations to 
build counter-terrorism capacities and increase regional cooperation. Kenya also 
cooperated with the United States and other nations to secure especially dangerous 
pathogens and enhance the Kenyan government's capability to prevent the sale, 
theft, diversion, or accidental release of chemical, biological or radiological 
weapons-related materials, technology and expertise.482 
4.6.4. SUDAN: 
Sudan had succeeded in convincing the UN to lift the terrorism related sanctions 
placed on it. In 1999, Sudan signed the International Convention for the 
Suppressing of Financing terrorism which showed that it is ready to cooperate in 
combating of international terrorism.483 The following year, 2000, it ratified the 
International Convention for Suppression of Terrorist Bombing, which led to the 
482 !d. 
483 State Sponsors: Sudan. WW\Y.cfr.orglsudanstate-sponsors-sudan 
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UN to lift the sanction against Khartoum, Sudan in 2001. Sudan also ratified the 
OAU Algiers Convention in 2003 and the same year signed Counter-Terrorism 
Agreement with Algeria, Yemen and Ethiopia. 
In 2000, the US and Sudan entered into a counter-terrorism dialogue, prompting 
Sudan to close down the popular Arab conference, which had been functioning as a 
forum for terrorists. In May 2003, Sudanese authorities raided a suspect terrorist 
training camp in Kardufan State, arresting more than a dozen extremists and seizing 
illegal weapons. Four months later, a Sudanese court convicted a Syrian engineer 
and two Sudanese nationals of training group of Saudis, Palestinians, and others to 
carry out attacks in Iraq, Eritrea, Sudan and Israel. In August 2004, Sudanese 
authorities arrested, prosecuted and convicted Eritrean who hijacked a Libyan 
aircraft and forced it to land in Khartoum.484In 2007, the US State Department 
called Sudan a 'strong partner in the war on terror', and praised Sudan for 
aggressively pursuing terrorist operations that threatened US interests.485 
The most significant development of Sudan's statute with US took place on 9 July 
2011, when the southern portion of the country seceded to become South Sudan. 
Notably, Sudan has an Anti-Terrorism Act, 2001, which vests jurisdiction of 
terrorist cases on special court known as Anti-Terrorism Courts. They also have 
Rules of Procedures for Anti-Terrorism Courts, 2008, which prescribes the 
484 Preeti Bhattacharji. State Sponsors: Sudan. Council foreign relations, 2008 at 4. 
485 Id. 
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procedures to be followed by the Anti-Terrorism Court in prosecuting terrorist 
case.486 
Human Rights activists are in opposition of the activities of the Anti-terrorism 
Courts on the ground that it infringes the International Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Laws, especially the Court's trial procedures and imposition of 
1 . 487 pena t1es. 
Sudan also has Anti-Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism 2010. It 
consists of 3 7 Articles and is the first comprehensive legislation for fighting money 
laundering and financing terrorism. The law was made as a substitute to the law 
combating money laundering 2003, so as to cope with the international legislative 
developments of fighting the money laundering phenomenon. 488 
Further, in 2014, the National Assembly endorsed the new Anti-terrorism and Anti-
Money Laundering Laws, thereby convincing the FA TF to remove them from list of 
countries classified as a high risk in the field of money laundering and anti-
terrorism. 
486 see Rules of Procedures for Anti-Terrorism Courts, 2008 
487 Sudan: End sham Trials by Anti-Terror Courts. April25, 2012. www. 
UNhcr.org/refworld/country,HRN,SDN,489c 1 b2614,o.html 
4881brahim Musa .,Sudan: terrorism and money laundering. August 7, 2010. 




Nigeria has "the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act" 
(EFCC), 2004. It also has another Anti-Terrorism legislation known as Terrorism 
(Prevention) Act, 2011, which was signed into law on June 3, 2011 by the president 
of the country, Goodluck Jonathan but the Act has an Amendment Act known as 
"Terrorism (Prevention) Amendment Act, 2013". 
The 2011 Act provides for the Prevention and Combating of Acts of Terrorism and 
for the Suppression of Financing Terrorism in Nigeria.489 It also emphasized on the 
effectiveness of OAU Algiers Convention, 1999. 
The Act did not define terrorism per se, but it provided for "Acts of Terrorism" and 
Related Offences. It also provided penalties for such acts. The power to prosecute 
the offender is vested on the Attorney General of the Federation (AG)490 and it also 
confers sole jurisdiction of trial of the offence and imposition of penalties under the 
Act on the Federal High Court.491 Section 33 of the Terrorism (Prevention) Act, 
2011 provides for penalties for terrorist offence and related offences, starting from 
one million naira (Nl, 000 000), and three years imprisonment to life imprisonment 
depending on the category of the crime. The Act also prescribed hostage taking as 
an act of terrorism,492 as described in Niger-Delta crises supra; invariably, 
489 see The Terrorism(Prevention) Act, 2011 
490 Id. at Section 30 
491 Id. at 32. 
492 Id. at II. 
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criminalizing and groupmg the Niger-delta cnses gomg on m the country as 
terrorist acts. 
But, the 2011 Act ensued heated debate among the members of the house that led to 
the amendment of the Act in 2012, by enacting the "Amendment Bill 2012" as an 
addendum to the existing Terrorism (Prevention) Act, 2011. However, there were 
obvious differences between the bills that prompted the re-submission of the two 
bills for review by both Chambers to reconcile the difference. The outcome of the 
reconciliation of the two Acts is the "Terrorism (Prevention) Amendment Act, 
2013". It is an Act which amends the 'Terrorism (Prevention) Act, 2011 ', makes 
provision for extra-territorial application of the Act and strengthens terrorist 
financing offence.493 
The Act altered some sections of the existing Terrorism (Prevention) Act of 2011 
by deletion and addition of new sections. Importantly, the 2013 Amendment Act 
provides "that anybody guilty of the offence under this Act is liable on conviction 
to maximum of death sentence".494 It also deleted Section 11 (Hostage taking) of 
the 2011 Act, but provided for the same offence of 'Hostage taking' in Section 15 
of the 2013 Amendment Act. 
The Nigeria incidence of January 24, 2011, in which the notorious Boko-Haram, 
Islamic sect, bombed Kano state, killing two hundred people, induced the Federal 
493 See the preamble ofTerrorism (Prevention) Amendment Act, 2013. 
494 Id. at Section 1. 
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government of the country to launch the Integrated Assistance for Countering 
Terrorism (I-ACT), projects on conflict prevention and internal Coordination and 
Information sharing among law enforcement.495 The law promotes information and 
intelligence sharing among law enforcement agencies in Nigeria, facilitated by the 
UN Counter-terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF).496 On April24, 2012, 
Nigeria military joint task force invaded a suspected Boko-Haram bomb factory in a 
suburb of the restive Northern city ofKano.497 
Nigeria is also a member of the Trans- Sahara Counter-terrorism Partnership 
(TSCTP), established in 2005, that is a US funded and implemented multi-faceted, 
multi-year effort designed to counter violent extremism and contain and 
marginalized terrorist organizations. TSCTP's core goals are to enhance indigenous 
capacities of government in the Pan-Sahel, to confront the challenge posed by 
terrorist organizations in the Trans-Sahara, and to facilitate cooperation between 
those countries and US partners in the Maghareb.498 
Furthermore, Nigeria is a member of the Inter-Governmental Action Group against 
Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA), a financial Action Task Force 
(F ATF)-style regional body. The country was publicly identified by the F ATF in 
February 2010 for the strategic anti-money laundering and combating the financing 
495 Victoria Ojeme FG launches counter terrorism projects. January, 25,2012. 
www. vanguard.com/2012/0 I /fg-launches-counter-terrorismprojects. 
496 Id. 
497 Ibrahim Garba.,Nigerian force raid suspected Boko-Haram bomb factory. April24, 2012. 
lYlYW.csmonitor.cm/world/ A frica/20 12120 12/0_:!24/nigerian-frce-raid-suspected-boko-haram-bomb-
factory 
498 U.S Department of State. Supra note 466. 
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of terrorism deficiencies. In October 2011, Nigeria was named in F ATF Public 
Statement for its lack of progress in implementing its action plan. In 2012, Nigeria 
made significant progress in addressing its outstanding deficiencies, including, 
through the adoption of amendments to its Money Laundering (Prevention) Act.499 
The Ministerial Plenary Meeting of the Global Counter-terrorism Forum (GCTF), 
Nigeria announced it would partner with Switzerland to co-host a Sahel Working 
Group meeting on combating the financing of terrorism in early 2013. In January, 
the UN Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force Launched three projects 
under the Integrated Assistance for Counter-Terrorism initiative to support Nigerian 
government efforts to combat terrorism. Nigeria is a lead member of the Economic 
Community of West Africa States and has committed ground forces and logistical 
support for a possible intervention force in Mali. Through its Office of the National 
Security Adviser, Nigeria has taken a lead role in initiating dialogue between 
regional countries on how they can better coordinate their efforts to confront 
networks of terrorist groups that span international boarders. 500 
Moreso, in response to the '200 missing school girls', abducted by Boko- Haram 
(discussed in Chapter two), Nigerian President accepted assistance of foreign 
countries in finding the missing girls that was kidnapped by Boko Haram. The 




include any military operations. 501 The U.S deployed a Military Surveillance 
aircraft to try and locate the students and dispatched hostage negotiation experts and 
other specialists to Nigeria. Britain also sent a team of experts and France had 
proposed holding talks among the leaders of Nigeria and nearby nations to discuss 
how to handle the situation. The Japanese indicated willingness to offer assistance 
to bring stability to the region and prevent violence against women. 502 
Also, by way of response to the Niger-Delta Crises, Nigerian government, in 
October 2009, persuaded all major militant leaders to renounce violence and 
surrender their arms in exchange for amnesty, government stipends, training 
opportunities, and pledges of greater development for the Niger-Delta. Most 
militant groups in the Niger Delta accepted the then president's offer of amnesty in 
2009, and the overall level of violence there declined. Although, the amnesty led to 
a sharp decline in attacks by militants, kidnapping for ransom, armed robberies and 
gang wars; fighting connected to the theft of crude oil ( known as illegal oil 
bunkering) continued and contributed to the region's general insecurity and lack of 
economic viability. 
By the end of 2012, at least twenty-six thousand, three hundred and sixty-eight 
(26,368) former militants had benefited in some way from the amnesty program. 
Many former militants received vocational training and stipends. At year's end five 
501 America officials in Nigeria to help find kidnapped girls as report says government had warning 
attack. www.foxnews.com 
502 See The Y~miuri Shimbun. World must quickly help rescue of abducted Nigeria School girls.; the 
Japan news ofMay 15,2014. 
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thousand, two hundred and eighty (5,280) former militants were undergoing 
vocational training, with one thousand, five hundred and thirty-eight (1,538) 
attending courses abroad. The amnesty program resulted in a sharp decline in 
militant violence in the region. 
Furthermore, with the establishment of a Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs, manned 
by indigenes of the area, it is expected that visible changes will occur in matters of 
youth employment, industrialization and the provision of amenities, that will finally 
end the crises in Niger-Delta. 
4.7. CONCLUSION. 
No doubt that most Member States have complied with the requirement of the OAU 
Algiers Convention 1999, by enacting anti-terrorism laws and other security laws in 
their respective nations, including establishment of criminal offences for terrorist 
act. But how effective are these laws in combating terrorism in their nations? 
Despite all these existing legislations on combating terrorism, terrorist acts are still 
on the increase in Africa. Most of these national anti-terrorism legislations are being 
criticized by legal experts and human rights activists on the ground that it infringes 
on International Human Rights and Humanitarian Laws. Is it therefore right to 
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conclude that, those national anti-terrorism legislations are not in compliance with 
the UN's requirements for combating of terrorism? 
A critical look at the three Conventions above shows that the OAU Algiers 
Convention 1999 got its foundational ideas and initiatives from the Arab 
Convention and OIC Convention, but undoubtedly enacted more precise anti-
terrorism Convention than the other two Conventions. Also, some of these Member 
States in OIC and Arab Convention are also members of the OAU Algiers 
Convention, as Stated before, and the Conventions defined terrorism in their own 
different ways; which of the definitions will the Member States, with multiple 
membership, be bound with? 
There is need for AU to review, amend, delete and add sections to its already 
existing Convention on terrorism, to reflect what is practicable within the capability 
of the continent, bearing in mind the Member States' economic and technological 
power, in combating terrorism as a nation. Convention should not merely be 
enacted to fulfil ones obligation under UN mandate. UN is interested m 
effectiveness of the Convention achieving its purpose. 
Therefore, duplicating or imitating a more advanced States' or regional conventions 
will not impede terrorist acts in Africa because they are economically and 
technologically sophisticated than Africa. Applicable laws in those regions should 




CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION. 
5.0. CONCLUSION. 
This dissertation has reviewed the OAU Conventions on Preventing and Combating 
terrorism and assessed its effectiveness in combating terrorism in the continent of 
Africa. 
Notwithstanding the highlighted pitfalls of the OAU Algiers Convention of 1999, 
the OAU Algiers Convention forms the major pillar for the enactment of other 
OAU (AU) legislations on peace and security in Africa. Comparatively, among the 
three conventions discussed in this dissertation (OAU Algiers Convention, 1999, 
Arab Convention, 1998 and OIC Convention 1999), some scholars had praised the 
OAU Convention as one of the best regional conventions on combating terrorism 
with a clearer definition of terrorist acts. 
But, arriving at appropriate implementation of the OAU Algiers Convention 1999 
remains an important task for the continent, despite the AU's action plans; 
especially because of poor economy level of Member States, porous boarders and 
lack of modern technologies in the continent for tracking down and prosecuting 
terrorist acts. 
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The purpose of the Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism 
was to provide a concrete expression to the commitment and obligations of African 
countries, to combat terrorism and to enhance their access to appropriate counter-
terrorism resources. It sought to provide robust guidelines and strategies for 
collective and individual state action against terrorism by incorporating continental 
and international standards for combating terrorism with particular attention to the 
provisions of resolution 1373.503 But this purpose has not been attained so far. Also, 
the presence of PSC neither increases the efficacy of the applicability of 1999 OAU 
Algiers Convention and its preventive measures nor combat terrorism itself. 
The biggest shortfall of Africa's engagement of the war on terror is the absence of 
an effective and efficient continental mechanism to support the required 
cooperation between states, give effect to the OAU Algiers Convention of 1999, 
implement its operative provisions and assist Member States to comply with 
international law and continental obligations. 504 
The international mandate to fight terrorism in the same way has generated an 
extraordinary level of compliance, but that compliance has been customized at the 
level of Member States, resulting in a set of laws that may not in fact provide the 
503 Martin Ewi and Kwesi Aning. Supra note 367. 
504 DuPlessis, Inus. The impact of war on Africa Security. 511/05 SREVSAFR 47 at 10. 
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common legal framework that the architects of the Security Council anti-terrorism 
resolutions had in mind.505 
It is difficult to discern clearly the practical impact of many of the regional 
conventions. At present, the sheer diversity of regional definitions is sufficient to 
militate against the view that there is any embryonic customary definition of 
terrorism. While some of the more recent treaties include generic definition of 
I terrorism, others have deliberately refrained from this, following the approach of 
the older regional treaties. Among those treaties which include generic definition, it 
is further difficult to discern any underlying shared conception of terrorism. As the 
International Court of Justice stated in the Asylum case, these treaties reflect 'so 
much uncertainty and contradiction, so much fluctuation and discrepancy ... that it 
is not possible to discern in all this any constant and uniform usage, accepted as 
law' .so6 
I 
The principal obligation in international treaties against terrorism is to incorporate 
the crimes defined in the treaty into the domestic criminal law and further to make 
them punishable with sentences that reflect the gravity of the offence. State parties 
also agree to participate in the construction of "universal jurisdiction" over these 
offences. Partly because of the lack of political will among a number of states to 
support the international cooperation against terrorism, and partly because of the 
belief that terrorism is a notion dependent on an individual's political belief, it has 
505 Kim Lane Scheppele. Supra note 372. 




so far been impossible to achieve a universal consensus on a comprehensive anti-
terrorism convention and on a universal definition of terrorism. 
International human rights law lays down obligations and duties which Party States 
are bound to respect and fulfil. This obligations means that States must refrain from 
interfering with or curtailing the enjoyment of human rights. The obligation to 
protect requires States to protect individuals and groups against human rights 
abuses. The obligation to fulfil means the states must be of positive action to 
facilitate the enjoyment of basic human rights. 507 
Through ratification of international human rights treaties, Government undertake 
to put into place domestic measures and legislation compatible with their treaty 
obligations and duties. The domestic legal system, therefore, provides the principal 
legal protection of human rights guaranteed under the international law. Where 
domestic legal proceedings fail to address human right abuses, the mechanisms and 
procedures for the individual and group complaints are available in the regional and 
international levels to help ensure that international human rights standard are 
indeed respected, implemented and enforced at the local level. 508 
A comparative analyses of five states' responses (Ethiopia, Somalia, Kenya, Sudan 
and Nigeria) demonstrates that economic level, security laxity, religious differences 
507 The foundation oflntemational Human rights Law. }YWw.un.org/en/document/udr/hr/law.shtml 
5os Id. 
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and political interest of Member States largely affect the effectiveness of combating 
terrorism in the continent. 
The difficulty of overcoming the politically subjective nature of terrorism remains a 
significant obstacle to the drafting of any comprehensive international anti-
terrorism treaty. International law has not emerged as an effective tool for 
prosecuting terrorism and is perhaps only "useful as a measure of international 
I concern and opinion ... .lacking methods and mechanisms for enforcement, it cannot 
be said to be an effective deterrent."509 
A number of human rights issues have arisen from OAU Algiers Convention 1999 
and its Member States domestic anti-terrorism laws designed to deal with terrorism. 
The Special Rapporteur on Terrorism and Human Rights notes that the 'definitional 
problem is the major factor in the controversy regarding terrorism', not believing 
that broad definitions of acts of terrorism can be justified. Since counter-terrorism is 
designed to address specific conduct, the necessary definitions ought to be 
d 1. d . h . . 510 e meate wit precisiOn. 
The provisions ofthe Convention, no doubt, appear to be in contravention to human 
rights law. For example; the right to freedom may be implicated under the 
Convention. Under Article 3 (b) of the OAU Algiers Convention 1999 for example, 
the definition of terrorist act includes 'any promotion, sponsoring ... incitement, 
509 Nathan A. Canestaro. Supra note 64. 
510 S. Iagwanth and F Soltau. Supra note 305. 
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encouragement. .. or procurement of such act'. Again, it would be difficult to justify 
such a blanket and far-reaching limitation of the right and unless it is carefully 
tailored to meet the ends of fighting terrorism.511 
Article 4 (b) and (e) ofthe OAU Algiers Convention 1999 deal with monitoring and 
data collection of terrorist elements of groups. Given that the scope of what 
constitutes terrorist elements of acts is extremely broadly defined, these provisions 
may constitute a serious violation of the right to privacy and may include the 
monitoring and collection of information on peaceful and non-criminal activity. 
Under some domestic laws, search and seizure provisions may also constitute an 
unjustifiable limitation on the right to privacy.512 OAU Algiers Convention 1999 
can also be said to be derogatory from human rights law because of death penalty 
imposed in the domestic laws of some Member States' anti-terrorism law. 
Since the classification of conduct of terrorism is frequently accompanied by an 
abridgement of procedural and fair safeguards, it is all the more crucial that the 
crime is precisely and restrictively defined. This is even more so when it is 
punishable by death. How to define terrorism is of course a particular vexed issue. 
It is important that States, when adopting such measures, be vigilant about ensuring 






On the other hand, despite these requirements of obligations from Member State to 
comply with the norms of international human rights law, strict adherence to such 
obligations will gravely affect the effectiveness of combating terrorism. Terrorism 
has no justification. Terrorists themselves are not exempted from these obligations 
being citizens of a State. Although, human rights and humanitarian laws are also 
necessary in combating terrorism, priority should be given to social stability, than 
securing an individual's right at a very critical moment, especially when the 
individual is a perpetrator of terrorist act. 
A terrorist cannot claim an infringement of fundamental human right when he is 
also guilty of violation of human rights. The equitable maxim of 'whoever that 
comes into equity must come with clean hands" should never be dispensed with'. 
Human rights activists should think towards reviewing the laws, especially as it 
relates to 'combating terrorist acts'; find the proper balance between counter-
terrorism and human rights law, bearing in mind the extreme cruelty of terrorist acts 
against innocent people. 
The menace posed by international terrorism which demands both national and sub-
regional concerted action is, for instance, manifest in the policy pronouncements of 
Kenya, Uganda, the Sudan, Ethiopia and other IGAD Member States. An official of 
the Ethiopian government had made this very clear when he stated, "it is obvious 
that no matter how economically and militarily strong a state may be, it cannot 
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alone fight terrorism."514 Again, in order to avoid conflicts and find the proper 
balance between counter-terrorism and Human Rights law in Africa, there should 
be a 'Universal Court' vested with terrorist jurisdiction. 
5.1. RECOMMENDATIONS: 
Solely, obligations and cooperation on the part of Member States of OAU Algiers 
Convention 1999, as mandated under the OAU Algiers Convention, are not enough 
to combat terrorism; except where it is in common interest of the Member States 
concerned, as clearly discussed under extradition in chapter three of this 
dissertation. Concurring with the Ethiopian government official, who said that no 
matter how strong a nation may think it is; it cannot combat terrorism alone. Joint 
effort by all Member States will be the most effective approach to eradicate 
terrorism in Africa. 515 
Most Member States of the AU are financially incapacitated in combating terrorism 
alone as a nation. The AU should uphold the most important element of their 
Charter which is "solidarity, development of friendly relations and cooperation 
among Member States"; and help the less privileged States combat terrorism, not 
just by mere encouraging or urging Member States to cooperate or offer legal 
514 Prof. Knife Abraham. Supra note 222 at 11. 
515 See supra note 453. 
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mutual assistance to one another, but, by combating same under one umbrella of a 
universal court. 
The OAU Algiers Convention of 1999 needs to be amended by AU in order to 
make it an effective law enforcement instrument for combating terrorism. Such 
amendment should include establishment of 'universal court' vested with 
jurisdiction of terrorism, to deal with this terrible phenomenon, which is beyond the 
capacity of any one country to handle alone; or in alternative, confer jurisdiction of 
terrorism on the already existing African Court on Human and People's right.516 
Parts IV and V of the OAU Algiers Convention 1999, focusing on Extradition and 
extra-territorial investigation, should also be amended to remove the limitations 
attached to it, under which a Member State shall not extradite or refuse to legally 
assist another. General procedure for arraignment of a terrorist offender in a 
universal court should be included in the Convention, so that even if the offender 
flees the State in which the crime was committed, the offender cannot escape 
punishment. 
Most importantly, the OAU Algiers Convention of 1999 created an avenue for 
amendment under its Article 21 (2) and (3), which provides thus: 
"This Convention may be amended if a State 
516 The AU has African Court on Human and People's right, which came into being in January 2004. 
the court is vested with the jurisdiction over all cases and disputes submitted to it concerning the 
interpretation and application of the African Charter on Human and People's rights, the Charter, the 
Protocol, and any other relevant human rights instruments ratified by the States. See Article 28 of the 




Party makes a written request to that effect to 
the Secretary General of the Organization of 
African Unity ... 
2. The amendment shall be approved by a simple 
majority of the State Parties. It shall come into 
force ... received notice of the acceptance. " 
It should therefore, amend the Convention, through the prescribed procedure of 
Article 21(2) and (3) supra, to include establishment of universal court for trial of 
terrorist offences, appoint qualified personnel to handle terrorist offences; in the 
absence of conferment of terrorism jurisdiction on the African court. The 
establishment of the universal court will facilitate the tracking, investigation, arrest, 
trial and punishment of terrorist acts. 
More so, there is already a universal acceptable definition of terrorist act in the 
OAU Algiers Convention 1999517 by the Member States. AU also has a multilateral 
agreement for extradition and extra territorial investigations and mutual 
assistance,518 which can be conveniently handled by a centralized judicial body for 
the Union. 
Combating terrorism in Africa should be moved from national level to regional 
level for effective preventing and combating terrorism. 
517 Article 1(3) ofthe OAU Algiers Convention 1999. Supra note 26. 
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